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DFT
SKETCHES







Aug 10. 1803

SKETCHES
ON THE INTRINSIC STRENGTH,
MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCE
OF
FRANCE AND RUSSIA;
WITH REMARKS
ON THEIR PRESENT CONNEXION,
POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND FUTURE
PROJECTS.

Mihi Galba, Otho, Vitellius, nec
beneficio nec injuriâ cogniti.

TACIT.


IN TWO PARTS.

PART I.

HAGUE, 1803. ✓

LONDON:

SOLD BY J. BUDD, CROWN AND MITRE, FALL MALL.



P R E F A C E.

Sketches of France

When individuals venture to communicate their private opinions, or to expose any thing which they may consider as useful information to the world, it seems to be a standing *etiquette*, to apologize to the public for intrusion. The following sketches are published from the same motives which induced us to write them, viz an attachment to our country, and an anxious desire for its prosperity and preservation: these render apology unbecoming. Travelling on the continent, our remarks were printed at different periods, some parts of the subject are therefore, not so methodically connected, nor could the whole be revised so accurately, as might have been wished. The statements and facts however, may be relied on, and the opinions we have advanced will very soon be tried. As to the

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approbation, or censure of garret critics, the consequential hum of place-men, or the sneer of official politicians, they are to us perfectly indifferent: the errors of the press we must leave to the intelligent reader to correct.

The powers of the several states of Europe being relative, and the national existence of each in particular, now immediately depending upon its own strength only, as a preliminary to a general investigation, we have, in the following sheets, given a statement of the national sources and military force of our most formidable neighbours.

For some of the facts stated, particularly those relating to the defence of Great Britain; by the construction of safe naval stations on the eastern coast of the island, the statements of the naval force of the several powers of Europe, particularly of the northern states, and the remarks on the armed neutrality, we are indebted to a gentleman with whom we casually met on the continent, whose name, were we at liberty to mention it, would add weight to what we have advanced on these subjects. We take this opportunity

to return him thanks for the ideas and information, which, we probably could not have obtained through any other channel; and we trust, he will excuse the use we here apply them to, as we know it to be his desire as well as our own, to contribute to the welfare and prosperity of our common country.

With respect to France, — The formalities of law, the shackles of property, the embarrassments of ancient usage, common prejudice and partial rights, have all disappeared before the potent *sabre* of a military chief. If Bonaparte, or any other man possessing talents and character, be able to maintain an unlimited authority at the head of the French nation, and keep alive, upon interior improvement, that energy and vigour which the revolution has brought forth amongst that people, the intrinsic sources of the European dominions of France are such, that their produce may soon enable the chief consul to carry into effect the most gigantic projects of his revolutionary predecessors.

In the following pages, we have stated, that the produce of agriculture on the present territories of

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the republic, will, in all probability, exceed that of old France, by one third part in the space of ten years from this time. We are daily more and more convinced that to this statement, a considerable allowance may still be added. A community agitated by rebellion, civil or foreign war, becomes capable of efforts, which, to whatever pursuit they are directed, rapidly surpass the ordinary routine of nations in quiet security. To whatever part of the civilized world we turn our researches, we find that all great national works owe their origin and extent, more to that vigour of thought and action, which political broils and military warfare never fail to infuse into civil society, than to all the arts of drowsy opulence in peace. The present government of France seems fully sensible of this fact. Since the time of Czar Peter I, there has no man appeared at the head of public affairs, in any state in Europe, who has dared to attempt useful works of national improvement, that bear any sort of resemblance to those already carrying into execution by the first consul. (It is perhaps a pity Bonaparte had not been leading minister under a legitimate government!)

From the best authorities, as well as from our own knowledge of facts, we have said that 15 per cent raised as a medium assessment on the national income of the republic, would produce an annual revenue of L. 30,000,000 sterling. We are strengthened in this statement, the consulate having announced its intention to diminish the imposts on the soil and agriculture, which, at this time, amount to about 20 per cent on the income. Besides the resources of ordinary taxation, the French government has yet in reserve an immense fund in case of emergency; we mean, the so called national property, which, during the rage of the revolution was bought with *assignats*. There is no doubt that a call will be made upon the possessors of this property. The assertions of British writers, setting forth the misery and oppression which they pretend pervade the interior of France, are written either with a profound ignorance of facts, or with a design to lull their abused country into a fatal security. We speak from ocular evidence, having within these last twenty months visited every department of that vast republic.

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Upon the manufactures of France, we have said but little. The multiplicity of negative laws and restrictions with which ignorance and venality load all sorts of competition in universal industry, prevent a reciprocity of trade, and renders it impossible to form a calculation upon the progress, or benefits of any branch of manufacture, trade or commerce. The natural advantages and political superiority of the French nation, might soon render that country the work-shop and emporium of the world. But to act upon advantages that nature has pointed out, seems beneath the dignity of modern governments: perhaps, beyond the economical knowledge of Bonaparte! Modern legislators have *calico-printers*, *sugar-planter's* and *corn-factors* for their oracles on national economy. For the privilege of enhancing the price of the conveniences and necessaries of life to the community, these give *douceurs*; pay custom and excise; and the treasury is the key-stone of all cabinets. The common interest of society is not the concern of *common* ministers. In most countries, the duration of the state seems to be but a secondary consideration with its rulers.

The fisheries and maritime trade of France must yet depend upon several circumstances. Should Bonaparte be able to secure the possession of St. Domingo and Louisiana, no impartial man can, we think, entertain a doubt; but France, governed by common sense, must inevitably become the first commercial state in Europe. With these two settlements, Lisbon and Madrid, it can certainly not be denied that the consulate may govern the trade of America; masters of the Mediterranean, of Algiers and Morocco, governors of Constantinople; Bassora and the Cape under their orders, they must likewise have strong pretensions to a share of the trade of Asia and Africa. We are told by the political English writers of the day, that, "for want of ability to make loans, France has lost the whole of her capital; that all commercial intercourse with her is interrupted, and that her credit is cut up by the very roots!" We are however not informed who has acquired her property or become richer by her losses; nor is it said, how, or by whom her commerce is now, or hereafter, to be interrupted; and that the very roots of

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her credit should be plucked up for want of debt to keep them down, is a phenomenon, which we have not been able to get explained, neither on the exchange of London nor Hamburg. In our statements, we by no means wish to depreciate the support which ministers may derive from the demonstrations of hired and speculative politicians; but we are persuaded, that were the possessions and real productive capital of the French republic laid into one scale, and all the sources of commercial wealth and maritime power which we yet possess in security put in the other, to keep the balance even, would require materials of more weight and solid value than the eloquies that have been written on the treaty of Amiens. Settlements, fully sufficient to maintain our naval superiority, are *yet* within our reach it is true; but to attempt the acquisition of them in time, is, we are afraid, a measure by far too bold for our ordinary politics!

As to the military force of France, we have said, that it is equal to the military force of the rest of Europe, Russia excepted. Since our statements were

sent to the press we have seen the consul make French soldiers of all the males in Switzerland: In a few weeks we shall hear that he has made Spanish soldiers of the Portuguese; that he has ordered legions to be organized for his service in Candia, Cyprus, and perhaps in Sicily. The military power of France is rapidly rising to command the world; and, as if Bonaparte guided the measures of all his powerful neighbours, his only formidable rival Alexander I. seems principally occupied in building kitchens à *le Baron Vogba*, and teaching cooks to make *Rumford-broth*. It is truly lamentable to see well-meaning sovereigns planting in every corner of their dominions the pestiferous institutions of those *errant-quacks*, that is, seminaries of idleness, indigence, and vice.

With respect to the politics of the French republic, we have said, it is to acquire an universal ascendancy raised upon natural sources sufficient to maintain a preponderating power. Acting upon this principle, the French calculate their measures upon permanent things; to facilitate the realization of their plans, they carefully analize the characters of leading

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4men; and when a favourable moment occurs, they carry their measures into effect with military precision. Had general Washington still governed America, we should not yet have heard of any obstruction to the trade on the Mississippi; had Peter I. or even Catherine II. now governed Russia, general Brune would not have commanded on the Bosphorus: nor could the consul be certain that every English minister would have given up to him the property and command of Malta, the command of the Cape, the *disposal of Lisbon* and the property of Brasil; Bonaparte cannot therefore be blamed if he make the passive indifference of other governments subservient to the advancement of his own.

We have said, that the reduction of the power of Great Britain is the principal consideration which now occupies the cabinet of the chief consul; we have the authority of Bonaparte's personal affirmation to that effect, to wit: his state of the republic laid before the legislative body on the 22d February. It is observed in the following sketches, that a nation *without a soul* cannot be formidable to its neighbours nor safe within itself. When the consul drew up his said address

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to the nominal legislators of the republic, he must certainly have been firmly persuaded that *John Bull* had already given up his ghost! Bonaparte is, we presume, acquainted with the history of his country so far, as to know, that if there remained in Great Britain the most feeble ray of British spirit, or a spark of national patriotism, the conduct of France since the treaty, more properly the *treasonable truce*, of Amiens, aggravated by his weekly menaces, especially by the before mentioned *manifesto*, would inevitably meet with its well merited chastisement. He knows, that every man of common sense must see, that here is no question about this or that colony; about import-duties on wine and porter, nor about diplomatic etiquette, the present question is *the national existence of the British empire*; that existence the French government is determined to destroy. We trust however, that our condescension will not go so far as to justify the consul's calculations on the facility of our subjugation.

With respect to Russia we have only repeated what has long been notorious, that a prince of talents and character, at the head of that empire might soon place

himself at the head of our eastern continent. Should however Bonaparte prove supple enough, to occupy the Cabinet of Petersburgh with the form and cut of new caps and cloaks for the relations of the empress, until France shall fix her dominion on the banks of the Bosphorus, the hitherto irresistible career of Russia may meet with a check. We are sorry to see the present emperor figuring in that contemptible caricature, the extraordinary deputation of the German empire at Ratisbon. A place more analogous to the rank of the successor of Czar Peter I. would be at the head of a convention of legitimate governments, to secure the world from general pillage and final subjection.

We have reprobated our quarrel with the northern states — first, because the object of that war was not worth to Great Britain the *little finger* of a British sailor, secondly because it proved to the world an obstinate adherence to the most despicable principle in politics that ever was countenanced by the government of a great nation, viz that of avenging upon weaker neighbours, wrongs received from powerful enemies! That Denmark and Sweden were accomplices with Russia, was to those who were acquainted with the circumstances, a futile, absurd pretext — and thirdly, because that war, without producing any sort of bene-

fit to Great Britain, organized and cemented an universal combination of hostile enmity against the British empire. We must however avow, that the noble Lord, who commanded the attack upon the Danish hulks in Copenhagen-roads, acquitted himself of his charge, in a manner which entitles him to the *lasting* gratitude of his country.

We have made some remarks upon the indecent behaviour, pitiful intrigues, and ostentatious ignorance, of that part of the English diplomacy, which for these last twelve years has been placed *north of the Elbe*. But as we shall in the second part of these sketches, give an analysis of the public negotiations and ministerial conduct of these gentlemen, we will here only observe that if it be necessary to pension such men, it would be less detrimental to the public, if they consumed their annuities at home: public ministers abroad are generally looked upon as the skirts of the government to which they belong, and foreigners are apt to estimate the value of the robes, hung round a throne, by the quality of the fringes.

We have recommended a friendly intercourse and close political connexion between Great Britain, Russia and America. Such may yet be brought about notwithstanding Bonaparte's late declaration to the con-

trary; and such is perhaps the only combination of power that can now be formed sufficient to bridle the domineering audacity of the French republic. Any partial alliance or treaty for subsidy, which Great Britain can make on the continent of Europe, can only produce the instantaneous subjugation of the continental party. But to form a permanent connexion with the government of the Russian empire, and to defeat the Jacobine machinations of France in America and in our settlements abroad, the British government *must* resume a British character, and adopt a system of politics analogous to the present situation of the world and to the political state Europe. Honesty and candour in negotiations; bold simplicity in public measures, and vigorous perseverance in their execution, may yet save the state. Such are now become necessary.

Hague March 1803.

NB.

At the bottom line of Note 9 Page 17 read: *two 7ths.* instead of *two 5ths.*

At the bottom line of Note 11 Page 22 read: *two shillings* instead of *one.*

INTRODUCTION.

It is a common phrase, that, as nations have their rise and their maturity, so they must in rotation, submit to decline and decay.

The history of mankind seems to favour this loose remark; but in the nature of things, there is certainly no moral necessity that a body politic become decrepit by years; nor that wealth and dominion must enfeeble a State. On the contrary, it is by experience that the organic laws of society are improved and made perfect; wealth well administered creates and fortifies power; and dominion, that is held by sage laws, and supported by firm authority, will always consolidate itself.

It cannot indeed, be denied, that most of the ancient, as well as of the modern states and empires, mentioned in history, have begun to decline as soon as they ceased to rise. But this vicissitude in human

affairs, wonderful as it may appear, is certainly to be accounted for, without having recourse to the decrees of mysterious destiny.

To organise a confused multitude into civil society, to raise troops of errant marauders to political rank and consequence, are events that have been produced in every quarter of the globe, and in all ages. The causes, have, in every country always originated in nearly the same source; to wit, the natural propensity of man to better his condition. When any circumstance presents to him, a probability of success, he musters up all his faculties; and as a sort of mutual sympathy, pervades every active community, and unites the efforts of all its members in one common pursuit; — if the object be sufficiently plausible, it inspires the whole with a moral energy that frequently seems to carry the physical powers of man beyond their natural standard. Hence we find, that wars for conquest, have always been the most productive in extraordinary achievements; and when well conducted, they are generally successful.

When nations arrive at a certain meridian of power and wealth, their rulers are apt to pause, and rely on a presumptive security; the public generally then begin to temperate their pursuits with

enjoyments. This stage is called their maturity; and it is the most critical period of their existence. Here, the energy of the public mind beginning to mollify, soon degenerates into effeminacy. The seductive powers of enjoyment beget the neglect of public duty, and the security of the state is placed upon the wealth of the nation. The primitive discipline of religion and morality relax, venality and abuse of power intermix with public trust; partial considerations assume the importance of national concerns; rank and privilege absorb the spirit and energy of the people. When these vices are rooted, they unman the nation, unmoralize the public, and bring forth injustice and oppression: discontent and faction, inseparable companions, then succeed, and either tear the state to pieces, or sink the nation into the drowsy arms of indigence and apathy.

That such should be the invariable course of all states, is remarkable indeed; and it appears almost like a fatality; especially, as the dissolution of great nations has ever been foreseen and timely enough predicted, to have prevented their fall.

But how, prevent the fall of a nation once corrupt? And who is to make the attempt? Its rulers! — they have its property at their disposal, they can

cover their ignorance and justify their crimes with the arms and the blood of the subject; their reputation is interwoven with the vices of the state, and can only be supported by the progress of corruption. What should induce such men to exchange the sweets of power, wealth and ease, and submit to the rigid discipline of virtue, honor and glory. (*) The ascendence of vice is such, that, men once initiated into its habits, cannot, to save property, reputation, nor even life itself, be torn out of its downy bonds. And can a state, in its career to destruction, be arrested, but by its rulers? To demur upon the measures of a vicious government is disaffection; to offer advice is sedition; and to remonstrate is treason and rebellion. Where then seek patriotism! and to what purpose? (²)

(¹) We speak of a corrupt nation sunk into a state of depravity.

(²) Treason, rebellion and patriotism, are the most emphatical expressions in legislative and political language; and yet they are remarkably arbitrary and ill defined; they are all three indiscriminately applied, to public virtue, to villainy, and to regicide. When generous efforts to save a falling country fail, their authors are held up as traitors and rebels to universal execra-

IN MONARCHICAL STATES, should the public be sunk into depravity and torpid indifference, there is still a remedy. In the nature of things, an hereditary monarch is an hereditary patriot. His personal dignity, power and safety, as well as all the interests of his family, depend entirely upon the rank and prosperity of his subjects. He can have no concerns, neither private, nor public considerations, but in the happiness and welfare of the community; nor can he have any party but that of the nation. Such is the nature of civil society, that a government, sunk beneath the level of public esteem and the state on the brink of destruction, a hopeful Sovereign, can yet by an energetic arm, raise the one to public admiration, and rouse up and save the other, from evident ruin. Such a sovereign can, by a single nod of command, fill the public functions of the state, with respect, experience, vigorous in-

tion, and then punished. When, with patriotism for their parole, a band of assassins in pursuit of pillage and rapine, wade through carnage and desolation to the throne, and reeking with the blood of their sovereign assume his place; they are received as the friends and acknowledged as the cousins and brothers of all the other rulers of mankind.

tegrity and known talents. (1) And nothing more was ever wanted, to perpetuate the government and existence of any nation, once settled and independent of its neighbours.

(1) Such a government will always have the will, the physical and moral powers of the nation at its unconditional disposal. With these — to consolidate the rank and prosperity of a once independent state, it is only necessary, to make the wealth of the nation, the spring of national industry, and combine enjoyment with morality, so as to make both stimulus to public spirit and national improvement.



SKETCH OF THE PRESENT STATE OF EUROPE.

In European Politics, it has been a long standing maxim, that every state is to consider its own safety, elevation and prosperity, as more or less depending upon the decline and ruin of its neighbours. It is in this vicious system, that, all the evils, we hear so loudly complained of, in every quarter, seem to originate. It has long excluded from the national councils of all countries, that candor and public honor, by which they should ever be governed; and has converted state politics, into circumvention, fraud and military usurpation.

This sort of Cabinet Warfare, has rendered war, and bloodshed almost permanent. To keep up numerous armies, annual levies from the labouring class of the people have become inevitably necessary; and to maintain these armies, with their

heavy appendages, the industry of the labourer, left at home, is over burdened and rendered insufficient. For these many years, the annual increase of the public expenditure, has, in every European state, far surpassed the progression of national improvement. To make up the deficiency, or to augment the revenues of the government, legislators have obstinately adhered to a system of taxation, which necessarily diminishes the produce of national industry. In all countries, financiers have long proceeded by the same mechanical routine; they add impost to impost, upon the earnings of the poor; (*) they tax the caprice of the rich (†) and by trivial economy bridle the circulation of movable capital. By this ridiculous mode of raising a public revenue, public industry is depressed, the enjoyments

(*) Excise capitulation, conscription and corvées, with other such vexations, benumb the hands of labor, and extinguish every spark of patriotism and of generous sentiment; they render the laws and ordinances of the state, odious, disrespected, and make perjury a joke; — we had almost said a necessity.

(†) Of all objects of taxation, men's whims and caprices are certainly the most absurd. They are arbitrary in their nature and nugatory in effect.

of the rich are curbed, and the patriotism of the great is rusted into a cankered contempt. These, with the inability of some sovereigns and the obstinate timidity of others, have deprived the public of every hope of improvement, or reform, and as a consequence, deprived governments of the confidence and cordial support of the public.

These circumstances have contributed more to promote the spirit of discontent and revolution, than all the philosophical sophistry that ever was written. (e)

As matters now stand, the political powers and military force of continental Europe, are to be considered, as concentered in the governments of France and Russia. These two states, have, each in its sphere, fought themselves over the frontiers of resistance; in understanding with one another, no power, or combination of powers can check, or

(e) It was not, although generally said, and universally believed, the doctrine of Freemasonry, or the metaphysical reasonings of Voltaire, Rousseau and others, that turned the heads of the people and brought about the present disorganisation of Europe. The people seldom read these kinds of writing, nor do they understand them.

It is feeling, and not reading, which alienates a nation from its rulers. When metaphysical po-

interrupt the operations of either of them. South of the Danube and the Elbe, Europe is directly and indirectly subject to France; and the coasts of Barbary and Morocco will forthwith be colonized under her authority. North of the Elbe and Danube to the Frozen ocean, is under the dominion, and immediate control of Russia; Asiatic Turkey and Persia may also soon fall under her yoke. If Austria and Prussia assume a sort of independency of one another, that very assumption secures the dependency of both, upon the Czar and the Consul: no doubt it will therefore be allowed, and encouraged, until both these governments can be dispensed with. How long the chiefs of those two mighty empires may agree, and continue to pursue their present system, cannot, perhaps at this moment be determined; we shall therefore, in as far as relates to their neighbourhood, political

liticians and disappointed courtiers, see that their arguments can be demonstrated in the ignorance and immorality of the public functionaries, and confirmed by the craving necessities of the laborious classes of the community, then — but not till then — they raise the standard of insurrection and rebellion.

ties and commercial intercourse with Great Britain, consider both France and Russia in their present state, and as they now stand relatively to the British Empire.

F R A N C E.

No matter who commands there, nor what denomination the government may assume; it is a nation possessing immense natural sources of wealth, power, and political influence.

Situated as France is, under an excellent climate, and with an arable, easily worked soil, agriculture must always be the staple branch of her national industry, and the principal source from which she must draw her political influence and military power.

Soil

Prior to the revolution, agriculture in France, was nearly in the same state in which we find it still in every country in continental Europe: about two fifths of the land susceptible of cultivation, were, in what is termed culture and pasturage; and produced, upon an average, about one 3d of what ordinary

culture, upon the like quantity of the same soil, would have produced. Notwithstanding that wretched economy, the government drew, from the produce of agriculture, alone - L. St. 8,000,000
The clergy, with religious and charitable institutions, drew, from the same source, upwards of - - - - - L. St. 8,000,000
The feudal and honorary dues, paid to the nobility, with *corvees*, militia &c, amounted at least to - - - - - L. 5,000,000
So that exclusive of the rents of the land paid, to the Lay-proprietors, and of the duties of excise, consumption and the like; the produce of the soil was charged annually with upwards of L. St. 21,000,000.
By the realization of the church and crown domains, of the tithes, feudal and honorary dues; and, by the abolition of the religious orders, charitable institutions and *corvees*, the whole of this sum, may now be appropriated, to a part of the public revenue.

In every country in Europe, and especially in France, agriculture is susceptible of great melioration; the entire abolition of privileges and the almost total subversion of property, has laid open an immense field for speculation; which the vigor

of the present government, seems not ill calculated to encourage.

However, as the cultivation of the soil, has long been, and may yet, long continue to be, but a secondary consideration with the governments of Europe, we shall suppose, that improvement in the agriculture of France, may still be left to individual enterprise; and in that case, with the acquisition of the conquered countries and considering the changes, which the several orders of the community have undergone, we must allow, that in the space of ten years from this time, the produce of the soil of the Republic, will exceed the ordinary produce of old France, by one 3d. at least (⁷). Add to this, what

- (⁷) Under the monarchy, the manor rents of the clergy in France, (exclusive of their tithes of L. 3,600,000 Sterling), amounted to about 120 millions of livres or L. St. 4,800,000
 The domains of the crown, & of the princes of the blood rented for 1,200,000
 The territorial rents of the sovereign princes and clergy in Brabant, Germany and Italy, viz, in the conquered countries, exclusive of tithes, *covées* & taxes, amounted to 1,000,000
 together Sterling L. 6,000,000

may reasonably be presumed, that the government will introduce an intelligible system of impartial reparation, by which the amount of the territorial imposts, may be clearly ascertained and fairly collected (*), and then, it will appear, that without adding

These lands were worth double the rent at which they were charged. And, should the present government obtain the confidence of the public, we may safely estimate the future rental of the same property at L. 10,000,000 Sterling.

In all probability, the exportation of corn will be entirely forbidden in France. And that measure will greatly encourage & spur on improvement in agriculture. Nothing can be more detrimental to the improvement & prosperity of a nation, than, the exportation of grain. This fact might easily be demonstrated; indeed, to be convinced of its pernicious effects, we have only to look at those wretched countries where that trade is most generally carried on. A state that exports corn, and a farmer who sells fodder improve by the same negative progression.

- (*) To lay an impartial tax upon the produce of any property, the nature and amount of the property itself, must first be ascertained. To tax a ship

to the taxes, raised under the ministry of M. Necker, the produce of the soil, of the present dominions of the republic, would, in less than the period we have granted, yield a sum of L. 31,500,000 sterling. But as the taxes upon the rental of the soil, and upon the produce of agriculture now, only bear at the rate of about five 7ths of what the imposts and tithes were, under the monarchy, we shall estimate the territorial revenue of the republic, as it may be expected to stand, at the end of ten years of peace; viz, at - - - - - L. 22,000,000

for 100 tons, when she carries only 90. and to assess a still for 30 gallons, which holds 40, would be equally unjust & ridiculous. Yet, we find, that, in every country in Europe, all imposts upon the soil are laid on in this random manner.

It is impossible for any goverment to know the real intrinsic sources & powers of the state, or to lay on a fair land-tax, without having first an exact topographical survey of every hundred acres it contains, & a faithful cadastre of the nature & quality of every single acre of the soil. To tax land by the public rental, is fallacious; and to tax the produce, is unjust, because industry will be overcharged — and indolence exempted.

To these *twenty two* millions, may be added an excise, or duty on the consumption of those who live detached from the soil, but who subsist by manufactures and trade, created by its produce, and by the consumption of the cultivators and proprietors &c. The amount of this consumption duty, may be justly estimated at - - - - L. St. 8,000,000.

Thus agriculture, and the other branches of industry maintained upon the produce of the soil, may, in the course of a very few years, raise to the government of France, a secure permanent and growing revenue of L. 30,000,000 sterling and upwards.

What we consider as a secure permanent revenue, is that, which arises out of the internal sources of the nation, without inconveniency to the public; and, which neither war, political, nor commercial differences with other states, can in any wise affect. Duties upon foreign trade, distant colonies, luxuries and such things, cannot be considered as coming under that description. Portugal and Holland had colonies; and Spain yet possesses empires beyond the seas; but the British navy has long controled both the trade and revenues of them all: *Luxuries depending upon individual caprice, are still more uncertain.* To what ever rank, power and wealth a na-

nation may have risen, its stability must necessarily depend on the strength and management of its natural sources. (9)

We have stated, that under the monarchy, the rental and raw produce of the soil, was charged with about twenty one, say Lst. 20,000,000.

The excise and consumption duties, raised at the barriers of the several divisions of the kingdom, in the cities, towns and villages, on the produce of agriculture amounted to L. St. 6,000,000.

————— L. St. 26,000,000.

The expense of collecting.

We have the authority of Necker and others, to say, that upwards of 300,000 persons were employed in the collection of the revenue. The

(9) We would not be understood, as wishing to give any opinion upon the propriety of raising the whole revenue of the government of France, upon the produce of agriculture: we speak merely as to the easy practicability, of drawing, the immense sum of Thirty millions sterling, from the soil of the territory of the republic. And that, not only without adding to the former burdens of the cultivators, or creating any new inconvenience to the public; but even after reducing their taxes by two $\frac{1}{5}$ ths. of what was paid under the old system.

subsistence of three hundred thousand men, would, in any part of Europe in Necker's time, have cost at least - - - - L. St. 6,000,000.

In all countries, those employed to collect the public revenues, and to hunt after smugglers, are considered, as being taken from the dregs of society, and capable of every species of baseness and corruption: we may therefore estimate the thieveries, and extortions of such a number of these *gentry*, together, with what they would receive as bribes and douceurs, for connivance, - - at - - L. St. 6,000,000.

The produce of the labor of 300,000 men, employed in useful industry, over and above their subsistence, must have been worth to the community, at least - - - L. St. 3,000,000.

L. St. 15,000,000.

Anticipations, discount, and gratuities to the financiers, spies and informers.

From the American war to the breaking out of the revolution, the anticipations upon the revenue, or the advances made to government, by the Farmer generals and others, were seldom under ten, or twelve millions sterling: and never cost less than from 12 to 15 per-cent. These, with other *agiotage* or stock-jobbing, and the immense fortunes, amassed by all those who were, in any wise, concerned in

the finance department, amounted, we will say, to only - - - L. St. 5,000,000, which, with the fifteen millions, make LSt. 20,000,000.

Of these twenty millions, four $\frac{1}{5}$ ths, at least, fell upon the proprietors, cultivators and consumers of the produce of agriculture; say ('^o) L. 16,000,000. which, with the twenty six millions as, at page 17, make - - - - L. 42,000,000.

So that, the rental and the produce of the territory of old France were charged with *forty two millions sterling*. ('¹) Or with two fifths more an-

(^o) The duties on foreign trade and on the consumption of foreign articles in France, produced, at the highest calculation, only about one $\frac{1}{5}$ th. part of the annual revenue: and being confined to few ports, they employed only about one $\frac{1}{5}$ th. of the collectors and runners. Necker tells us, that upwards of 240,000 of that pestiferous crew, were occupied, in collecting the *vingt iemes*, the *taille*, *capitation* and such like imposts.

(¹) An immense sum: — and it proved that the natural sources of that country, well managed, were inexhaustible. Yet the paltry deficit of twenty two millions of french livres, made the sottish ministry lose the *kingdom & their sovereign*.

Towards the latter period of the monarchy, it was

nually, than thirty millions would be upon the present extent and population of the republic.

impossible to establish any reasonable system of finance in France. The government having dwindled into the hands of mean intriguing men, of narrow conceptions; — independence, candor & honesty had left the court. The old nobility and men of property and public spirit, despised an administration which, in common decency, they could not respect; and as a consequence — they opposed its measures, — whether good, or bad.

When a timid administration arms itself with prejudice and calls jealousy to its aid, it is remarkable how its leaders can resist the powers of common sense. The destruction of the french monarchy, and the means to prevent its fall, were, for the space of fifty years at least, hung up in the Cabinet of Versailles, as clear as noon day. In France the whole system of taxation was vexatious, partial and oppressive; and the punishments, of frauds committed on the revenue, were tyrannical. The evading an oppressive tax, conveys to the mind no idea of moral guilt; and where there is no conviction of guilt, correction, or punishment is naturally considered as the most insupportable tyranny. Thus, it was the excise laws of the ministry and not the harangues of the philosophers, that brought forth in France that terrible doctrine of sacred resistance.

As the manufactures of all countries, are more or less, modelled upon the leading taste and manners of the people amongst whom they are made, those of France, were hitherto considered so gaudy and overcharged, that they never were in general request amongst the sober part of the community in any other country. There never was any thing, of real use, combined with durable elegance, made in France: nor, if we except their pomatum, hair-powder and girlish toys, did their manufactures produce any article, that could command a general market.

The republic has now however acquired advantages which *monarchical France* never had. The revolution has destroyed that prejudice which excluded manufacturers, mechanics and merchants, from what was considered genteel society: It has annihilated the public debt; the circulating capital is thereby nearly confined to specie and wares, and cannot so far exceed a fair proportion with the produce of the soil, as to raise the produce of labor above the level of exportation: and it has laid open the face of the whole country to agriculture and improvement; so that an abundance of the necessaries of life is secured and certain. The war has given to *republican France* a military command over half the go-

Manufactures.

vernments of Europe; and the diplomacy of *Bonaparte* commands the other half, and also Africa & America: The consulate may, therefore, either monopolize the consumption of these countries, or insist on a decided preference being given in their markets, to the produce of the republic and her manufactures.

The other states of continental Europe can set no manufactures in competition with those of France: their military and militia laws, the feudal vassalage still existing and the rights of corporations, are insurmountable obstacles to all kinds of mechanical perfection. In Great Britain, the immense mass of public and private paper in circulation, the amount, and manner of levying, the public imposts, with the unpardonable neglect of agriculture and of the fisheries, have raised the price of labor to such a rate, that, notwithstanding the superiority of British mechanism, if efficacious measures are not taken to secure the necessities of common life at a fair price, her exportation must sooner or later be confined to such articles as cannot be made elsewhere. ('')

('') It is said in Great Britain — that although a given quantity of provisions which costs 3s in England costs only 2s in France, the english workman earns his three, with as much ease as the frenchman earns one shilling — granted, — but a given piece of

It we add to these, the vigorous efforts, said to be making by the french government to encourage the manufactures; and also, what cannot be doubted, that considerable emigrations of both hands and money from other countries will settle in the repu-

work, that costs LSt. 15, in England and only LSt. 10, in France, cannot with equal profit to both owners, be brought to the open market, for the same price, neither in Europe nor in America. But then, say we, an Englishman will do as much work in one day, and on one day's provision, as a Frenchman can do in two days, and on two day's provision; also granted — but not as a standard position, whereby we may estimate the relative powers of the two states; for, both Frenchmen and Germans may certainly be *taught to work*, as will as Englishmen. Besides, when an Englishman sees, that by his superior dexterity he can gain two day's provisions in France with as much ease, as he can procure one day's subsistence in England, he will go to France. To attempt, by penal laws, to obstruct the emigration of men, or of money, is labor lost; useful men must be attached to their country by other means: and money will always seek high interest, even on perilous security; calculating men, prefer the security of a bankrupt *set free*, to that of a great dealer *involved in debt*.

blic, it will appear extremely probable, that should the present government maintain itself for some years, in peace, the manufactures of France, may become an important branch of her national industry.

There can be no certain estimate made of the *Fisheries & Maritime trade.* produce of the fisheries and maritime trade of France; the extent and duration of the one and the other depend yet upon various circumstances. To carry on the fisheries with advantage, and the maritime trade in security, the republic must establish a durable peace upon solid terms; or must assume a superiority upon the ocean.

If we can form any opinion of the pacific system of the *Consulate*, by what Europe has already seen of the politics of that *college*; it would appear, as if the republic can only maintain peace, when all her neighbours have implicitly submitted to the will of her rulers: If she can enforce that submission, her fisheries and her trade will be proportionate to her dominion: viz *Universal*. Or should she attempt, and succeed, to establish a dictatorial authority on the seas, her fisheries and trade, will extend to the same standard.

We will, however, suppose, that the maritime peace in Europe may continue, some time, undisturbed; and that the rights of the colonies, the colony

trade and that of catching and selling fish, will remain as they have been lately arranged by the plenipotentiaries at Amiens: in that case, the republic will be enabled, to carry her fisheries & maritime trade far beyond what France ever could do before.

Prior to the revolution, the consumption of cured codfish in France, Spain & Italy, amounted to about 2,500,000 of quintals. By Bonaparte's *Concordat*, and the *Senatus-Consultus*, that may be subjoined to it, the rites of the church will, in all likelihood, be so modified, that Roman catholics and others, may eat what pleases their palate and suits best their pocket. To eat fish, will then, no longer be considered as a penance; and they will become a voluntary change of diet for all seasons of the year; we may therefore safely estimate the future consumption of salted and dried codfish, in the countries before mentioned, at 3,000,000 of quintals annually. To supply this consumption, will be the exclusive prerogative of the French Republic. To catch, cure, and carry to the respective markets, three millions of quintals of these fish, will employ and maintain 20,000 able seamen; besides young men and boys.

The whale-fishery was never carried on to great extent by the french; but if we may form any calculation upon the apparent spirit of the sea-port-towns

in the northern and western departments of the republic, it is likely, that, in a year, or two, 150 vessels may be annually sent out to the north & south seas upon that fishery; in which will be employed 5000 able seamen; besides young men and boys.

The herring, mackerel and pilchard, or sardine fishery, for the colonies and for home consumption, will maintain - - - - able seamen 10,000.

And the thon, or tunny and sturgeon fishery, in the Archipelago, now secured to France, with her fishery for daily consumption along her own coast, say, from the Island of Cyprus to the Dogger bank, will, at a very moderate calculation employ, able seamen 10,000 besides an immense number of young men & boys.

Thus the fisheries alone will maintain for France 45,000 able seamen; and produce a considerable item in her national income.

To what extent the maritime trade of France *Maritime* may be carried, is, at this moment, impossible to be foreseen.

Trade. The republic, is already in possession of the sources of more colony-trade, than all Europe has besides; and she now occupies such posts, that when they are garrisoned upon her scale, all other European colonies will be in her power.

It must certainly be evident, to those, who are *willing to see*, that the republic commands, in absolute sovereignty, Holland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy: it is, therefore, a natural consequence, that, the *consulate* holds the keys of the Cape of Good Hope & Batavia; of Cuba and Brasil; of Sicily and Malta: (14) with these posts at command, and St. Domingo, Louisiana and the Floridas, once garrisoned with french troops, Bonaparte may certainly sneer at the idea of any European colony being independent of the French Republic.

In Germany, the *Chief Consul* of France is steward of the Empire! After incorporating with the republic what part, or parts he pleases, he parcels out the remainder, in such a manner, as may best secure the dependence of the whole to France. Those emperors, kings and electors, who can tamely suffer

(14) That Russia should guarantee the chapter of St. John of Jerusalem, at Malta, reminds us of the late king of Prussia's guarantee of an hereditary monarchy in Poland! — To consider that Island an independent state, while it is garrisoned with Neapolitan soldiers & while the *Consul* Aide du Camp is prefect of the Royal palace in Naples, requires more diplomatic sagacity than we possess.

Bonaparte to divide and make presents of their hereditary property to his friends and flatterers, cannot certainly, refuse to eat and drink the sugar and coffee of St. Domingo, and to wear the cotton of Surinam in preference to that of any other country.

At Constantinople that decrepit government, must necessarily lock up to the republic, as the only power, which is now able to avert, for a moment, the execution of its final doom. The *college* of the Thuileries, may therefore, guide or direct the trade of the Turkish empire, and bar, or open its ports, as they please, ('')

('') The trade of the Black-sea, may in a little time, be to France, what that of the Baltic has for many years been to Great Britain.

The Danube, Neiper, Don, Wolga, & the Iaik, intersect *two thirds* of Europe in a thousand directions, and communicate with a great part of Asia; these rivers discharge themselves, the three first, into the Black Sea direct, and the two last indirectly, by a junction of the Wolga with the Don. All sorts of naval stores, corn, and other East-country produce, may be conveyed to the ports of Bulgaria Bessarabia Oczakow and the Crimea in less time and at less expense than they can be taken to the ports of the Baltic.

The importation of colony produce from, the

and the trade of the states of Barbary, Fez and Morocco, may now be considered as a part of the colony trade of France; for should Bonaparte not yet think proper to set aside the Deys & Kings of these countries, his commissaires will, at all events from henceforth, govern them.

In short, the *Consulate* believe, that, the republic is now able to open all the markets of Europe and Africa to the produce of France; and that, when it may suit their purposes, they can confine the produce of every other country to its native soil.

With respect to America, it is not easy to foresee how the United States and the French Republic may finally arrange their commercial intercourse with one another.

french ports in the Mediterranean, and the consumption of french salted and dried fish, in South Russia, Moldavia, Hungary and Poland, will be immense.

To France, this trade alone may raise and maintain a considerable marine.

Great Britain can derive little, or no benefit from the privilege she has obtained to go, under *Bonaparte's* wings, through the Bosphorus. A British merchant can send nothing there, upon equal terms with the French; and the distance is too great to import Eastern produce through the Dardanelles.

Of the numerous faults and blunders committed by the several parties concerned in the late revolutionary war, next to *Great Britain*, the government of America has made the most irretrievable: To enter into war, for the mere purpose of acting upon the defensive, is the most ridiculous of all political absurdities. Such parties generally receive more blows than they give; and in the end, they are spurned at by their friends and despised by their enemies.

As the United States are situate, possessing an immense length of coast, a great number of mercantile ports, and the several provinces producing but little variation in their exportable commodities, to enable their rapidly encreasing population to maintain a profitable intercourse with the rest of the world, a certain portion of the sugar-trade is indispensably necessary. A small settlement, or two, would be of little importance to America; nor can it be expected that this government will be satisfied with such. But how are they now to acquire any great possession?

During her warfare with France, or, at any time, prior to the destruction of *Toussaint*, America might have easily secured St. Domingo; a single proclamation, declaring that island an integral part of the

federal republic, and an independent state in the union, would have instantaneously rallied, both *blacks & whites* arround her standard. And what had the United States to apprehend from France? *Caresses* and *attention*: but certainly no sort of danger. (¹⁶)

The acquisition of St. Domingo, would have been, both in a commerical and political consideration, every thing that America could rationally desire: it would have enabled the United States to carry on a wide, extensive and profitable maritime trade; and, as it would have rendered the political and mercantile interests of America and Great Britain reciprocal & mutual, by securing the British possessions in the West-Indies, it would have raised an insuperable barrier between the United States and their perfidious sister, the French Republic. (¹⁷)

(¹⁶) A person familiar with Frederick II, reading his campaigns of 1741-42, asked the king, why he left his allies, the French, in so critical a situation at Prague in 1742. His Majesty replied — "that they might court my alliance at another time."

(¹⁷) That St. Domingo, being a state of America, would have secured the possessions of Great Britain in the West-Indies, admits, we think of no sort of doubt. To maintain that settlement,

The opportunity is now lost! The partial patriotism of her chief magistrate, has, to all appearance, deprived America, perhaps for ever, of becoming that conspicuous nation, which nature and the spirit of her inhabitants, certainly designed her to be, in a few

and the tranquillity of its own coasts and maritime commerce, it would have become, with the government of America, a necessary policy to encourage, and *support if required*, the permanency of the maritime preponderance of the British empire. The United States could then, never have anything to apprehend from a naval power; nor from armies to be carried across the Atlantic Ocean direct. Nor could the West-India colonies of Great Britain be, in any wise, endangered by the vicinity of the Americans. That government, in possession of St. Domingo, could by no rule of prudence, nor maxim in politics, aim at the acquisition of more islands; the produce of that settlement would be abundant for the interior consumption of the United States, and for all useful purposes in their foreign trade; to attempt further aggrandisement by conquest, or to monopolize the sugar-trade, could not fail to combine Great Britain and France against them; a circumstance, that, were they in possession of all the sugar-islands, they could not be prepared against, for centuries to come.

years. The politics of the acting president, seem to be guided by no other system, than the personal animosities of Mr. Jefferson: he seems to bear malice against the British government; and that hatred is, with him a sufficient reason to make America the unconditional dupe of the French republic.

St. Domingo lost, the Americans have turned their views towards the island of Cuba; they consider the acquisition of that settlement, as the certain result of a quarrel with Spain, and they pretend to have already a plausible pretext to make a claim upon that forlorn monarchy. But will France, now *military* mistress of the gulph of Mexico, suffer to settle under the lee of St. Domingo, a power, which might thereby become her rival, in the colony trade? Certainly not; the very idea is repugnant to common sense. The consulate may perhaps, permit, and even encourage America, to quarrel with Spain, with Portugal, or with Great Britain; but the republic will reserve to herself, the objects of their differences, as a pledge of their future tranquility.

Although the rulers of France know enough of the principles of sound policy, not to build the permanency of their government, upon the caprice, or partiality of temporary ministers; yet, we see their leading system, is to manage the official and public

men in other countries, so, as to render their influence, ignorance and credulity subservient to the consolidation of the Consular republic. The *Versilian* policy of the Consulate, being well seconded by a revolutionary audacity, and supported with energetic firmness, has contributed more, than all the Jacobine armies of France, to subdue the corrupt and cowardly governments of other states. The Consuls have been remarkably fortunate in finding manageable men abroad, it is true, and it must be confessed they have known to make use of them; for should the governments of Europe and America, hereafter see their errors, the consulate has taken special care, that they shall not have the means to retrieve them. The French are now in possession of the whole island of St. Domingo, with all their former settlements in that quarter, and Louisiana is ceded in sovereignty, to the republic; so in all probability are, the Floridas: with these possessions, she is indisputably mistress of the gulph of Mexico; General Bowles & his Creek nations, will soon become her *auxiliaries*; and she will either fraternize, or revolutionize the southern states of America, already disposed to break up the Union.

These, we think, will in all probability be the consequences of president Jefferson's short measured politics.

However, as the Senatus Consultus and diplomatic *paroles d'ordre*, issue with extreme rapidity from the dictatorial press of Bonaparte, and considering, that, upon every subject, these acts express the most sullen contempt for the authority, power and property of all other governments, (14) it may be, that

(14) It is certain, that the most powerful sovereigns in Europe have made repeated application to the Chief Consul, in favor of the king of Sardinia, and other injured princes; and it is equally certain, that, prior to the death of the late emperor Paul, these applications were received with indifference and answered with illusory professions: since the death of that sovereign, every proposition which was not conceived at *Malmaison* has been spurned, at the Tuilleries.

It is said that Bonaparte, *personally*, has long despised the governments of all other European states; no wonder that he should do so now. He may well consider his own success and the rank he is tamely allowed to hold, sufficient to authorize him, to treat his contemporaries with indifference.

When, at the request of a legal sovereign, the late Pretender, who had only the shadow of an hereditary right, was sent from Paris, the French government was held up to universal opprobrium, and its weakness on that occasion, was considered as

providence has yet in reserve, some men of talents and character, whom the reiterated insults of those marauding republicans, will at length, rouse up and draw forward, to save from further desolation and final slavery, this timid and unmanly world.

At all events, until every probability of setting boundaries to the overbearing usurpations of France, shall entirely subside, we will not venture any conjecture, how far her dominion may be extended; and therefore, shall consider her colony and maritime trade, as confined to the possessions and commercial advantages already secured to the republic.

We have already stated, that the fisheries will employ and maintain for France - able seamen 45,000. Her colonies, once recovered from the ravages of revolution and war, will employ, in, and out of Europe, in carrying their produce and supplying their wants. (19) - - - - - 25,000

ominous of its future fate. What can the Consul think of these monarchs, who in obedience to the will of the most execrable college of rebel usurpers that ever disgraced the government of a country, refused to the legitimate king of France, and innocent princes of the House of Bourbon, a wretched asylum in the secluded corners of their dominions?

(19) By the kingdom of Fez and other settlements in Africa, of which they intend to possess themselves,

able seamen; and the other European and coasting trade of France, will certainly employ and maintain at least - - - - - 50,000 more; thus we may safely estimate, that, in the course of a few years of peace, the Republic will possess within herself, upwards of - - - - - 120,000 able seamen, with nearly an equal number of young

the French believe, that they will be able to supply their West India colonies, with all sorts of provisions and other necessaries, independent of America: and, as their West India shipping will thereby, in general, have some part of a cargo outwards, they imagine they can bring home their Colony produce at a lower freight than others. These two circumstances, with the superior quality of their sugars & coffee, and with the possession of Guiana, will, by the calculation of the *Consulate*, enable France to furnish continental Europe, with West India produce, on better terms than Great Britain.

The French consider Guiana, both Dutch and Portuguese, as an acquisition of the highest importance; and not inferior to the British settlement of Bengal; they say, they can in a few years make it raise sugar & cotton enough for the consumption of half the world! that they can never be dispossessed of that colony and may extend its territory on all sides, to any distance they please.

and ordinary men inured to the habits of a maritime life; besides upwards of - - - - able sailors 50,000, as vassal auxiliaries in Holland, Spain and Italy.

Now, when we impartially consider the internal sources of the republic, and that, if the Consulate be suffered to dictate the tarifs and to monopolize the markets in other countries, it will evidently appear, that thirty millions, judiciously assessed, on the income arising from the agriculture, manufactures, fisheries and trade of France, may be raised without inconvenience. (20) Such a permanent revenue, with her dominion at home and possessions abroad, will enable the republic to maintain a military, and raise a naval force, far superior to any power that ever appeared in Europe.

Military strength. Much has been said, about a military spirit, with which, it is pretended, that certain nations have been,

(20) By the statements laid before the national assembly in 1789 and 1790 it appears, that the contributions and imposts of all denominations, levied upon the industry, soil and fisheries of France, amounted to a milliard of french livres; or, to upwards of 30 per-cent of the produce of the kingdom; besides the extortions of collectors &c.

and are yet endued. Some people have no doubt, at certain periods displayed uncommon military valor; but this, is neither hereditary, nor confined to any peculiar locality: (21) In their primitive

(22) Several extraordinary men, have, at certain periods, raised and maintained armies and navies very disproportionate to the visible means they possessed. In confining our remarks to modern times, we find that Gustavus Adolphus organised an army, which made Sweden arbitrator in the affairs of Europe: Some men of talents raised even Holland to the same rank; and Frederic II. made a Brandenburg army formidable to the House of Austria. But, the localities and natural powers of Sweden, Holland & Prussia, not being in themselves sufficient to consolidate a preponderance in the political world; their power declined as the genius and heroism, which had raised them to eminence disappeared; those states are now, some fallen into dependency and under foreign subjection, and the others are dwindling insensibly into their natural insignificance.

It may be said, that Prussia has yet 260 000 soldiers: but those who know the present situation of affairs, see that army, like other relics, only respectable in the memory of those heroes, who created it: instead of being a support to the state,

errant state, men are naturally active and warlike; but, in all stages of society, as if it were by a moral necessity, they follow chiefs and imitate those whom they consider as their superiors. In the civilized world, the spirit, or public character of every nation, is derived from, and guided by the rulers of the state; if the government be virtuous, valiant and active, the community will be moral, brave and industrious.

Since the Jacobin system of resistance to legal authority, has been ratified by all the sovereigns of Europe, and hallowed by the Pope, much pains have been taken to shew, that a people fighting, in what is called their own cause, are capable of greater achievements, than those who fight for a chief. By this invidious doctrine, it is meant to prove, that oppression, ignorance and corruption are the hereditary characteristics of a legal government: otherwise, how could it be asserted, that a band of rebel adventurers, a few usurpers, or, a self elected chief, should be better qualified, than a legitimate sovereign, to raise a commonwealth to grandeur? (*2) The fact is, these

the military in prussia, are daily preying upon the vitals of the nation-

(²²) There is no country in Europe where this doctrine is less defined, nor propagated with more industry, than it has lately been in Great Britain.

pretended extraordinary powers of democracy, are bugbears of sophistical invention: A people no sooner renounce their allegiance to one ruler, than they

When a faction of Polish adventurers, sanctioned by the most insignificant prince that ever swayed a sceptre, attempted to extend the Jacobin revolution of France, from Constantinople to the northern extremities of Europe, the British press teemed with prayers for their success, and poured out reprobations upon those governments, that, in their own defence, opposed the torrent of anarchy and confusion. The London-papers made heroic and victorious armies of the black negroes in St. Domingo: and at the moment we are writing, they are filled with such panegyrics on the patriotism and noble zeal of a deluded rabble in Switzerland, that, to read them is degusting to common sense.

In what relates to the political state of Europe in general and to the affairs of the respective states in particular, the extreme ignorance exhibited by our public writers, and sometimes by our public speakers, is to be regretted; for, it is through their medium, that the nation is taught to estimate men and measures; and upon their papers and harangues foreigners form their opinions of the politics and talents of the British government.

pass under the dominion of another: and if, at the command of a consul, or president, they perform deeds, which they will not do at the order of an emperor, or a king, the cause must necessarily lie in the superior, or inferior capacity of one of the parties.

Calculations, made upon the spirit of a nation, *without a body*, or upon the body of a people, *without a soul*, will always prove fallacious. In the political sphere of human action, extraordinary men appear but seldom; and although the vexatious vices of ignorant rulers, may sometimes, rouse up an oppressed people to vengeance, yet, they will never become formidable to other states, until they themselves are subdued and follow a leader, or obey a chief.

The only true criterion, by which the natural powers of a nation can be ascertained, is, its population, and the ease, or the difficulty of subsistence: and the permanent military strength of a state, must ever be confined to that part of the community, which, unemployed in productive labor, can be maintained without inconveniency to the whole. (21)

(21) When a government raises its military force above the level, or proportion of the surplus of the income of the nation, that force then becomes a charge to the public; and when the military become a burden,

With respect to France, the peace of Nimeguen made the dominions of Louis XIV the most compact and populous kingdom in Europe: that of Utrecht extended them to Spain and the Indies; and a natural consequence was, the consolidation of the military preponderance of that monarchy. The present situation of Holland, Germany & Italy, was then foreseen; and the ruin of Great Britain itself was predicted.

At Nimeguen, Sir William Temple declared it to be his opinion, "*that whoever advised the States General to make peace with France, in her then formidable posture, was a traitor to all the sovereigns of Europe.*" The elector of Brandenburg was of the same opinion; and wrote to the prince of Orange, "*If Holland will not come heartily forward, it is our duty to exterminate those Dutchmen, and to establish in their stead, a more effectual barrier to the conquering system of France.*" During the negotiations at Utrecht, the emperor told Lord Peterborough, that, the queen, by her secret preliminaries with Louis, had ceded Europe and the Indies to France: and the electoral prince of Brunswick, afterwards George I. in his memorials, endeavoured to convince the British ministry, that, by giving up the Spanish monarchy

instead of a support to the state, it never fails to absorb its strength and hasten its ruin.

to the house of Bourbon, they surrendered the British kingdom as a province to the same power. The same prince observed to Raby, afterwards Strafford; "Your *mistress has signed the death warrant of Europe, and of old England; and you, sir, are charged to prepare the halters.*"

In short, the peace of Nimeguen was the preliminary to the subjection of Europe, and that of Utrecht, was the definitive treaty: the one put France in an offensive position, the other destroyed the defensive means of all her Neighbours. (24)

(24) It is remarkable that the British government should have imposed both these treaties upon the world. It is still more remarkable, that the fallacious conclusions, puerile sophistry, and bombast, made use of to justify such measures, should ever have been heard with patience in a British Senate!

When Louis XIV began his military career, Holland and Austria were able to defeat all his projects. At that time, the Dutch possessed a national character, wealth, and a powerful navy: by the geographical position of their country, they were the natural allies of Great Britain; and it was the duty of the British government to have enabled them to extend their territory and maintain their marine. But when chancellor Shaftesbury, in the House of Lords, cried out in the vehemence

That the advantages acquired by France in these two treaties, were not sooner carried into effect, was

of his patriotic ignorance, *delenda est Carthago*, meaning Holland, His Lordship's noble zeal seized his Peers and the British navy was sent out, to batter down one of the essential out works of the British Empire! In all probability, the Great state-herald, in his calculation, had not observed on whom the wrecks of his Batavian Carthage was most likely to fall.

The peace of Utrecht was conducted in a manner so disgraceful to the British name, and concluded so much to the prejudice of Europe in general, and to the detriment of Great Britain in particular, that every honest man must wish the whole transaction erased from the annals of history. In 1709 the French king offered, to resign all the pretensions of his family to the Spanish monarchy; and to cede the Spanish Netherlands to the Dutch: but Pensionary *Heinsius*, insisted that the frontiers of Holland should be extended to the Somme; even that would have been agreed to, had not *Gaultier*, a priest and French spy, with *Prior*, *Hill* and other hirelings, found means to introduce into the queen's councils, men in whose politics the interests of their country seemed to make but a secondary consideration. The new ministers, were

accidental. From the death of Louis XIV to the accession of the *consulate*, the French monarchy was under, what we may call, an interregnum: that court was a *college* of *crapulous* effeminacy and frivolity; the public departments were filled with intrigue, meanness and venality; to support the extravagance of the one, and to satisfy the avarice of the other, the country was oppressed, and the state kept suspended on the brink of insolvency. But such were the natural resources of the nation, that notwithstanding the depravity of the government, and the disastrous

so moderate in their demands, that when *Philip* declared to Lexington, "that he would no more wear the two crowns of France and Spain, than if he had never been born," they were satisfied: and without regard who should hold the dominion over the French and Spanish monarchies, they immediately entered into a conspiracy, it can be called nothing else, — with Louis XIV. against the United Provinces. They demonstrated to the satisfaction of the British Parliament, that the castle of Ghent, in the hands of the Dutch, would prove dangerous to the political existence of Great Britain; and, that a German prince, on the throne of Spain, would be more formidable to the British Empire, than the monarchies of France and Spain united, under a sovereign of the House of Bourbon!!

wars, in which it was frequently involved, the real internal power of France continued, as we have lately seen, superior to that of the rest of Europe united.

As the military strength of all states must ever be relative; to estimate that of republican France, her natural and moral means and advantages, as they stand in proportion to those of her neighbours, are to be considered.

In relation to other states, the natural advantages enjoyed by France, are, the climate and fertility of the soil; the geographical situation of her dominions; and the proportion which the population of those dominions bears to the extent of her territory. These, in a military point of view, give to that country, an advantage, of 20 per-cent at least, over any other part of Europe of equal size and population. That is to say: when any state in Europe, the most favoured by nature, possessing, we will suppose, 10 millions of inhabitants, can maintain a standing army, or military establishment of 200,000 men, an equal portion of the population of France, can, with the same facility and at the same expence, maintain 240,000 men.

Next to France, the Continental state most favoured by nature is Austria. (²⁵) The population of the

(²⁵) The dominions of the House of Austria command

Austrian dominions, including Hungary, amounts to about 20 millions; and her peace establishment is

a large proportion of the most valuable gifts of nature; they abound with all the necessities of life; and with every thing that can, in any wise contribute to the ease and happiness of mankind. When we feel the salubrious climate, see the richness of the soil and contemplate the happy situation of these countries, the vicinity of the Ocean and commercial intercourse with the new world, which others enjoy, lose their value and importance.

Firmly organized under an intelligent government, the Austrian monarchy might soon become the most wealthy and powerful nation in Europe: In its present state, it is a body disjointed: the several members are at constant enmity with one another; and they are all but slightly attached to their head. When a stranger passes from Tyrol into Austria, from thence into Hungary, Bohemia and Galicia, he is apt to think, that he is passing the frontiers of states in open hostility. Their barrier-system, and the nature of the civil and municipal government of the respective departments, keep the inhabitants of the several provinces, with the produce of their industry, as much separated, as if they belonged to different sovereigns.

The weight of the public debt is now become

usually stated at 290,000 men, but as commissary-accounts generally admit of a considerable rebate, we shall state her peace-establishment at 260,000 men. The population of the republic exceeds 30 millions,(²⁶) which, on a par with Austria, gives 375,000 men, the natural advantages at 20 per-cent give - - - 75000; hence, the peace-establishment of France would be - - - - - 450,000 men. By the foregoing calculation, the war-establishment of the republic may be - - - - - 566000 men.

insupportable, the taxes are oppressive and annually more and more deficient; national industry and the produce of the soil have been upon the decline these forty years; and in that period, the expenditure of the government is tripled. The whole system of finance is complicate, vexarious and nugatory; and the military, or militia-laws, are partial, void of energy and absurd.

What opposition, or resistance, can Austria, in this situation, make against the military republic of France?

- (²⁵) Some late enumerations, make the population of the republic amount to 33,111,862; and some german writers have stated that of the Austrian dominions, at 24,000,000. We believe both are exaggerated: at any rate, they do not essentially alter the proportion of our calculation.

Let us suppose, that in case of war, the republic could not send beyond her frontiers above two thirds of these men, say - - - - - 384,000, and that, to the Austrian army, of 320,000, there might be added, the military establishment of Prussia, - 260,000, of the inferior powers of Germany, - - - - - 70,000, and the armies of Denmark and Sweden - - - - - 110,000,

Total number of men 760,000.

Deduct from these, the number of regular troops necessary to maintain the police and secure the interior tranquility of those countries in time of war; viz, Austria - - - - - 120,000, Prussia - - - - - 150,000, Other states of the empire - - - - - 40,000, Denmark and Sweden, 60,000,

Acting army - - - - - 370,000. (27)
390,000.

(27) It may be asked, if France could march two thirds of her army over her frontiers, what should pre-

Thus, we find, that France can with the same facility as any of the above mentioned powers, main-

vent Prussia and the inferior states to send out an equal proportion of theirs? To this question, we are sorry to say, too many valid reasons might be given: The late king of Prussia's declaration to the chief of the empire, on a proposition to arm Germany in a mass, is sufficiently clear and the original document is public; we shall, therefore, only mention here, that, the territory of the republic is compact, her frontiers are naturally strong and artfully covered, the military system, or conscription of the consulate, whether considered as offensive, or defensive, is far more formidable than the militia-regulations of any other government. The Prussian monarchy is a patched edifice; its dominions have neither frontier, nor centre; its subjects have no country, nor do they form a nation; and the soul of that army is long departed. As to the inferior states, they can now have no cause of their own to fight for; whoever be masters in Germany, or in France, the weaker princes must, henceforth be subjects; they will never arm, but by compulsion, or for subsidy; when turned out by force, they will only march to run away, and those who arm for subsidy never arm to fight.

tain a defensive military establishment, superior to any force that can be brought against her; and can send forth an offensive army equal to the effective armies of all the independent states of continental Europe, Russia alone excepted.

It may be said, that, to defend her foreign possessions and to secure the free circulation of her national industry, the republic must maintain a navy as well as an army; this is however conditional; and has no connexion with the security and natural power of France. If a navy be necessary to protect the colonies and maritime trade of the republic, these must be of such national importance as to maintain that navy. (28)

(28) How far navies are, or may be necessary to the security and prosperity of a nation, and whether, as offensive weapons, they are politic and efficacious, depends upon various circumstances.

From the nature and territorial extent of the United provinces, to raise them to the rank of a political state, commerce, foreign possessions and a powerful navy, were absolutely necessary. Maritime trade, extensive colonies and a preponderating navy, are to Great Britain, as an European power, essential to the preservation of her political existence. With respect to France the case is

The political advantages which the republic, in a military point of view, possesses, in preference to her neighbours, are:

I. An immense, secure, annual revenue.

We have already observed, that the European territory and industry of France are capable of producing, without inconveniency to the public, 30,000,000 sterling to government.

Or, if we take 15 per-cent, as a medium assessment, by *cadastral*, of the property and income of the nation, it will give the said sum and upwards.

different. Her power and national security is established independent of naval concerns. Considered as offensive weapons, the Dutch and British navies, however preponderant they might be on the ocean, could never become formidable to other nations. Without a military force to second their operations, these states, could only protect their own possessions and maritime commerce by keeping in check, the foreign settlements and naval force of their more powerful neighbours. But should the republic be suffered, to add to her military preponderance a naval superiority, we may then exclaim with Pensionary Buys, — "Il n'y auroit plus de sûreté, de cette position à la monarchie (ou consulat) universelle, il n'y a presque point d'intervalle."

From these thirty millions, deduct about two millions, which the consulate is yet pleased to allow to the creditors of the state, and there will remain a clear and unencumbered revenue, of L. 28,000,000 sterling. A sum equal to, if not exceeding the unencumbered part of the revenues of all the independent governments of Europe. Add to this, that, in all other European states, the public imposts, *as they are raised*, amount to upwards of 30 per-cent upon the income of the taxable part of the community.⁽²⁹⁾

(29) Although we have said, that 15 per-cent upon the national income of France might produce thirty millions, we would not therefore, be understood to infer, that to impose 30 per-cent would give sixty millions: on the contrary; there is a test, to which taxation, well administered, operates as a stimulation to industry and national improvement. But over that standard, every shilling exacted from the public causes a diminution, of 13, 15, 18 pence to 3 shillings, on the general produce of the nation.

In most of the continental states of Europe, the public imposts bear heavy on industry; and in some countries the produce of property is over-taxed. In the Austrian dominions, the several denominations of land-tax, amount, at this time, to upwards of 33 per cent of the rental, or income of the

II. The military Organization of the Republic.

By the conscription-laws, every male is liable to serve in the lowest military capacity: there is neither legal exemption, nor privileged preferment: and consequently, there is no subject for jealousy in the army, nor for discontent in the community. In France, upwards of six millions of men, are able to carry arms; of these, two millions and a half are between 18 and 23.

proprietors; and the contributions on the peasantry, or cultivators, exceed 50 per cent of the produce of their possessions: mechanics, manufacturers and merchants, or the burghers of all descriptions, pay by law 16 per-cent of their income, but in fact they pay 20 per-cent, besides excise, barrier and frontier-tolls, assessed taxes &c. In Prussia, the privileged nobility, only, being eligible to possess landed property, the soil is not so heavily taxed as in Austria; but the Prussian cultivators, peasantry and *bourgeois*, can be considered as nothing more, than menial servants to the government and the army; the produce of their industry is entirely absorbed by taxes and military contributions. In the inferior principalities of Germany, the public may be said to be nearly in the same state, as in Prussia. Denmark is the state in Europe, where the public imposts are the least vexatious and least detrimental to industry.

Any number of these young men, may be armed and put in motion by a *parole d'ordre*; — for, both the legislation and sovereignty of the republic, are in the staff of the army: the military is the only road to consideration and power. And such is now the reputation of that profession, that, to avoid the contempt of the public, it is necessary, either to serve, or to have served. These are advantages, which no other government possesses. (‘^o)

(‘^o) The absurd declamations and fallacious reports, which we daily see in the London-newspapers, respecting the tyranny of the conscription and the desertion of the young men in France, deserve no attention; they only shew, that those writers are as little acquainted with the military institutions of other countries, as they are with the present state of the republic. In every part of continental Europe, the lower orders of the community are as immediately subject to military service, as they are in France; and with that aggravating difference, that, the baptism of every male is the act of his enrolment; infirmity, or death, is the only term, to which he can look forward for release; neither talents, bravery, nor other merit, can advance the rank, or better the condition of an European bond-man. It should likewise be considered, that, it is not the low situation, in which the great majority of

*III. The Frontiers and Avant-posts
of the Republic.*

In a defensive point of view, since the meridian of the Roman power to the present time, no state had ever its frontiers so judiciously covered, as those of the French republic now are. The strength of the frontier lines of monarchical France has often been proved; the subjugation of Holland, Switzerland and Italy, render those lines now, we may say, inaccessible. Those vassal auxiliaries, being acknowledged by the rest of stupified Europe as independent states, may either serve, as neutral outworks, or will have to maintain French armies sufficient to oppose any force that can be brought against them. Considered as offensive, the strength of her frontiers and the lo-

mankind is placed, that induces them to complain of their lot; it is the difference they see between themselves and others that makes them dissatisfied and oppose their superiors: in as far as relates to the conscription system in France, this difference is professed to be done away; and the mass of the nation rejoice at it. Besides, we know for a certainty, that it is only the rich and easy, who complain of military tyranny; and their desertion, will rather facilitate than impede the operations of government.

calities of her several dependents, must necessarily give to the armies of France, a decided preponderance in Europe. From the Ems, up the Rhine to Basil and Feldkirk; from thence, by Verona and the Adriatic-sea to Calabria, the republic is covered with a chain of double and triple lines of natural barriers and military posts. Secure at home, her *avant* departments, open to her armies, every part of the continent from the Morea, to Pomerania: Bonaparte's legions may be at the gates of Vienna and Berlin, before the Austrian and Prussian cabinets have any suspicion of the Consul's hostile intention. Lord paramount of Naples, the cession of Malta and all other military and naval stations in the Mediterranean, by Great Britain, puts the Turkish government under the immediate direction of the consulate. With the command of Constantinople, or, only enjoying the freedom of navigating the Dardanelles and Bosphorus of Thrace, the republic will check the operations even of Russia itself; and may make that mighty empire subservient to her future projects. (a)

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- (a) The ascendancy of the consulate at Constantinople, and the free navigation of the Black Sea, now allowed to France, cannot fail to produce effects of great importance; these two circumstances, must, either cement and strengthen the political

IV. Her Colonies and settlements abroad.

Whatever the nature and extent of the French settlements beyond the seas may be, the advantages, derived from them, can by no means be considered as secure and permanent. If colonies can be looked upon as such, they are generally over-rated; and have long engrossed too much of the attention of all the maritime powers of Europe. To France, such possessions are, in reality, concerns of a very subordinate nature: She neither depends upon their produce for a revenue, nor upon their trade to train up sailors for her defence. To the consulate, however, the foreign settlements of the republic, with those of her dependents, are considerations of the highest importance.

For these hundred years past, the leading principle in the politics of France, has been, the reduction of the power and political influence of Great Britain. We have already observed, that, for ninety years

ties that are already existing between the consulate and the emperor of Russia, or they must break off the connexion. Should Russia and France continue friends, they will co-operate and subdue Asia, as they have done Europe. They cannot now separate without quarrelling, and in that case, they will crush the world between their mighty armies.

of that period, the French government was so relaxed, that the British empire might have acquired and consolidated a decided superiority; but fortunately for her enemies, the foresight of our statesmen, kept steadily in the rear of *their* indifference and imbecility. In as far as relates to us, there can be no rational doubt, but the consulate acts upon the same principle that guided the monarchy; with this difference, the consular college acts with vigor. The present Government commands means far superior, to those possessed by any of their predecessors, and Bonaparte has personal, as well as public motives, for turning *those means*, and all his influence against the now only remaining rival of the republic. (b)

(b) Most public men have the vanity to blend personal considerations with the concerns of the state.

In France, the people are daily telling their *Corsican* chief, that his person is *la divinité* of the republic; and the clergy exclaim *Amen!* (*) To retaliate presumed injuries, to gratify malignant ambition, and to confirm the mob in their belief of his supernatural genius, we must not be surprised, if this mighty adventurer, should make the French nation, attempt such daring enterprises which moderate thinking men would consider extravagant.

(*) Octavius was also deified: *Præsenti tibi maturos largimur honores!*
Horace.

Considering how the great sources of our maritime power are scattered, the whole Island of St.

During the late revolution-war, Bonaparte affected to carry victory in his name: Great Britain was the only power whose arms checked his military career and confused his diplomatic combinations. The destruction of his fleet at Aboukir, the defence of Acre, (in its effects the most important occurrence of the war) the expedition to the Baltic, and the loss of Egypt, were mortifying events. These being the only disappointments he met with, they were the more sensibly felt; and they will not be forgotten, until, he either revenge them, or perish in the attempt.

The consul is said to be naturally vindictive; his station obliges him to look upon the legitimate sovereigns who have not yet submitted to his dominion, as his foes; and the same policy by which he holds the government of France, points out to him the necessity of subduing those foes. It has long been notorious, that, in the French cabinet, probity, good faith and common honesty, are bugbears, far beneath the notice of their enlightened legislators. To ruin a rival power, force, corruption and treachery, are equally legal. The British empire, is now the only rival of the French republic; to destroy its government, would be the *se plus ultra*, of Bonaparte's wishes; and such an achievement would indeed make him the hero of his

Domingo, the boundless countries of Guiana, Louisiana and the Floridas, with the invaluable settlement of the Cape, are, in the hands of the chief consul, offensive stations of the most formidable nature. (c) Making her armies subservient to the cultivation of the soil, these possessions will become such military departments, that, when the republic shall again think proper to find a pretext to quarrel openly with Great Britain, Jamaica and Brasil, may be easy conquests. Or, should the consulate limit its operations in Amer-

century. Should *l'homme de la providence* have resolved to make the attempt, as we believe he has, passiveness and concession may fortify his rancor, but they will certainly not alter his decrees.

- (c) By the late peace, France is enabled to form a complete circumvallation of naval posts, around the gulph of Mexico. The Cape, the Isle of France, Rio-Janeiro and Bueons-Aires, are flankers upon the maritime communication between Europe, Asia and the Pacific Ocean; the republic commands at those stations, and the coasts of Europe and Africa, from the Ems to Senegal, are under her dominion. Thus situate, it is the opinion of some sea faring men, that 200 stout well equipt french Frigates, properly distributed in, and out of Europe, might oblige Great Britain to carry her maritime trade in line of battle ships.

rica, as some think it will, to a free trade with the Spanish and Portuguese colonies; France will in that case, have ample means to raise and keep up a maritime force, proportionate to her military preponderance.

We have already stated, that the fisheries and trade of the republic, in her present situation, will employ and maintain 120,000 able seamen; the foreign possessions chosen by her rulers, having no boundaries, she may extend her settlements and augment their produce, we may say, to infinity; (d) and by managing other powers with a pacific prudence, (e)

- (d) So much has been said about the want of capital in France, that it would almost seem, as if our sage politicians wished to repose the security of their own country upon the presumed poverty of the republic! Do those calculating sagacious men not know, that, in consolidating the republican government by concessions and solemn treaties, we open to the planters of St. Domingo and Surinam, the purse of every merchant in Europe, and, that by the same measures, we have also secured an universal credit to the merchants of Antwerp, Bourdeaux, Marseilles and Rouen? Had Jamaica been ceded to Bonaparte, we believe, the planters in that Island would have found little difficulty to raise money in London as usual, to carry on their improvements.
- (e) This is however, we think impossible. The

she may double the number of her sailors and secure a dominion on the ocean, before any of her neighbours be aware of her design. Commanding the powers, the ports and arsenals of Spain, Italy and Turkey, France may very soon possess the absolute sovereignty of the Mediterranean; with the Rhine, she has the

The Republican government, cannot so far dissemble its natural character, as to impose upon the most shallow observer. The civilities and pacific professions of the consulate, are, to common-sense, glaring treacheries; the principles of the French chiefs, are printed in fixt colours, on all their actions; and their rancorous enmity to other states, is demonstrated by their most simple gestures. The statesman who is the dupe of french politics, cannot, in such capacity, plead deception, nor bad faith; for the hostile helmet of the republic, is nailed to the crown of her champion; besides, good faith was never the attribute of usurpers.

Abstracting from the politics of their rulers, the French cannot live for any length of time, on peaceable terms with their neighbours; as equals, they are incessantly labouring by intrigue and circumvention to become superiors; and when allowed to assume a superiority, they are imperious, wanton tyrants: No nation near them, will ever enjoy peace, while they maintain their present posture.

forests of Germany for the use of her Dock-yards; with Holland, she acquires an extent of coast and a chain of sea-ports, which may enable her to raise a numerous navy in a few years. (f)

- (f) It has been said, that the consulate intends to raise an enormous navy and to distribute it, as follows:

In the Mediterranean,

France shall maintain 30	} 65 sail of the Line of battle ships
Spain - - - - - 20	
The Italian states, including Naples - - 15	

From Cadix to the Texel,

France shall maintain 100	} 160 sail of the line of battle ships
Spain - - - - - 40	
Holland - - - - - 20	

Should the French compose a navy in this manner, and oblige their allies to keep up 95 sail of the line for the service of the republic, the Dutch and Spanish officers and men will be under the immediate orders of their masters, the *French*. The inconvenience of separate commanders, which has so often frustrated the best combined plans of confederate forces, will thereby be avoided.

The heavy navies of France will not however, soon be in a state to give much uneasiness to her rival neighbour. Should Bonaparte seriously set about building line of battle ships, Great Britain

The foregoing statements of the natural and moral sources of France, are by no means exaggerated;

may congratulate herself and let him go on. Lucky gamesters play boldly; but, when they meet with a few successive checks, they lose their clue, and become more disconcerted than others. The consul has hitherto staked high, and with remarkable success; should he attempt to pursue his fortune upon the ocean, his preparations will be analogous to his usual measures; skirmishing is not in his tactics; if he send a fleet to sea, it will be such a fleet, as France never could boast of before; but if the spirit of the British nation do not entirely subside in the interval, that fleet will be beaten; every effort, which revenge can devise, will be made to augment its force, and it will be beaten again; its creator may then lose his temper and France will lose her stake in the game.

The light *Flottilles*, which the republic is preparing, may perhaps merit the attention of the British government, more than all the heavy navies of Europe and America together. It is certain, that at this moment, arrangements are making to form and repair such *dépots* and convenient harbours, between Brest and the Ems, where 1500 to 2000 light vessels may be kept in safety and constant readiness; to act either offensively or to defend their

the estimates we have given, are far under, what an intelligent government might derive from the inexhaustible treasures of that over-grown empire. Fortunate, perhaps, it may be for the yet independent nations of Europe, that those sources of irresistible force are in the hands of Frenchmen!

Except when the personal characters of leading men, may, now and then influence the measures of a government, the politics of every state is, to secure its independence, augment its power and elevate its rank. These objects cannot be pursued singly, they are interwoven with one another.. The independence of a state can only be secured by an unremitting progression in power, of which rank is a consequence. We have already remarked, that almost all states have begun to decline, as soon as they ceased to rise. The ambition, avarice and ignorance of individuals allow nations, no interval of stationary quiet and security.

In modern times, the only governments that

own coasts, as occasion may point out, or require: It is equally certain, that immense quantities of materials and stores, for the construction and equipment of these vessels, are already collecting from all quarters: and, there is no doubt that, the consulate intends to extend this naval system of light squadrons to America and the West-indies.

seem to have acted upon any digested system, are the French since the commencement of the reign Louis XIV, and the Russian since that of Peter I. These two monarchs felt the internal strength of their respective empires, and measured the powers of their neighbours.

When Louis assumed the direction of affairs, he found himself hemmed in, on the side of Germany, Italy and Spain, by Austria; and on all other sides, by Great Britain and Holland. To break through that circumvallation, was an enterprise worthy of a young aspiring monarch; and as enterprising princes generally do, he succeeded. By the valor of his arms, seconded by the infatuation and treachery of his neighbours, he levelled down all the bulwarks of his opponents; and laid Europe open to the inroads of France. He broke the power of Austria and thereby destroyed the union and force of the German empire; he made Spain a province of his dominions; annihilated the arrogant and independent spirit of the Dutch; (g) and deprived Great Britain of all her

- (g) The Dutch struggled long and bravely to consolidate the independence and political rank of their country; from 1709 to 1712 they believed they had succeeded; but one of those unforeseen fatalities, which, in a moment destroys the work of ages, blasted all their hopes. The change of system in

useful connexions on the continent of Europe. (h) His successors made but a poor use of the means he left at their disposal, it is true, but they adhered to the

the British Cabinet, or rather the change of men, (for it is not known to us, that ever a system was adopted there) produced the infamous treaty of Utrecht. The Dutch having spent immense treasures during the war, and obliged to abandon all the advantages they had acquired by it, their proud spirit of independence and ambition for military and naval glory, sunk into a sullen hatred towards Great Britain. That hatred never diminished; on the contrary, the connexions between the Houses of Brunswick and Nassau Orange, and our interference, sometimes by intrigue and sometimes by force, in favor of the Stadtholderate, made every Dutchman our inveterate enemy; and has, in the end, made Holland a department of France.

- (h) Since the peace of Utrecht, Great Britain has had for allies, Portugal, the Stadtholder, Hanover and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel. In every continental war, these powers have been conquered by the arms of France, and have been ransomed either by British money, or by British conquests; or retaken by other powers subsidized for that purpose: witness the surrender of our colonies at every peace, and our subsidies to Prussia &c.

leading principle of his system; they kept fast hold of Spain; took all the measures, which a court like that of Versailles could be expected to devise, to weaken the House of Austria; to attach Holland to France and undermine and divide the British empire. (i)

The revolution has, in no wise altered the politics of France; it has changed the actors and they have adopted new measures. But they are measures much more dangerous to the peace of the civilised world than those of their predecessors. Instead of grovelling, in obscure intrigue, deceit and circumvention, the champions of the republic have substituted, a bold system of treachery, violence and military despotism. During the few years, that they have exercised the supreme authority, the republic has achieved all that

- (i) To direct the government of Spain, to subdue the Low Countries and to attach and secure Holland in the interests of France, were considered as the most effectual means to ruin the maritime trade and destroy the power of Great Britain. These three objects were the principal articles in the political creed of the French monarchy. They are now accomplished! How far their effects may ultimately justify the calculations that have been made upon them, will depend upon the British cabinet. The result will, in all likelihood be shortly seen.

Louis XIV. perhaps, ever intended; France is raised to an eminence of power, which in that prince's time, would have made him as completely master of Europe, as he was of Alsace and Navarre. The treaties of Lunneville and Amiens, have made the First Consul a more formidable potentate, than those of Utrecht and Rastadt made the chief of the House of Bourbon.

However, although the republic may certainly be considered, as completely mistress of the south-west-half of continental Europe, there is another power, of equal force, and perhaps of superior strength, that claims a similar dominion over the north and eastern-parts. We have before said, the political powers and military force of continental Europe, are devided between the governments of France and Russia. These two mighty empires, are come in contact: Berlin, Vienna and Constantincple, can only be considered as three neutral posts, situate in their line of demarcation. By the reduction of other states, the politics of Europe are much simplified; but that very circumstance renders the respective positions of the two dictatorial powers more critical. The intermediate field of their usual machinations is cleared, the slightest motion of the one, must now directly affect the other.

A free, independent and secure communication between the southern provinces of Russia and the

Mediterranean, was an essential article in the fundamental system of Czar Peter; it has been pursued, with more, or less energy by all his successors; and, it is of such importance to the Russian empire that it can never be abandoned.

The navigation of the Black sea, was a standing project in the politics of the French monarchy; it is now obtained, and to preserve it, is a consideration of the utmost consequence to the republic. The Turkish government, sunk as it is, into a lethargic effeminacy, an open passage through the Archipelago and the Dardanelles, gives to France, not only the direction of the trade of that empire, but what, to the consulate, is an object of infinitely greater importance, it lays open the only vulnerable part of the frontiers of Russia.

In the present state of things, can Russia and republican France go mutual sharers in the trade and government of the Turkish empire? This is by no means likely; nay, we may venture to say, it is impossible. Which of the parties then is to give up its pretension? The cabinet of Petersburgh must certainly know, that should the consulate be allowed to assume an ascendancy at Constantinople, or, to intermeddle in the affairs of Turkey, the fate of Moscow may again be disputed at Pultava! Will the present government

of France retract and leave the Seraglio and St. Sophia to the desecration of Russians? In that case, a Cossack and Highland army, seconded by a Russian and British fleet, might yet confine the empire of Bonaparte to the government of his Gauls of the West. Or, can the ambition of Russia and the avarice of France be satisfied with a partial partition of Turkey? It is a known fact, that the consul did propose to the court of Petersburgh, to leave Moldavia, Walachia, Bessarabia, Bosnia and Servia, to the disposal of Russia and Austria, on condition that France might possess Candia, Negropont and other Greek islands in the Archipelago. But Russia, would as soon see France in possession of the canal of Constantinople and the Crimea, as suffer her to fix her feet on posts that might soon command the communication between the Black and Mediterranean seas. (k)

- (k) Had the British ambassador arrived at Paris a few months sooner than he did, His Excellency could have informed Bonaparte, that Russia would not connive with France for the Turkish provinces north of the Danube. His lordship himself had the honor, as an agent, to sign away the property of those countries to the empress Catherine II. This monument of British shame was subscribed to by Sir

To propose an entire partition of the European dominions of the Turks, to whom give Thrace and Constantinople? Besides, Russia will never agree to a division that shall leave the Grecian islands to France; (I)

Charles Whitworth at Petersburgh on the 22 July 1791. We hope it will not prove ominous!

Oczakow was not only the key to the northern provinces of Turkey, it was to Constantinople, what Bergen-op-Zoom and Maestricht formerly were to Amsterdam; and what the Pyrenees might yet be to Madrid. That post in the hands of Russia, to offer her the sovereignty of Moldavia, Walachia and Bessarabia, was ridiculous enough.

The Russians at Akkermann and Soroko, and the French, or their auxiliaries in Malta, the Sultan with his Seraglio have the comfortable prospect of very soon passing, either *au fil de l'épée*, or *sous le knudt*, into the kingdom of Mahomet. It is remarkable, that when the emperor of Turkey was obliged to surrender Oczakow, the king of England was mediator with 36 line of Battle-ships armed, in his favor; and when Malta was ceded to be possessed by France. Great Britain was also an ally in co-operation with Turkey.

- (I) Were the Chief consul to admit amongst the fractional parts of his political calculations, the value of the characters and abilities of the men he finds, here

nor can it be expected that the consulate will leave the Bosphorus to Russia.

Thus, between these two governments matters seem to be come nearly to a crisis. Considering the characters of each respectively, and the powers and attitude of the two empires, if the consul possess only the half of those transcendent talents which his panegyrists are willing to allow him, he must certainly see, that their present cordiality cannot be of long duration. (m) And he is no doubt likewise aware,

and there, at the head of the public affairs of other states, he might, perhaps at this moment, be induced to possess himself of such posts and strongholds in the Levant, as would insure to the republic at once, the dominion which she will otherwise have to fight for. Who knows, but such is his design? We cannot however, presume, that those governments which are most immediately interested, can be so immersed in ignorance and lost to all sense of public duty and personal safety, as not to see through the perfidious manœuvres of the consulate.

(m) It is truly pitiful, to see public ministers and men charged with the defence of nations, cajoling themselves in the hope, that Russia and France will quarrel and fight! Quarrel they certainly will, but when that event takes place, woe to their neighbours! While at peace, their mutual preponderance requires

that while Great Britain can powerfully interfere, to risk a quarrel with Russia would be imprudent and dangerous.

In this situation it appears to us, and indeed daily occurrences seem to confirm our opinion, that the

only dependency and obedience: at war, their hostilities will impose upon the eastern continent, submission and slavery.

When the Czar and the Consul draw forth their legions in hostile array, mediation, armed coalitions, neutral conventions and *demarcation-lines*, will be of little avail. Those powers have long been unused to cabinet warfare, and to courtier *éiquette* in the field. The intervention of other states, may hasten their own subjection, but cannot ward off their fate. The chieftains of Russia and France, will meet nearly on the centre of the world: the object of their quarrel will not be a bishoprick, a sugar-island, nor, who shall read their mass in latin, or say their prayers in greek: they will fight for the possession of the *Hellespont* and *Bosphorus*, two posts on which hangs now suspended, the empire of our eastern hemisphere. Such contending parties will not come out to skirmish and then mutually retire; nor will they fight for conquests to give away; the one will keep the field, — and with it, the dictatorship of the world.

plan of the Chief consul is, to manage the court of Petersburgh until he disengage his rear; that is, until he shall tie down the British government to passive inactivity.

To point out the measures by which the rulers of France intend to reduce the British government to inaction, is here unnecessary; they are already plainly exhibited to the world. When the rest of Europe was beaten off the field, Bonaparte saw, that to fight with Great Britain alone, was an unprofitable trade; the archives of Versailles furnished him with several striking examples: but in that same library, the General learned, that in a campaign of diplomatic negotiations, victory was certain; this was tried, and, the consulate make it no secret, that, the success far exceeded their most sanguine expectations. Since our continental alliances have been reduced to a few needy subsidiaries, the only means which we have had, to check the ambitious projects of France, were, to keep the French colonies and trade under the guns of a preponderating navy. This check the consul has not only removed, but he has also inverted the position. The peace of Amiens has left the British colonies under the guns of France; every passage to, and from our possessions abroad, is now flanked by posts already garrisoned, or to be garri-

sioned by the the republic and her auxiliaries; and England herself is half encircled by the naval *depôts* and rising *flottilles* of her enemies. Bonaparte considers Great Britain, as being reduced to the necessity of hereafter confining all her military and naval operations to the defence of her own dominions. (n) Abroad he has now no vulnerable point for us to attack; and our communication with the continent of Europe and Africa, depends immediately upon his will. These circumstances open to the republic, another advantage of a more serious nature, and which, the consul believes, will lay open and expose to his tactics, the very soul of the state; namely, the financial sources of the nation.

Bonoparte's opinion on the Finances of England has been repeatedly expressed to the following effect.

i. That the annual expenditure amounting to such an immense sum, the ministry dared not augment it; and therefore they made peace.

- (n) No state, once reduced to fight in its own defence ever fought long. It is now about a century, that the military operations of Holland, Austria and Turky have been confined to the defensive; and the warfare, as well as the independence, of these states, may be considered as having nearly ceased.

2. That the peace, having enabled the republic to secure all the valuable possessions of France, Holland, Spain and Portugal, and to exclude Great Britain from the continent of Europe, when occasion may require, the British merchants and men of property, seeing the nation deprived of every possibility of making new conquests and of extending their commerce and manufactures, will not come forward with their money to enable the government to re-commence a war, which can produce nothing but public danger.

3. That, should a ministry, obtain the confidence of the public, so as to be able to raise the funds, to re-equip the navy and organize the army, with the other expenses attendant on war-like preparations, would, in the course of the first two years, absorb a capital, the interest of which, would require ten millions sterling to be raised annually upon the public: a sum, that added to the present expenditure, would either revolutionize the country or make a national bankruptcy inevitable.

So that although the ministry in parliament, declared the resources of the nation to be still abundant to continue the war, it was perfectly evident, that the danger which they apprehended from the pressure of the public burdens, was the real cause that made

them sue for peace. (o) Deprived of every prospect of gaining by war, they will not now get money to

(o) It is rather unmannerly of Bonaparte, to say, that old England sued for peace! However, if it be true, as the world really believes it is, that the terms of the peace have broken down those bulwarks, which centuries of warfare, "heaps of treasure and streams of British blood had raised around "the British empire," and that the soul and body of the empire itself, are thereby exposed to the up-lifted daggers of a Jacobin republic, we cannot, should we dislike the consuls philippics, with any sort of plausibility deny the fact.

At no period of the war was the situation of France so critical, as just when the preliminaries of London were signed. To have lost the battle of Maringo, might have lost the progress of the campaign, but the consequence would have been nothing more. At the juncture we refer to, the existence of the republic, the destiny of France, hung upon the will of an irritated and all powerful enemy. The British navy was completely mistress of the Ocean, of the Gulph of Mexico, the Baltic, Mediterranean and Indian seas; from the Point of Florida to cape Horn and from Madagascar to Japan every island port and place, were under our command and at our disposal; as were also the continent

recommence hostilities. Or, if they could still add to the national debt and public imposts, that very cir-

of Africa, Egypt, Syria, Natolia, Cyprus, Candia, the Morea and Greecian islands, Malta, Sicily, and Lisbon. No nation ever stood in such a posture. And sue for peace! A frank declaration to the world, and a liberal proposition to the court of Petersburgh and to the United States, would have instantaneously rallied all the sovereigns of Europe and America (the king of Spain not excepted) around the British standard. Then we might have consolidated our maritime empire, every state that bordered on the sea would have become our natural ally, and all civilized nations our cordial and constant friends. And France, republic or monarchy, no matter which, might have been finally remanded within the limits of her own legal dominions. These Bonaparte saw, and by an address, (or, perhaps from our want of address), he snatched away the fruit of all our toils. The very means we then possessed, to have interwoven the interests of Europe and America with our own, the consul is now dealing out to unite the world in enmity against us.

It cannot fail to be highly gratifying to the present rulers of France, to hear, maintained in the British senate, a doctrine, in itself preposterous and in its effects the most dangerous that ever was

cumstance would ruin the government. The British ministry must therefore, to preserve the state, main-

introduced into the councils of a king — to wit — that, to retain in peace conquests made in war, marks ambition, rouses the jealousy of other powers and creates enemies to the state: whereas, to give up conquests bought with our blood, manifests magnanimity and moderation, and quiets the anxiety of our neighbours: the latter is therefore, in sound policy, to be preferred. We shall not comment on this dangerous and cowardly precept; but merely observe, that if it be persisted in, Great Britain will not long be the envy of her neighbours. She is now, no more their dread!

Jealousy arises from rivalry, which implies a pretension to equal power; as Great Britain lately stood, no such pretension could have been set up; or if it had, to what purpose? In possession of the object and able to defend it, the jealousy of rivals soon dies in its own impotence. If, to avoid the jealousy of those whose rivalry we always despised, we have (as it is said) given up the object, *viz.* — *the sources and securities of our maritime preponderance*, we have no great chance to meet with a similar modesty on the part of our neighbours. While Bonaparte can command their obedience, all the powers of Europe may burn with jealousy, as long as they please,

tain the peace; and that proud nation must be a passive spectator of the rising glories of France.

Such is the opinion of the chief consul; and, we are sorry to add, that it is more, or less, the opinion of all the governments of continental Europe.

To justify his calculation and insure the pacific neutrality of Great Britain, Bonaparte will keep the government in a continual state of suspense. To oblige the ministry to carry the annual expenditure, more, and more above the receipt of the public revenue the consulate will order, or pretend to have ordered, squadrons of gun-boats and light vessels, to be built and armed on the Mississippi, on the Rio-grande de la Madalena and on the Orenoco; the republic will form, or talk of forming settlements, on the Red and Win-

for what he cares. And we may hereafter plead our magnanimity with as much effect, as the *ci-devant* king of Sardinia lately pleaded his attachment to the republic.

But stop here. It is likewise maintained in St. Stephen's holy-hall, that the acquisition of military and naval posts, of territories, population, produce and revenue, doth not strengthen nor add to the power of the republic. If that be true, it is the most comfortable piece of news that we have heard since the surrender of Alexandria.

nipeg lakes, in Tupinamb and Cap-del-rey; and the consul will enter into treaty with the president of the United States, to declare Acadia and Canada free republics, to put New-britain, Hudsons-bay and the island of Newfoundland, under the natural sovereignty of America; and that free ships shall make free cargos. Orders will likewise be given, to build squadrons on the Euphrates, at Bassora, Gombaroon, on the Indus, and on the lakes in Siba; to take possession and fortify the islands of Salsetta, Ormus and Kismish; the posts of Aden, Zeila, the islands and ports of Camarana, Erquiko and Monbaza, will be ceded to France; (p) and the republic will make settlements in Sindi, Guzerat, Aracan and Pegu. (q) A treaty

- (p) To possess and secure the command of the gulf of Ormus and straits of Bab-el-mandel, is not a new speculation; if the late empress Catherine II would have countenanced the views of France, that project would have been attempted in 1785 and 1786. Perhaps Bonaparte may have more influence in the councils of the present emperor than Vergennes had in those of Catherine.
- (q) With respect to the Dutch settlements abroad, as they were given up at Amiens, they will be garrisoned and stored without any unnecessary parade or pompous demonstration. It is inconceivable

with the emperor Alexander to reinstate the Mogul and hereditary princes of Indostan in their former rank and possessions, will be approved of by the Sophi of Persia, consecrated by the Grand Lama and cried through the streets of London, Calcutta, Madrass and Delhi. A senatus-consultus, prohibiting the importation of British manufactures and the consumption of British cured-fish in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey, and forbidding the transit of British produce through Holland and up the Rhine, will be talked of, perhaps really issued: and a convention to recover and maintain the liberty of the sea, under the auspices of France and Russia, will be acceded to by all the maritime states of Europe. (r)

how the people of England can be so far deluded, as not to see, that the *ci-devant* Dutch colonies in Asia, Africa and America, are, and must necessarily be, subject to the consulate. Every body knows, that, the Batavian republic is a department of France; and it requires no very deep sagacity to see, that Bonaparte will make the appertenances of his departments subservient to the execution of his future projects.

- (r) To these demonstrations, will no doubt be added some diplomatic altercation, for instance, the

Besides these menaces abroad, we shall be amused with the consul's preparations at home; dozens of line of battle ships will be launching monthly in the ports of Holland, France and Spain; gunboats will rise in the channel like mushrooms; and St. Valery, Boulogne, Mardik, Dunkirk and Flushing will be converted into spacious impregnable naval harbours. (s) Naval manœuvres, (t) military encamp-

French minister may tread upon the British ambassador's toes at Petersburgh, or at Constantinople; a Danish ballad-singer may be paid to draw another resemblance of the king's minister at Copenhagen, a French-jew buying, or pretending to buy muskets there, may again attempt to purchase a passport at his excellency's office; the vice president of Italy will arrest, or cause to be *deported* some dozens of our English beaux from Rome, or Naples; and the prefect of Switzerland will, by mistake, hang an English secretary there for a spy &c.

- (s) We believe it is intended to make St. Valery the grand naval *dépt* for the flotilles and light squadrons of the republic, in the channel.
- (t) In case of another war, these manœuvres will be so managed, as to make it appear to the people of England, that no serious invasion is intended; and squadrons will no doubt be sacrificed to shew, that

ments, sham-fights and reviews, will be exhibited to astonish and terrify the swarms of our gaping countrymen, who, to the disgrace of the British name, are daily flocking to cringe and bow before their sovereign's tumid foe! (u)

if such really was intended, to land would be impossible. To disarm, or turn our opponent off his guard is always an advantage; no matter by what means.

- (u) Britons have for many ages been considered as the people possessing the most laudable and dignified national pride: they are the only people in Europe who have neither been beaten, nor in any wise humiliated during the course of the late revolution war; and it is remarkable, that after the peace, they are the only people who, in a contemptible admiration for a rebel chief, have lost sight of their own and their country's worth. Other nations have been despoiled and conquered, they have bowed to the tyrant's sceptre by compulsion; but peers of England, British senators, and English men of all descriptions seem to regret the valor of their defenders; they are proud to be noticed in the ring of Bonaparte's gallic slaves; and hurry in crowds to offer their oblations to the foul priestess of that polluted temple of treason (the Tuilleries) still rancid with a sovereigns blood! We cannot here

Dissertations will be periodically circulated on the continent to shew, that the trade and manufactures of Great Britain are ruinous to all other countries; that for these hundred years past, the maritime pre-ponderance of England has hung like a mill stone upon the neck of Europe and America; and that her politics have ruined all those states with whom she has been connected. (x) Others will be distributed

avoid mentioning a circumstance that lately happened on the continent: One of the first monarchs in Europe, desired a nobleman at his court to prepare to go as his Ambassador, or rather Plenipotentiary to Bonaparte; the other replied, "for the first time that ever a ——— demurred to execute the orders of his master, I am upon this occasion, proud to disobey your Majesty's commands. As an officer, I cannot be the instrument to compromise the dignity of my sovereign's crown; and as a gentleman, I dare not dishonor a nobleman who wears my name and your Majesty's uniform."

- (x) The late king of Prussia said to an English gentleman of our acquaintance — "you (meaning the British nation) are now making a last effort to subsidize Europe to fight with France, until you secure to yourselves, a monopoly of the trade of the world; should you succeed, you will then soon make us repay your subsidies with usury."

amongst the people of England, setting forth, that the national debt is a burden laid on the poor, merely

Whatever the people of England may be told to the contrary, we can, from a personal knowledge of facts, affirm, that this doctrine is believed in every cabinet and by every political economist on the continent of Europe. The present dependent state and *certain* subjugation of Portugal, the ruin and conquest of Holland, and the degradation of Spain, with a thousand circumstances of a similar nature, are artfully laid to our charge; and all the little scurrilous predictions, of our decline, that issues from the numerous presses now in all countries devoted to the cause of our enemies, are read and heard with avidity and pleasure by the people of all ranks and professions. Let those fools read them, say our English politicians, what is that to us. Did we not know the end purposed, and see the effects daily produced, by the newspaper-statements and comparative views circulated by the secretaries, clerks and emissaries of the consulate, we might perhaps join in the chorus with our *dotard* countrymen. But we see in those productions, the advertisements and *programme* of the most formidable combination that ever was planned against an empire. And although we know that it will not be

to augment the wealth of the rich; that it is the cause of all the taxes and of the high price of provisions;

believed, conviction compels us to affirm, that Bonaparte's pamphlets and pensions, have more effect in confirming the several states of Europe in their enmity towards Great Britain, than all the subsidies the British treasury can ever pay, will have in conciliating their friendship. Subsidies are, no doubt, considerations to the agents and commissaries employed in paying and receiving them, and they may have a certain momentary value with the mistress of a prince, or a minister; but they never were, nor will they ever be, a national consideration to any state. The spoils of the British empire, are on the contrary, objects of the most seducing nature; scattered as they are, they suit the interests and ambition of many speculators; and the consul's liberality will perhaps increase, as he augments this means.

We do not mean to infer, that Great Britain has any imminent danger to apprehend from the organized enmity of Europe; but as that enmity can in no wise, promote the interests of England, but on the contrary, may prove more or less detrimental to them, we think it might be as well to prevent its organization; especially as that could yet be

that if it were abolished, porter would be sold at two-pence the pot, and bread at three pence the quarter-loaf; and it will be demonstrated, by metaphysical sophistry, that to pay the debts of generations past, and to fulfil the engagements of transient ministers, is no part of the duty of freemen. To this will be added, a parallel drawn between the present state and future prospects of Great Britain and France: wherein will be set forth, — the one, as having in 1762 passed the meridian of her power; in 1782 lost one half of the sources of her maritime trade; and as having in 1802 given up, or exposed the other half to the discretion of France; as possessing but a precarious revenue, to be pressed out of an equally precarious commerce; subject to an enormous expenditure, which may be augmented, or doubled by a single gesture of the first consul; in fine, as a state now reduced, despised, by the greater powers and hated by the lesser. Whereas, — France will be represented, as having by the revolution encreased her European territory by one 4th; abolished her debt, doubled her revenne, tripled her power; and as having acquired more real sources of maritime trade than all Europe possesses

done with much facility, and to the great and permanent advantages of the British empire.

besides; as being now at the head of the political world, dictating to the most powerful states and protecting the weaker. In short, Great Britain will be, we may say is already, held up as being on a rapid decline; with her remaining powers resting merely upon paper, ships, wet-docks and canals; while the republic is cried up as having built her growing prosperity and future grandeur upon solid acquisitions of territory, produce and population. (y)

(y) The present state and future prospects of Great Britain and France compared, is, according to Parisian news, to be exposed to the public by a well known disciple of Abbé Sieyes. This arch emissary, had some of his materials arranged and presented to the K— of — by colonel C——— at Berlin already in 1798. Having seen the manuscripts, we recollect, that to deliver the industry of Europe from the oppression of our *chapman laws*, as they were termed, was strongly recommended to the humanity of that young monarch. No doubt the heavy debts of our Jamaica planters, and the restrictions under which European settlers labour in Bengal, have by this time moved the compassion of this philanthropic jacobin; and we shall very soon see, a plan drawn up, according to which, the former may pay off their burdens by an Act of

Such are, and will continue to be, the manœuvres, by which the rulers of France will endeavour to embarrass the finances, fatigue the government, and depress the spirit of the British nation. The inveterate enmity of those rulers can never be removed; for unless Great Britain be reduced to a passive inferiority, they cannot consider their republic as consolidated or secure.

It is said and industriously propagated, that Bonaparte having established his authority in France, it is become his personal interest to cultivate a pacific understanding with all his neighbours. And that, as he is now capable of maintaining ties of political relationship with other powers, it is their interests to support his authority.

This reasoning has no doubt originated with the consul's confessor bishop Talleyrand. That it should have gained admittance and approbation in the councils of Europe and America, seems to be owing to

the assembly of the island, and the latter by a similar deed, may re-assume their natural freedom of trading with whom they please. It is not unlikely, that the first consul may think proper to disapprove of this plan; but he will certainly permit its being made public; and Mr._____ is a supple negotiator; he has his secretaries in more *bureaus* than one.

the baneful influence, of that hideous genius, which jacobinism and rebellion have set loose upon mankind. The fact is, — when Bonaparte signified his desire for peace, his authority was not established; his situation, as well as that of the republic, was as we have mentioned, extremely critical; he sought peace with his neighbours, that he might have time to establish his authority, and to save the republic from what he considered, and what might have easily been brought about, its almost certain destruction. The consul foresaw the effects which the conquest of Egypt was to produce in both England and France; he saw the still greater effects, which, Great Britain holding the destiny of the Turkish empire in her hand, might then have produced at Petersburgh; and he knew that in America, a single word to the purpose would have obliged president Jefferson to change his system, or his place, and might have barred France, for ever from that side of the Atlantic; nor could he consider Portugal an equivalent for Brasil. Besides the Arms of both Portugal and Spain might have been turned against him. (z) Under these cir-

(z) In this position, the consul knew, that to have adopted a certain system of politics (which may yet be necessary when it will be more difficult to

circumstances was peace obtained, and it is no wonder Bonaparte should wish to preserve it; at least until he acquire the means to command peace, or to defy war. When he believes himself in that situation, we shall see how far, and upon what terms, he is disposed to maintain his pacific relationship with his neighbours. (a)

carry it into practice) the British government, might in the space of six months after the surrender of Alexandria, have drawn forth into Action, all the power of Austria, Russia, America and Spain, against the republic: not to fight for subsidy, nor for the commercial interests of Great Britain, but to fight for their own interests.

It may be said, that had Bonaparte felt himself in the predicament we have mentioned, he would not have been so haughty and imperious during the negotiation. The contempt with which the consul seemed to treat the negotiation, and his arrogance upon that occasion, might be accounted for, by several reasons; but, that to mask his anxiety was one leading motive, is certain.

(a) Bonaparte has great advantages over his contemporaries. He was brought up in the world, and in active life. Beginning his career as a subaltern, his profession obliged him to think; and the habit of thinking no doubt taught him to calculate. The

It must be evident to the world, that the present rulers of the republic, from whatever point of

revolution enabled him to see men of all descriptions exposed without disguise; and now consul, he easily sees through the masks of those who have the vanity or folly to attempt to deceive him. This adventurer is in possession of absolute power, has the means to make that power irresistible, and has experience at an early period of life. He is the patron and protector of all sorts of principles, professions and prejudices; and is himself bound by none.

Amongst the absurdities of the times, it is not one of the least, to hear the legislators of Great Britain propping up the power of the British empire by the discontent and broils which they foresee generating in France, and with the jealousy which the politics of the republic is said to be raising amongst other continental governments. The obstinacy of infatuation is astonishing! Should the people of France be angry with the man who snatched their country from the precipice of inevitable ruin, and who raised *them* to the dictatorship of the world? And will they oppose his endeavours to consolidate their situation? But they are oppressed, says John Bull! If we ask with what? — the whole of John's *corps diplomatique* cannot tell. In politics and in

view they are taken, can only be considered as rebel chiefs. They were born subjects of their king, most of them held offices in his service, and at mature age, swore allegiance to his government; he is alive, and at this time is morally, as well entitled to sit on the throne of France, as any hereditary monarch can be to sit on the throne of his ancestors. These usurpers know, that, however pliable and passive the politics of other governments may have, now and then appeared, it cannot be presumed that legitimate sovereigns should prostitute the dignity of their stations, and expose the safety of their persons and families in so palpable a manner as voluntarily to sanction the rebellion, robberies, pillage and plunder of the republic; and asso-

public society, oppression is relative. To attempt to scare Bonaparte with the jealousy of other powers, is, perhaps still more ridiculous! Those who have any power, are his associates in despoiling those who have none. What benefit could the change of the name of a chief produce to Great Britain, or to Europe? Would a General Moreau or a Masena be less a Frenchman than Bonaparte? No, — but we say they may be less *habile*! When the ability of enemies becomes a consideration with Britons, then Alas! our legislators may go home and plant potatoes.

ciate in treaties of friendship and mutual support, with the irreconcileable enemies of all legal government. The chief consul knows, that the treaties; which he has imposed upon other states, are extorted bonds, and will never bind the conscience. He is well aware, that when his authority in France has occasion for help from abroad, his part of the drama will be nearly out. Nor can he suppose that his neighbours are less sensible, that the support of France implies her dominion. In short, rebels know that rebellion can only be legalized by ultimate success; and that while any legal government possesses the means of opposition, and resistance, the success of the French republic cannot be considered as secure. The consul may profess peace and friendship with all states; and he may offer alliances to the great, and protection to weak; but every legitimate sovereign should know, that when the missionaries of Bonaparte approach his throne, they come either to spoil, crush, or undermine it. The destruction, or subjugation of all independent nations, especially of all rival powers, is with the rulers of France, a principle of self-preservation, and is, therefore interwoven with the very existence of their military community.

We would not be understood to say, that the present government of France intends to conquer,

and incorporate with the republic, all other European states: On the contrary, we do not suppose that the consulate would wish Holland, Spain, nor perhaps Italy, more immediately under the police of France than those countries now are: Nor, do we believe, that while Great Britain and Russia continue in their present posture, Bonaparte would countenance a farther reduction of Austria, nor the expulsion of the Turkish government from Europe. We consider the real system of the French republic, to be neither more nor less, than, *an universal ascendancy raised upon natural sources sufficient to maintain a preponderant power.* Such an ascendancy is essential to the existence of the republic, and it will be pursued as long as that fabric does exist. The obstacle which stands most directly in the way of that pursuit, is the naval empire of Great Britain; its reduction is therefore the object, upon which the hero of the nineteenth century must first employ his natural and moral faculties, and all his supernatural talents.

R U S S I A.

In as far as this country affects the politics and commercial interests of the civilized world, the Czar Peter may be said to have first discovered it.

To attempt to give a sketch of the national sources, power and military force of Russia, would be premature; for almost every news-paper announces another kingdom, nation, or tribe, added to some point, or quarter of that swelling empire. Such is, already the extent and situation of its territories, the nature and abundance of its produce, (b) and

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- (b) The extent of that part of the Russian empire which is susceptible of culture, considering the fertility of the soil, and allowing for the variety of climates, is capable of being, in the single reign of another Peter, made to produce subsistence sufficient for the present population of Europe. Administered by a senate, or a popular college, national improvements make but slow progress; every minister has his department, in which, he goes on in a *routine*; (similar to the boy who turns the spit) to approve the form of a *casque*, and the cut of a soldier's jacket, is the function of one; to order a new assessment on beer and brandy, is the business of another; and to support the project of a new dock,

the number of its population; (c) that another Peter, a Catherine, or an *Alexander*, may extend

quay, or of a canal to oblige the merchants of Petersburgh and Riga, employ the time and exercises the talents of a third; and so on in pitiful detail. Peter was himself directing minister for the State; a financier as well as general; an engineer and farmer. His projects were all national, and he carried them into effect by the united efforts of his subjects. A barrel of corn not raised, but which might have been produced, he considered as a barrel of corn lost to the community. When hereditary sovereigns, presumptively secure, by their birth-right, retire from the laborious affairs of the state, and loiter out their days in a masquerade or a court, it is remarkable how rapidly the spirit of a nation can mollify, and how the energy of the public always relax! We have the example of all nations, both ancient and modern, as a retrospective illustration of this melancholy fact.

- (c) The population of the Russian empire, exclusive of Georgia, amounts, by the latest enumeration, to about 42 millions; whereof, there are upwards of 20 millions of male peasants, 700,000 enrolled soldiers, and 50,000 servants for the staff; and 1,200,000 free-men of all descriptions. The military strength of all states must be estimated by the proportion

its dominion to the extremities of Europe and Asia. (d)

which those employed in productive labor, bear to those who are not. In a country where agriculture and the exploration of the soil occupy all the industry of the nation, there are few idlers; a greater proportion of the inhabitants may therefore, without inconvenience to the whole, be maintained in the service of the state, or in military exercise, than there can be in mercantile and manufacturing countries. Those who live by trade, or traffic and refined manufactures, are not only themselves unprofitable consumers, but their subsistence and gains, are taxes or burdens on the industry and consumption of others. In England for instance, the subsistence of those employed in measuring ells of ribbon and yards of muslin; in weighing ounces of tea and half pounds of sugar; in scribbling accounts and in pleading mercantile cases; amount to more than the expense of all the Russian army. That army is however, now and then adding a new kingdom to the empire; whereas the former are depressing the national spirit, in corrupting and sapping the vigor and morality of their country.

- (d) Since nations have fought to extend their dominions, their progression has depended more upon the ability of peace-makers, than upon the talents

The politics of the Russian government are, as the politics of all governments should ever be, guided

of military heroes. Peter I. was a politician as well as a soldier; he knew, that to conquer in war was not enough; he also knew, that not to be conquered in his turn, it was necessary to retain in peace, such posts as could both guarantee the possession of his own territories and facilitate the future acquisition of others.

Charles XII conquered Denmark and Poland; and lived to lose not only his conquests, but also one half of his hereditary dominions, and the independence of his kingdom. The war, undertaken and carried on by the so called, Grand-alliance, was one continued series of victory; and the peace of Utrecht and Rastadt ruined the House of Austria, the principal party in that alliance; subjugated Holland, and laid Germany open to France. The maritime war carried on by Great Britain in 1759—60—61—62, was a train of conquests; and the peace of 1763 produced the conditions of that of 1783. The late war was on our part, a series of the most unparalleled success. We trust the peace of Amiens will not facilitate what that of Paris began, — the reduction of our maritime power!

Had Charles XII, after the battle of Narva, secured his posts on the Neva, Sweden might yet have

by the interests of the state: and the interests of Russia have as little connexion with those of other nations

been what Gustavus Adolphus left her. The acquisition of Noteburg, now Schlusselburg, Nyeskantz now Petersburgh, and of the Islands of Retusari now Cronstadt, posts of no consideration to the Swedish hero, secured to Russia the dominion of the north of Europe; and has enabled that government to extend a dictatorial influence over all Europe and Asia. By the more recent acquisitions of the Crimea, Oczakow and Georgia; — Constantinople, Ispahan and Delhi are now as much in the power of Russia, as Stockholm, Warsaw and Copenhagen, have long been. Had the peace-makers at Utrecht, secured an independent monarchy in Spain, and given to the United Provinces a territorial basis, such as sound policy, justice and even common sense pointed out, Europe might yet have been composed of independent states. Had Great Britain at the peace of 1763, maintained her conquests, she would not have had to sign away the half of her empire in 1783. Nor would it have been necessary to purchase the respite of Amiens with the safety of the other half.

It has been argued, that Great Britain lost nothing by the independency of America, because that country did not pass under the dominion of another

as the etiquette of the court of Peking has with the ceremonies of the conclave at Rome. That great

power! By the same mode of reasoning, we should lose nothing were Ireland, Indostan and Jamaica free republics, so as we could trade with them! Is it then no object to Great Britain that the republic adds to the monopoly of her own extensive colonies, a free intercourse and open trade with ours? Is the political influence, military and naval power of the United States added to those of France, and all the ports of America shut against the British flag and against the produce of British industry, no consideration? It would be well if such matters did not in any wise affect the interests of the British nation; for although we have no particular inclination to prognosticate, we may freely affirm, that a trial, such as the world has seldom seen, will very soon be made, to bring about a separation between Great Britain and the remainder of her foreign settlements.

The insurmountable difficulties that is said would attend the march, or passage of a Russian army through Parthia and Bucharia to Cashmire and Cabul, or by the Euphrates to Bassora, reminds us of Mr. Canning's crocodiles that eat up Bonaparte's army on the banks of the Nile! And the estimations drawn up to shew the force which the

empire stands alone, at the head of the political world; its chief may not only controul the measures

Persian cavalry and the Arabian strollers would oppose to such an expedition, seems to be made from the same scale, by which we lately saw calculated the resistance the valiant Swiss were to make to the legions of France. How is it possible to presume that Persia, in its present state, could make any opposition to the demands or operations of Russia? From Astrabad to Ispahan, is not further than from York to London. From the port of Zaue or the Tendzen-river, and from the Aral-lake, to Cabul, is only about as far as from Oczakow to Teflis. A million of camels are to be found on the roads, and should a Russian army be pleased to purchase them, they cost only about the value of forty shillings a head; a hundred pound weight of wheat costs 15 pence, as much salt 2 pence, an ox of six to eight cwt. about 20 shillings, and a sheep of 200 lb. 4 shillings sterling. We can scarcely believe that an army of Cosacs and Kalmucs would find such a country impassable? especially when they are told that Tahmas-Kouli-Khan, on an excursion of pleasure rather than an expedition of war, brought a booty worth sixty millions sterling out of Indostan. And would the Grand Signor refuse a passage through his territories to Bassora, when only to

of all other powers, but he may likewise make them subservient to the advancement of his own. Mistress of

demur upon the demand might cost him Constantinople? If the safety of Delhi, Agra and other places in India, depend upon their distance from the frontiers of Russia, and upon the difficulties and dangers of the route, we would recommend to the Mogul and those concerned with him, to make terms, or hide their treasures as soon as they can.

We are told in England, and it is said, that writers have been paid to prove it, that the trade of Indostan cannot be carried on through Persia and Tartary by Russia; nor through the Persian gulph and Red-sea by France. That may be, but should these powers conjointly, or either of them, acquire the dominion of India, doth that imply, that the trade of Asia with Europe, must change its usual channel? We believe not. The French republic will, we know, very soon possess herself of Brasil, and she will, bring the produce of that country across the Atlantic as formerly. That the British and Portuguese navies could interrupt the passage, is possible, at least for a time; but what benefit could that produce to either? Besides, to keep those navies equipt, Indostan and Brasil are perhaps as necessary, as water is to keep them afloat.

the Baltic, Livonia and Poland, of the Black and Caspian-seas, Georgia and the Caucasus; the frontiers of Russia are inaccessible to any force that could possibly be brought against them, (e) and every part of continental Europe and Asia, is open to the inroads of her irresistible armies. Commanding as she doth, the Sound and the Belts, *if she do not lose the Bosphorus*, no check whatever can be set upon her future operations. That immense monarchy can neither be controlled by power, nor has it *yet* any common interests to bind its government to the rest of the world. Russia is therefore neither naturally, nor in politics the ally of any other state.

- (e) The Frontiers of the Russian empire, are, one half surrounded with an un-navigable ocean, six-^{7th} of the other half are covered with Asiatic nations, and wandering tribes, and mistress of the Baltic and Black-sea the remaining part is inaccessible; or that is, the space, we may say Isthmus, between Riga and Oczakow is the only frontier the Russian government has to guard; and Europe cannot organize a force that could now make any impression on that quarter. Were the hero of Maringo with all his veterans on the banks of the Boristhenes it is by no means likely that he would risk a *journée de Pultava*.

In England we say, "we can block up the Baltic" and ruin her trade, or we can send a fleet to Cronstadt and compel her to accede to terms." Although we may applaud the spirit of our countrymen, we cannot but regret their confined knowledge of other states! The fact is, that since the kings of Denmark and Sweden were reduced, and driven by our ill calculated mercantile politics, to hold their crowns and dominions of the Russian government *in FEE*; we can no more annoy that power in the Baltic than we can on the Oby. (f) And we may, with as much effect,

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- (f) Why the Castle of Croneburg has been called the key of the Baltic we know not, the Danes themselves did not consider it as such; for in their hostilities with Sweden they could never prevent the Swedish squadrons passing and repassing. Nor could the Swedes, master of both Croneburg and Elsingburg, and with a fleet in the Sound, prevent a Dutch squadron passing through to the assistance of Denmark in 1658. But the channel of Dragoe, or that between the island of Amak and the Swedish shore, is already impassable for heavy ships; and by sinking a few hulks, or naval horn-works, such as the Swedes have at Carlsrona, both this channel, as well as the passage of the Belts, may be rendered perfectly impracticable to strangers: and that without detriment to the navigation of the

employ the British navy to arrest the currents in the Pacific ocean, as to attempt to check the progress of

Danes themselves. Nor will the port of Copenhagen be again so easily approached as it lately was.

But suppose the Baltic were accessible, what could a British fleet do there without a port or an anchorage? In friendship with Denmark, and in co-operation with Sweden, and all their ports and arsenals open to us, what did Norris with 30 sail of men of war, do there in 1720 and 1721? He cruised between Stockholm and Revel, and saw the Russians with 42 sail of the line, 300 gallies, 480 flat-bottom boats and 24 bomb-vessels, lay waste the coast of Sweden for 300 miles round Stockholm, and to within 20 miles of that capital. The British fleet dared not to attempt the passages through which the Russians sailed, nor to approach any part of the enemy's coast, at any rate, they did not try; nor did they during the two campaigns ever fire a gun. After having extorted, from Sweden, the cession of the Dutchy of Bremen and Verden to the elector of Hanover as the price of our succours, we are unwilling to presume that the British admiral could have been instructed, to remain a voluntary spectator of the terrible ravages then committed in that unfortunate country by the Russian armies.

the political arrangements and military operations of Russia by interrupting her maritime trade. The trade

Prior to our last expedition to the Baltic, the unfortunate Paul, actuated more by candor than guided by policy, declared war six months before either himself or any of his maritime allies could move. The Danish hulks, which fought Admiral Nelson, were cut out through the Ice to their station after the British fleet was in the Categate. And what could that campaign, had it been persisted in, have produced? The destruction of Copenhagen? That is not certain. And if it had, what then? Had the Prince Royal been obstinate, we could not have passed that port without putting a garrison in it; and 20,000 men could not have defended it three weeks. Denmark neutral, what could *even* Lord Nelson have done? gone off Carls-crona and looked in, for to go in, is impossible. He could not have gone so near as to look into Cronstadt. By the time he had made that cruise, the season would have obliged him to retire. Supposing the islands of Zealand and Amak in the possession of hostile armies, were the whole British navy in the Baltic they might be land-locked there in one night. We know, that some who never saw the passages that lead into the Baltic, and who have seen them without looking at them, or who do not

of the Baltic, Black and white seas, is to Europe in general, and to Great Britain in particular, an object

know the means possessed by those who command them, will laugh at our assertions, and swear that British sailors could blow Denmark out of the water. It is not the approbation of such men that we desire. We know the easy practicability of defending the entrance of the Baltic, and we know that it will be defended should occasion again require; we therefore disapprove of any hostile campaign in that sea, except when we have Denmark and Sweden, or at least one of them, in co-operation with us.

Our late convoy-war, which we always reprobated and will ever regret, has produced more effects than were in all probability expected to arise from it. In the first years of the war with France the numbers of American vessels taken by our cruisers, and detained for, we know not what, created reiterated altercation, and produced Mr. Jay's treaty; those altercations, and this treaty, changed the whole political system of the United States, and we may say, revolutionised their government. President Adams, with those who were averse to a dependent connexion with France, were held up to public execration, and dismissed from all places of public trust; Mr. Jefferson, and his friends,

of great importance; but to Russia herself, were those seas dry, her powers of action would be the

attached to the cause of the Jacobin-revolution, were invested with the government of the republic; and the influence, power, military and naval force of the United States, were forthwith arraigned on the side of our inveterate enemies. How far they have yet changed their position, we leave to be explained by those, whose immediate duty it is to watch over the vulnerable parts of the empire. At the commencement of the French revolution, the late Count Bernstorff, who then guided the affairs of Denmark, and influenced the politics of Sweden, foresaw the effects which a maritime war was likely to have upon the trade of the northern states; and that the mercantile transactions of individuals, might not, in any wise interfere with the political relationship of the several governments, he proposed an arrangement, whereby the trade and maritime intercourse of the respective countries should be publicly and fairly regulated; but he was answered by certain of the leading parties, as the barons of the Exchequer might be expected to answer the petition of a reputed smuggler. When the war broke out, Count Bernstorff was still disposed to favour the interests of Great Britain, that is, in as far as strict neutrality would allow, and would have forbidden

same; she could then make the Categate, the Mediterranean, Persian-gulph and Yellow-sea, her maritime

the reception of privateers and captured property in the ports of Denmark and Norway; but a diplomatic correspondence, which we shall notice hereafter, having in the mean time made that minister consider his sovereign insulted in his own person, all amicable explanation was at an end. Cremations and recriminations employed the diplomacy of both parties; dismissed clerks, bankrupt brokers, and discharged ship-masters, were paid to rummage counting-houses, store-houses, ships and ship-warfs for subjects of complaint; and the most ridiculous chapman-dealings were represented as great expeditions, carrying on by that state in favor of France! All vessels displaying Danish and Swedish colours, were brought up, and detained to a vexatious length of time; the French imitated the example of Great Britain, and carried their vexations still farther; the neutral governments were then obliged to give way to the clamours of their subjects, and convoys were appointed. The commander of every such ship of war, was instructed to make himself perfectly acquainted with the contents of the cargo and nature of the trade of every vessel, which applied to him for convoy; he was to be fully satisfied that the cargo was

ports; and the rest of the world would still come there, to carry away the superabundance of her produce.

fair neutral property, and that the trade was conform to existing treaties before he took the vessel under his protection. By these precautions, it was presumed, that the belligerent powers would shew as much respect to the declaration of the commander of a king's ship, made in the name of his sovereign, as they professed to do to the certificate of a burgermaster, or a customhouse officer. Those precautions, on the part of the neutral governments, were however represented in England, as measures of defiance and hostility. The Swedish convoy was laid wait for, and brought up; restitution refused, the king requested the interference of his neighbour the emperor Paul, and that monarch, with his usual frankness, desired Baron Toll to assure his sovereign, that he would consider the transaction as having happened to himself; that the convoy should be restored, or that he (the emperor of Russia) "would himself come forward and raise "a standard of Union, around which, the insulted "sovereigns of Europe might rally in defence of the "property of their subjects." This affair was further aggravated by the pitiful puerility of our diplomacy in the north; these *busy* ambassadors ran from conference to conference, wherever they could get

An immense inland world of itself, possessing all the productions of nature which are either necessary,

admittance, with Sir William Scot's sentence of condemnation in their hand, bellowing out, that they were specially instructed to cram it down the throats of the Neutral governments! About this time (in 1798 and 1799) the court of Denmark made still another attempt to explain and arrange all mercantile differences with Great Britain, and to conciliate and cement a good understanding between the two nations; but this was disregarded, perhaps through misrepresentation in England. The affair of the Frya frigate then took place; and that event, as an almost necessary consequence, organized the enmity of the powers of the north; gave a system to their measures, put the means of Denmark and Sweden under the command of Russia, and added all the powers both political and military of Russia, to those of France. We trust efficacious measures will yet, ere too late, be taken to avert the effects of that formidable combination. As another effect of our war with the Neutral states, we are to consider that universal hatred and malignant rancour towards Great Britain, which pervades all classes of people, in every part of Europe and America. This universal spirit of ill-will doth, not appear to us a matter of perfect indifference, especially considering how

or useful; or, that can in anywise contribute to the ease and convenience of mankind; with irresistible powers (not to be collected from, nor depending upon scattered settlements abroad, but) issuing spontaneously from its centre, and with inexhaustible sources of wealth yet unexplored, maritime trade will ever be to Russia a subordinate consideration.

Great Britain now stands relatively to her neighbours. When a state once acquires a preponderating power, the ill-will of others, always subsides into harmless envy and good neighbourhood. During the late war, the most violent parties in America were not seriously disposed to a rupture with England; because they dreaded our victorious arms. Had the war continued, and Great Britain refused to acknowledge the neutrality of the north, the maritime states on the Baltic would have, for the same reason as America, rather taken part with us, than against us. The dread of chastisement stifles hatred; and the wise exercise of power converts ill-will into admiration: but the hope of gratifying malice, generally produces rancorous hostility. A hope, of being soon able to gratify the enmity of Europe and America upon the wrecks of the British empire, is now generally entertained; and what people once believe themselves capable of effecting, they sometimes do effectuate.

However, although trade and navigation will ever be but secondary objects to Russia as a state, yet the unrestricted exportation of the produce of her wide extended dominions, and the freedom of supplying her internal consumption with foreign produce from the best markets, are two pretensions which the power and political rank of that empire obliges its government to maintain. Upon these pretensions were grounded those of the armed neutrality of 1780. Upon that convention was *avowedly* raised the coalition of *armed hostility* in 1800. This last coalition is now become universal, it is with great regret we dare not venture to except America, and Great Britain is the object of its vengeance. (g)

(g) That the British government should have drawn on itself the enmity of so many states without having acquired, or even sought for any kind of benefit, or advantage permanent, or temporary, is extremely singular; perhaps unexampled in the history of civilized nations. We can certainly not consider the having intercepted a few cargoes of rotten corn and Norway deal-boards going to France and Spain, as a national advantage; and the whole importance of our ridiculous treaties, which stipulate, what articles are, and what are not to be considered as contraband of war, is not worth

This coalition might have been prevented by a single act of public justice; the *restitution* of the

to the state, six pounds of gunpowder. In these master-pieces of diplomatic absurdity, the principal chapters run as follow —

Iron — worked into arms is contraband — not worked into arms is fair trade.

Lead — cast into shot is contraband — not cast into shot is fair trade.

Copper — in plates $\frac{4}{5}$ th of an inch thick is contraband — in plates $\frac{1}{5}$ ths of an inch thick is fair trade.

Timber — formed by carpenters into ship's masts is contraband — naturally grown to the shape of ships-mast is fair trade.

Leather — made into soldiers boots and horse saddles contraband — not made into boots and-horse saddles is fair trade!

With other less important articles, classically arranged with equal judgment and political sagacity. It is a curious presumption that the French should employ Danes and Swedes to make muskets, shot, and boots for them! It is more curious still that we should be so anxious to oblige our enemies to maintain manufactures of the utensils of war amongst themselves! yet the fact is, that out of this sort of miserable matters, have always arisen our quarrels with the secondary maritime states.

Swedish convoy, and the repeal and punishment of those emissaries of discord, who were daily insulting, and by their fallacious reports calumniating the governments of the north. The emperor of Russia considered our attack upon Sweden as a wanton insult; especially, as we condemned that convoy on the principle of a resistance, said to have been made by its commodore, and saw with unmanly indifference and without offering a word in his behalf, that unfortunate officer, brought to the block for not having resisted! This transaction roused the indignation of Paul I. and succeeding events, equally trivial and unprofitable to Great Britain, as we shall explain in the second part of these sketches blew that indignation into a flame of revenge.

Notwithstanding this state of things, had the British government, after the affair of the Frya frigatte, sent out, instead of a contemptible menace to Copenhagen, a proposition worthy of the high and generous spirit of the British nation, and proportionate to the power and posture of Russia, we might not only have disarmed the enmity of the Northern states, but we could have secured their lasting friendship and permanent alliance, by the strongest ties of reciprocal, national interests. If we had injured the weaker states, it was our duty, and it would have been our glory, to have

granted them ample reparation. No concessions on our part, nor arrogance on theirs, could in anywise have affected the dignity of the British government, nor the honor of the nation. Nor could Russia have demanded any condition that was an equivalent for her friendship and certain co-operation. (h)

As it was not thought proper to enter into any discussion upon the claims of the neutral powers, prior to the battle of Copenhagen, that affair happily ter-

- (h) At the period we refer to, the emperor was irritated, it is true; but a frank arrangement with Denmark, and the satisfaction we owed to Sweden, agreed to, would have instantaneously reconciled him. An accommodation offered, in the name of our revered sovereign, either *direct*, — *through the king of Sweden*, or by the *Prince Royal of Denmark*, would have raised his generous mind to ecstasy, and instead of a most formidable enemy, he would have again become our most valuable friend. We speak here from a knowledge of the fact. It is perhaps a pity that sovereigns cannot, now and then take one another by the hand, and eat their beef-steak together *tête à tête* unmasked. If monarchs were better acquainted with one another, much mischief might be prevented. Official men say no: that is because so many of them would not be wanted.

minating in negociation, it was then the duty of the British government to have investigated, with particular attention, the nature of the convention of armed neutrality; whether it was built upon real national interests, or merely upon speculation; if all the parties entered voluntarily into that compact, or if some of the weaker powers acceded to it by compulsion; whether its leading principle was, or was not, a rooted enmity towards Great Britain, and then to have examined the real, or presumed causes of that enmity. We should have likewise calculated fairly and with intelligence, the influence and effects, which the powers of the Northern states, firmly organized under the immediate direction of Russia, and in conjunction with the power of France, could then, or at any future period, have upon the interests and safety of the British empire. These matters fully ascertained and duly weighed, the relative positions of Great Britain and Russia would have been clearly seen, and measures adequate to exigent circumstances might then have been adopted.

With respect to the origin and nature of the northern *neutralité armée*, we believe the idea was conceived in that academy of perverted positions, the cabinet of Versailles; with an intention to arm the navies of Sweden, Denmark and Holland as a check upon the naval operations of Great Britain, and partly

to prevent a confederacy between Russia and England, in time of maritime war.

The wretched figure which Great Britain made in the war that subsided in the truce of Aix-la-Chapelle, encouraged the government of France to form the project of expelling the English from America and the East Indies. To facilitate the accomplishment of that object, the cabinet of Versailles thought it necessary to prevent the co-operation of a Russian fleet with the British navy: Consequently, already in 1754, the French ministry proposed to the senate of Stockholm and to the Danish cabinet, a sort of armed naval convention; for, as they said, the protection of the trade of the states maritime, and to maintain the liberty of the Baltic. Little notice seemed to be taken of this proposal, until the events of the war began to promise an almost certain success to the efforts of France; then in 1758, the Swedish and Danish governments, in hope of gaining as we might lose, did enter into such a convention under the sanction of France and Prussia. But the brilliant exploits of the British navy in 1759, and succeeding campaigns, disconcerted their measures, and for a time suspended the effects.

The next disquisition that took place on the mercantile rights of neutral states, was brought forward by ourselves; not, in the spirit of ambitious France,

for the empire of Asia and America; but on an affair more analogous to our system of moderate politics; to wit, some webs of Silesian linen which our navy had captured, and which the British high court of admiralty had condemned, or detained, no doubt, as *contraband of war*. Our diplomatic *tracasserie* with Frederic II upon this *national* subject, ended in satisfying that prince for his cloth; and that circumstance created a precedent upon which, was afterwards founded the *avowed* pretensions of the armed neutrality.

Having at the peace of 1763, ceded to France our dearly acquired sources of maritime trade, and the strong holds which should have secured for ever, our naval superiority, that government, as might be expected, soon renewed its former project of confining the British empire, to the island of Great Britain. France possessing at that period but little influence at the court of Petersburgh, and still apprehensive of an alliance between England and Russia, to raise a sort of barrier between these two powers, the French ministry fawned on the Empress; intrigued with her favorites, and caressed her chamber-maids; they sung ballads and wrote verses on the heroism and legislation of Frederic II; on the patriotism and maternal affections of Juliana Queen of Den-

mark, and with money, they (from 1772 to 1778) enabled the young king of Sweden to rebuild his decayed navy; all, as they said, to secure for these states, the liberty of the seas. Our campaigns in 1778 and 1779, the accession of Spain and Holland to the French and American cause, with the retreat of the British fleet before d'Orviliers in our own seas, seemed again to crown the intrigues and perfidious treachery of the court of Versailles with ultimate success: all the governments of Europe were now convinced that Great Britain had finally lost America, and that our expulsion from India would be the certain consequence. The ruin of the British nation thus considered as inevitable, the spoils of our empire, naturally became a general consideration; the famous convention of armed neutrality, was therefore drawn up, published, and in 1780 acceded to, by all the maritime powers; even by Prussia and Turkey!

Thus, this armed neutrality, although its avowed pretension was the protection of maritime trade and indemnification for legal property seized, was, in fact a speculation, supported by the before mentioned precedent which we ourselves had established. States, especially commercial states, when once believed to be on the decline, like merchants, whose credit is suspected, must always look for a general run, or an

attack to be made upon their property. Not to go farther back into history, witness Sweden at the death of Charles XII, Austria at the death of Charles VI, Great Britain on the success of the American rebellion, and France in the confusion of the revolution. To maintain the political independence of a nation, progression in power is as necessary, as gain in trade is to support the credit of a merchant. When either the state, or the merchant comes to apply to neighbours for assistance, the interest never fails to absorb the capital; and ruin is the necessary consequence.

The covenant of Petersburgh (or of 1800) was planned and acceded to, upon principles very different from those of the former conventions. When the late empress Catherine broke off the commercial intercourse between Russia and the revolutionists in France, she signified her motives to the courts of Denmark and Sweden, for having adopted that measure, and invited those governments to follow her example. Her Majesty however observed, that, with the exception of France in its then state of rebellion, she continued to adhere to the principles of a free neutral trade. The declaration of the empress, perhaps ill translated, or misconstrued by our diplomatic agents, was considered by the British government as a formal renunciation of all the principles

and pretensions of the northern neutrality. On this presumption, and believing that we had Russia to second our proceedings, all neutral vessels, no matter with what they were loaded, nor to where they were bound, whether to France, Spain, Lisbon, or to Kamtchatka, were brought up and detained. (i) The passports of the kings of Sweden

- (i) In the long catalogues of information that were made up by our missionaries at the Northern courts and sent home, beans and pease shipt out for the negroes of St. Croix were inserted as gunpowder bound to Guadaloup; Stockfish for our Newcastle and Hull Greenland-men, as fire-arms for Dunkirk; Norway-timber and wreck deals for Grangemouth and Aberdeen, as ship-masts and crooked wood for Brest; some jews who, to avoid being hanged, had run away from Hamburg and went to Copenhagen, were represented as confidential Agents sent from Bonaparte to negotiate with the Danish government; a certain minister was said to have contracted with them, to deliver 50,000 muskets every four months for the army of the Rhine! with other such trivial and fallacious nonsense. Neither Denmark nor Sweden have any saltpetre, these countries are therefore not the best markets for gun-powder; nor is there so much oak-timber exported from the Baltic annually as would build to France half a dozen

and Denmark were disregarded, the declarations of their officers turned into insulting ridicule, their

sloops. With respect to fire arms, there are made in Denmark and Norway from four to five thousand muskets annually; that quantity is no more than sufficient to supply the Danish army, as may easily be supposed; and we know to a certainty, that there were not 2000 muskets in store in the kingdom, that is, exclusive of the king's arsenals. It is a notorious fact, that had the Northern and Baltic trade been carried on to France, during the whole of the war, without interruption, it would not have advanced her cause to the amount of a single gunboat; nor would it have been detrimental to ours to the value of a longboat.

To these mischief-making matters, were added others of a similar tendency; dissertations were written to shew that the Danish and Swedish governments were immediately concerned in every contraband cargo and other transactions that could in anywise favour or promote the cause of the enemies of Great Britain, and that if measures were not timely adopted to crush the mercantile spirit of the Danes, that enterprising nation would snatch away the commerce of both the Indies and rise formidable to the maritime power of Great Britain herself!

armed ships were attacked and taken, and their ports ransacked. These vexations (for such they certainly

Upon such like informations and apprehensions, were nourished our maritime quarrels, which paved the way for the legions of France to the Hague and Amsterdam; and which have now opened the cabinets of Copenhagen and Stockholm to the dominion of Russia.

We do not pretend to say that no clandestine traffic was carried on by the neutral states with our enemies during the war; on the contrary, we know there was, and that respected Houses in Great Britain and in our settlements abroad, were the principals concerned in it. We however deny that either the kings of Denmark, or Sweden did, directly or indirectly, countenance any transaction on the part of their subjects that was not strictly conform to existing treaties and to the long standing usage of neutrality; nor did they ever reclaim unfair or illegal property, knowing it to be such. To prevent illicit practices in trade is impossible; the connexions between merchants, may be made so intricate, as to escape the precautions of the most upright magistrates. But when a minister, or other public agent at a foreign court has cause to suspect that any transaction, detrimental to the interests of his sovereign or his country, is in *trame*, or in

were) did not however create in Denmark and Sweden any desire of fighting to be neutral. The power and attitude of Great Britain was at that time such, that all the nations of Europe were forced to admire her glory; the most mighty states wished for her friendship, and the weaker, although they had cause to complain of her conduct, courted her protection. In the British cabinet the governments of Denmark and Sweden could, however, find no quarter; their repeated approaches were repelled with scorn, and although the national interests and political independence of those two northern states, be as intimately connected with the prosperity of Great Britain as the safety of Ireland is dependent upon the power of England,

agitation, it is his duty to lay the causes of his suspicion candidly before the minister of that court; the affair would then be examined into, and a satisfactory explanation might be expected; but to bewilder his own employers with *denunciations*, which cannot be substantiated, and to calumniate the government and sovereign of an independent state, for participating in, and conniving at transactions that never were thought of, is a conduct highly censurable. This sort of diplomacy has produced to Great Britain more mischief than the convention of armed neutrality.

the kings of Denmark and Sweden were driven to solicit the mediation of Russia : for the interposition of that government the price has long been fixed; it is the implicit obedience of the parties to the will of the court of Petersburgh. The emperor Paul believing that he had, injuries to retaliate on Great Britain, so peremptory were his orders upon this occasion, that in the midst of winter, he obliged the king of Sweden to come, at the immediate risk of his life, to Petersburgh and sanction his hostile determination in his presence. The Prince Royal of Denmark having expressed a wish to modify the pretensions, set up in the deed, that was sent him to sign, the emperor instantaneously decreed that the race of Danes should be extirpated from the face of the earth; and he dismissed the Danish mission, not only from his residence, but from the territories of Russia. The court of Berlin, not having forgotten Mr. Fawkener's mission to Petersburgh in 1791, with Hanover and a prospect of Holland in her eye, (k)

(k) It was a speculation of the great king of Prussia, to have settled the crown of Poland, hereditary in the family of the Prince of Orange, and to have transferred the Stadholdership to the House of Brandenburg. We recollect that this project was mentioned in an indirect manner in London about 20 years ago; but to propose Prussia as a maritime

Prussia encouraged the pretensions of Russia; and Bonaparte had a strong army on the frontiers of Westphalia. In this predicament what were the governments of Denmark and Sweden to do? To forget all their altercations and offer an accommodation with Great Britain? That they had already tried without success; besides it was now too late; to have been suspected of such a *demande*, would have caused their certain ruin before we could have given them any

power, was then considered as little less than high treason. This shews that old England is in some things consistent in her politics; that Spaniards and Italians, might not become sailors, we guaranteed the Spanish empire to the French monarchy; and nearly a hundred years afterwards, that Dutch sailors should not become Prussians, we have preferred that the Batavian republic belong to the French consulate! France, Italy, Spain and Holland make now but one state; whereas had Spain and Holland been enabled (as they but very lately might) to maintain their independency, we would have had still three maritime powers to cope with. By a similar train of good luck, assisted by our steady system of policy, we shall also see incorporated, the powers of Denmark and Sweden, with those of the Russian empire, and all the three will then make only one power.

relief, (l) and what certainty could they have, that, in case of need we would make any effort to relieve them? We had disregarded all their advances until we saw the emperor's hostile flag hoisted on Cronslot. Had Paul I. agreed to strike that flag, and to accept the export-duties on his hemp to be paid in Russian rubles instead of Spanish and Albert-dollars, how could the kings of Sweden and Denmark know but it might be inserted in the contract, that Russia should next day possess herself of Finland and the island of Gothland; and that Prussia might march her troops into Holstein, as they left Hanover? Such things they had seen happen before. (m) In short, upon this

- (l) When the king of Prussia was marching his troops towards the frontiers of Holstein, the king of Sweden mustering his whole army, partly on the frontiers of Norway and partly in sight of Copenhagen, and a hundred thousand Russians cantoned on the coast of Livonia ready to march, or to be embarked, it was scarcely to be supposed that the Prince Royal of Denmark could then (in March 1801) publicly receive two English plenipotentiaries at his court.
- (m) Upon this trying occasion, a retrospective view of our general conduct towards the secondary powers, operated strongly on the minds of the

occasion, the courts of Denmark and Sweden were absolutely *compelled* to accede to the emperor's Ukase

northern governments. Our policy towards the republic of the United Provinces and the House of Orange from our campaign with Van Tromp in 1652 to that with admiral Story in the *Zuyder-zee* in 1799. Our desertion of the declining cause of the House of Austria at Utrecht and on several other occasions, and our suspicious conduct towards the king of Prussia in 1761, were scrupulously analyzed; and upon impartial examination, the result was found, not to be of such a nature as could inspire the sovereigns of Denmark and Sweden with any confidence in our protection. Besides these, the king of Sweden had fresh in his mind the promises we made of fleets and armies, to his father in 1788, 1789 and 1790. Nor had the Prince Royal of Denmark forgotten the blustering menaces of the British ministers at Copenhagen and Petersburgh upon that occasion. Both princes knew, that we had pledged the faith of the nation to Turkey, to Prussia and to Poland; and they recollect ed our shameful compromise with the empress Catherine in 1791 whereby those powers were, for some paltry mercantile consideration, abandoned to the mercy of Russia.

How far our late negotiations, and the result of them are calculated to inspire the continental

of armed hostility. The affair of Copenhagen ensued, and that cemented their dependency.

Thus were the powers, and what is of infinitely more importance, the localities of Denmark and Sweden, added to the immense power of Russia. A fair estimation of this aggregate, of the effects which its co-operation with France might produce, and of the probability that such a co operation may take place, should have made the criterion whereby our propositions to Russia, after the battle of Copenhagen, should have been measured. We had yet then full hands, and might, with perfect safety to ourselves, (n)

governments with a confidence in our future friendship, will be noticed in a second part of these sketches.

- (n) That Russia, were she as much mistress of the Mediterranean as she is of the Baltic, with St Domingo, the Philippine-Islands and California added to her dominions, should ever become a naval power in anywise formidable to Great Britain, is from her geographical situation and the extent of her inland territories a moral impossibility. But these, or other such possessions, would have rendered her power by land, and the powers of France by sea, much less formidable to our interests than they are likely to turn out.

It was a favorite scheme, of the late empress Catherine, to establish, what she called a naval

have gone to any length that could have been demanded.

equilibrium in Europe: to accomplish which project, she intended to secure one, or two invulnerable naval posts in the Levant, or in the Archipelago, and to maintain there, as well as in the Baltic, a strong fleet; that in case of war between the great maritime powers, she (Russia) might lend her right hand, or her left, or act with both, for, or against either of the parties as circumstances and her own interests should point out. It was to carry this plan into effect that the empress equipt her fleet at Cronstadt in 1779 and 1780. And not, as was absurdly pretended by our official men at the time, to join the British navy against France and recover America; nor yet, as we were told, to lead forth an armed neutrality against that navy. Catherine hated the American revolutionists, but she wished that revolution to succeed; she believed that the independency of America would make Great Britain more dependent on the trade of Russia, and that the British government would thereby become more subservient to her politics: but had she seen an appearance of France acquiring a superiority on the Ocean, she would immediately, with her own and all her dependent neutral fleets, have joined the British standard.

Russia demanded for herself and dependent allies, an interest upon the ocean, proportionate to her rank and to their maritime localities, with the freedom of cultivating that interest. These Great Britain could have granted and guaranteed for ever. The sources of the maritime trade of the world were at our discretion; we could have divided them so as to have consolidated our own political rank and naval superiority; and in that division, we might have satisfied all parties, at the same time rendering the most formidable powers dependent upon our friendship.

The Russian cabinet knew, that in terminating a war such as that carried on by revolutionary France, no government could be at liberty to adhere so far to hacknied precedents and principles long disregarded by all its neighbours, as to compromise the safety of the state: Who first settled at the cape of Good Hope, colonized Brasil and Surinam, or conquered St. Domingo, (o) and to whom had belonged Malta, Candia,

(o) Since the House of Bourbon ascended the throne of Spain, the separation of the colony of St. Domingo from France, was, in as far as relates to Great Britain the most important event that has occurred in the politics of the world. It should have been considered by the British government, as brought about by the guardian-angel of the empire, to

Egypt and Bassora, were, in the court of Petersburgh, considerations of no sort of *political* import:

affirm our national existence and perpetuate our maritime grandeur!

Of every twenty years that have elapsed since the peace of Utrecht, we have had to fight ten with monarchical France, in defence of our foreign possessions and maritime trade. In that period all that we have acquired is Canada in farm, and have lost in property that immense empire which now makes the United States of America; we have incurred a debt that absorbs twenty millions sterling annually, of the industry of the public; we have lost the naval support of Holland, the markets of Europe for our manufactures, and all political connexion with the continent: In the mean time, France is become a military state, has doubled her national powers, tripled her military force, disembarrassed herself from debt, roused the moral energy of the public by her conquests, extended her political influence from Washington to Moscow, and her military command from Bergen in Norway to Madagascar. In this relative situation we had the most indisputable of all rights, that of self-preservation, to have used every means in our power to prevent the French republic ever again acquiring possessions abroad. The revolution of

the government of Russia believed, that it was now
the question, *who should hereafter possess those and*

France in itself was a matter of indifference, to Great Britain as a state; her Jacobinism was a bugbear wherewith to frighten fools; or had she conquered continental Europe, what was that to us? It was our business to care, that neither France nor any power under her influence and authority should either conquer or retain a single port, post nor settlement out of Europe; and above all things, Great Britain should have spent her last shilling to maintain a separation between France, republic or monarchy, and St. Domingo. Rather than suffer that island to fall under the dominion of the consulate, it would be good policy on our part, to give to any power, Russia or America, no matter which, that would protect it, either independent or as a colony, the island of Jamaica as a *douceur*.

At war with France, she being unable to conquer our possessions, could not impose upon us any obligation to respect hers. Or, for what purpose go to war? If we went out to fight merely in our own defence, in that case, we had certainly, when it was in our power, a right to provide for our future safety. Our allies subdued, and the continent of Europe under the dominion of our enemies, the future safety of the British empire

other such settlements that concerned the interests and safety of the British empire; and it was thought that overtures drawn up, upon that principle, would have been made by the British ministry. Indeed all Europe expected that such would have been our line of conduct at this auspicious moment. Those who were in anywise interested for the future prosperity of the British empire and peace of the world, ardently wished that a cordial and solid arrangement between the governments of Great Britain and Russia might take place, and our enemies almost trembled for the consequence. (p) But here again Bonaparte's stars

undoubtedly required, that sources of maritime trade and naval power, sufficient to oblige those very enemies to open their ports to our commerce and their councils to our political influence, should have been retained. As France extended her dominions in Europe, it was our duty to have confined her to that continent and to have increased and secured our own possessions abroad. If the republic should recover the island of Hispaniola, that settlement alone, will in spite of the world, give her a preponderance upon the ocean, equal to the superiority she now assumes on land!

- (p) When the chief consul heard that our fleet was returning from the Baltic through the Belts and the

came round, and cast their baneful shade over all the hopes of his adversaries? Our cuckoo-song on subsidy,

Sound unmolested, knowing that his army in Egypt could neither hold out, nor be reinforced, he looked upon an alliance between Great Britain and Russia as certain. It is no secret, that under this apprehension, Bonaparte hastened to offer his mediation between the Bashaw of Widdin and the Grand Signior; he at the same time, proposed to His Sublime Highness, to send a troop of French soldiers and engineers from Otranto in Italy, through Macedonia to defend the canal of Constantinople; and he sent his most confidential adherents loaded with intrigues and diamonds to Petersburgh, Berlin, Copenhagen, and to other quarters; as we shall particularise in the second part of these sketches. He lavished his elogies on the Prince Royal of Denmark and pressed him to accept succours of men, officers and arms; and he used all his art to bring about an accord, or rather a co-operation between the courts of Berlin and Vienna. In this last negotiation the consul was seconded by certain men, who little suspected his motives!

What made the French government more anxious, and almost alarmed at the probability of an alliance between Great Britain and Russia was, that in a correspondence between general Duroc

the dangers of Jacobinism, export-duties on hemp, tallow, and iron; and the import-duties on coals,

and some persons near the court of Berlin, a grand treaty was stated to be really in agitation and far advanced, and which was said to have for its basis a plan, that had been proposed to the first consul, and demurred upon, during the life of Paul I. viz: —

1. To re-establish the Greek empire, to be confined to the Turkish Dominions in Europe.
2. To erect Natolia, Candia and Cyprus, into an hereditary monarchy for the exiled Princes of the House of Bourbon under the guarantee of Russia.
3. That the Ionian republic of the seven islands and the island of Malta be given to the order of St. John of Jerusalem.
4. That Egypt be an independent state under the protection of Russia and France.

To these four articles Great Britain was said to have acceded, taking upon herself the guarantees which the emperor Paul had offered to France; and to have likewise agreed with Russia and Denmark upon the following clauses, to wit: —

St. Domingo, (or the Island of Cuba if America should prefer St. Domingo) ceded to Russia

Porto-rico given to Denmark and guaranteed by Russia and England.

calicoes and cutlery; with a long chapter on the formalities under which a British officer may yet be per-

Another sugar-island to Sweden to be guaranteed by the said powers.

Holland, as far as the Scheld, to be given to Prussia, and the Prince of Orange to be indemnified in Poland.

The the Cape of Good Hope should be a free municipal settlement under the immediate protection and support of Great Britain and Russia.

That Russia should enjoy a free and unrestricted trade from the Elbe to India, China &c.

With some efficacious measures to be adopted for the delivery and independency of Spain and Italy from the yoke of France; for the security of the Portuguese settlements abroad, and for the exploration of the country and improvement of the trade of Brasil.

Whether, by this presumed treaty, it was intended to secure as much of the consul's influence as possible on the side of Brandenburgh in the general partition of Germany, or whether a plan for such an arrangement did really exist, we shall not here give any opinion. Certain it is, however, that to prevent its being carried into effect, all the talents and invention of the cabinet of Malmaison were occupied; and what, we must allow did more credit

mitted to go on board of a Russian or Danish vessel at sea, loaded with timber or stockfish, made up the whole

to the capacity of Bonaparte's ministers than to the diplomatic sagacity of some other parties, before it was either known at the courts of Berlin, Vienna, or London, that any intercourse between France Russia and Turkey was opened, the conventions now subsisting between the emperor Alexander and the Consul, and between the latter and the Grand Signior, were signed and ratified. It was then that Bonaparte resolved upon the entire subjugation of Italy, the partition of Germany, the acquisition of the kingdom of Fez, and the dominion of Brasil.

With respect to Brasil, next to Indostan, that country is the object that most immediately occupied the cabinet of St. Cloud. The consul knows, that were it possible to dispossess Great Britain of her settlements abroad, should the British government secure the empire of Brasil, our maritime and naval superiority would be consolidated in spite of all his efforts. It is the only country on the globe which neither France nor her allies, could ever molest; she cannot approach it by land, and in our possession, it alone, could maintain a navy that would bid defiance to the naval power of the rest of the world. To prevent Brasil falling under our dominion, the consullately spread out his protecting

amount of our negotiations with the court of Petersburgh. So that our political relationship with the

arm over Lisbon, and forbade his soldiers, as well as those of the king of Spain, to pillage that capital. Had general Lasnes managed his instructions more French like, than he did, or until the British troops had evacuated the posts and places ceded, or given up by the late truce, we should have heard of another cause for his quarrel with the regent of Portugal than the entry of a pair of *lace ruffles!* and by this time Brasil would have been guaranteed in a more effective manner than it has been on our sheep-skins at Amiens!

When Bonaparte guarantees the settlements of his allies, he secures the contract in its full sense, by either the possession of the settlement itself, or by taking his ally under the dominion of the republic. But when we send out our ambassadors to guarantee the dominions of our friends, they are not instructed to forbid such a friend to cede these same dominions to the consul next day; any such restriction would be to interfere in the affairs of other states! When the rulers of France see a post or country, which in other hands might, on some future occasion, prove detrimental to their projects, as a duty they owe to the republic, they secure it. Although we know, that settlements, or naval and military

northern states, stands now (in January 1803) nearly upon the same footing as it did in January 1801. (q) During this period the connexions between Russia and France are however strongly cemented.

The chief consul negotiates with foreign states

posts, in our power by conquest, are by their former owners ceded to our enemies, yet, should our dearest interests depend upon the possession of them, our magnanimity despairs to retain them! Worthy John Bull! We sincerely wish, that your magnanimity, so tempered as it frequently is, with other *heavy* ingredients, may not one day meet with such a reward, as will make you stare and say who could not have thought it!

(q) With that difference, however, which the change of leading characters may have produced; and, that in 1801 our naval and military posture commanded the respect and admiration of our enemies, and our national means were sufficient to have secured the lasting friendship of the world: whereas, a general belief that our powers are reduced, and our national means absorbed or given away, makes the world now seek cause of enmity against us.

The power of a state no longer formidable, and when more may be gained by its ruin, than can be acquired by its friendship, it is the direct interest of its neighbours to become its enemies.

on more liberal principles than we do. Where he can command by force, friends or foes, he does it without reserve, and when conditions are necessary, his propositions are regulated by circumstances; instead of asking Russia to fight his battles for a paltry subsidy, he offers her an empire to remain at peace; in place of menacing her with visionary dangers from abroad, he asks the support of the czar, for the republic; and rather than wrangle about port-charges, sugar and muslin-duties, Bonaparte will stipulate with the senate of Pittsburgh, that the Russian flag shall have open and free intercourse with the Havanna, Rio-janeiro, the Ganges(r) and Japan. Such propositions as these are

- (r) The British Parliament might perhaps be as well employed, in providing efficacious means to preserve Indostan, as in quibbling about the legality of our sovereignty over that country.

To insinuate that the safety of our possessions in India can be in any wise affected by the growing powers of our enemies, we know, will be sneered at in England; and we are sorry for it: we have already noticed the facility of marching a Russian army through Persia &c. And as the consulate may now muster a French army in the plains of Syria, Egypt and Asiatic Turkey with the same facility and safety, as in Italy, or in Sicily, to tell

national considerations; they will therefore be heard where our *commissary* and *chapman* overtures will be deservedly spurned at. Nor is there any thing extraordinary, or unnatural, in the present connexion and co-operation which subsist between the courts of Russia and St. Cloud. These two powers in accord with one another, have Europe and Asia at their disposal; and if personal jealousies, pride, or ignorance do not intervene, they will, in all likelihood, pass on in conjunction from the partition of Europe, direct to that of Asia.

Bonaparte that such an army could not reach the frontiers of Indostan, he might sneer likewise.

But then say the folks in Leadenhall-street, our European army, with the native troops, tributary princes and dependent allies in India, will repel any force that Russia and France can ever march, or carry out against them. We wish this may prove to be the case, for we have little doubt but a trial will soon be made. We must acknowledge our ignorance of the state of our army in India, as well as of the disposition and means of our allies there. It should however not be forgotten, that in these times, we see that generals like to be kings, soldiers to become legislators, and that to have faithful allies we must make them obedient subjects.

FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

In the foregoing sketches, we have been so far from exaggerating the sources and power of France, that since our statements were sent to the press we are officially informed, by the chief consul himself, that the public revenue of the tenth year, independent of colonies and foreign trade, amounted to the enormous sum of 1160 millions of French livres or in sterling to L. 48,000,000. And, that the peace establishment of the army of the republic in Europe, exclusive of *les conscrits* for the year, is to be kept up at 500,000 men.

The revenues of the Russian government are indetermined; but the sources of the empire are infinite. Russia is yet a new country, but few of its natural treasures are explored, and none of them exhausted. A sovereign, possessing energy and talents, may raise the produce of that nation and the income of the state, to any amount. (s) Besides the military

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- (s) Since the time of Peter I. Russia cannot be said to have been governed by national vigor and conspicuous talents combined. The brilliant reign of Catherine II. was a series of splendid victories, pom-

operations of Russia depend but little upon financial calculations; her armies always find magazines before

pous intrigue and licentious luxury; should the present turn out a reign of domestic improvement, and be invigorated by military pursuits of a national nature, Alexander may make Russia the universal monarchy which his great progenitor predicted she should be.

In 1714 Peter I, with 16 sail of the line and 180 gallies, defeated the Swedish fleet near the island of Aland in the mouth of the Gulph of Bothnia; when he returned to Petersburgh he was, by his vice czar Romanodowski, promoted to the rank of vice-admiral, upon which occasion he gave a fête to his brother officers, and harrangued them as follows. "Brother sailors, *la journée d'Aland* is the most glorious day in the life of *le Vainqueur de Pultawa*; we have, in the work of our own hands, (meaning his fleet) not only conquered the anicent masters of the Baltic; but we have by that conquest made the Baltic ours. It is the finest bay on the globe, and we will make it the most useful to mankind. Fellow soldiers! History places the original seat of heroism, legislation and science in Greece, then in Italy, from whence they were disseminated in certain portions through the several parts of Europe; it is now our turn, and if you will continue to

them. Possessing twenty millions of taxable male peasants employed in agriculture, her military force may be easily calculated; as we have already said, her peace establishment consists of 700,000 enrolled soldiers and 50,000 military servants to attend the staff of the army.

All the powerful states, of which political Europe was formerly composed, being either entirely subdued or become dependent upon two mighty empires, France, and Russia, and these governed by two absolute chiefs, Great Britain, insulated and alone and still daring to keep up pretensions of independency, must consider herself as the object against which the intrigues and hostile preparations

"second my designs, and to act upon the principles,
"which I have laid down, legislation and science,
"or the great schools of human happiness, shall
"by our valour, establish their empire under the
"sceptre of Russia; through us their influence shall
"again warm their native soil, and the re-action
"shall be felt in the remotest corners of the globe.
"Nature has made but one Russia, and she must
"have no rival."

This discourse we believe, may, be considered as the political directory, or guide of the Russian government.

of these two governments are now most immediately directed. (t)

The intrigues of the courts of St. Petersburgh and St. Cloud are universal; they are to be met with in the cabinet of every state, in the closet of every statesman, in the tent of every officer from the corporal to the general, and in the apartment of every chamber-maid. However, when honesty candour spirit and talents are charged with the administration of the public affairs, the effects of contemptible intrigue cannot be formidable to the British nation. (u)

- (t) While Russia and France continue in political connexion with one another, we have the most unquestionable certainty, that, they will continue conjointly at enmity with the British government.
 - 1. They believe themselves our superiors in power;
 - 2. We are a wealthy nation and have *yet* valuable possessions;
 - 3. We have not acknowledged our nullity in the political world nor the right assumed by the consul and the czar to govern it. No declaration of war ever advanced more valid allegations to justify hostilities.
- (u) The statesman who can be imposed upon, by intrigue, address, or the bad faith of others, is more criminal than he who sells Jamaica for a bribe, for

The public measures of those two powers, and our own means of defence, are what we have to look after. We cannot know the particulars of their arrangements with one another, nor can we see their plans of operation in detail; that is, we cannot know what they intend to do to morrow, or on any determined future day; but as we know their powers and our own strength we ought to know, *to a fraction*, what they *can do*. When our enemies' force is known, three fourths of our line of defence may be said to be completed. But the remainder should be added with all possible speed; and the whole kept in constant repair.

The intrigues of our enemies are, we know, exercising, and will, while they have any hope of success, continue to act upon the following speculations, to wit,

1. To form amongst the native princes of India a hostile combination against the British government there; they will promise those princes support from

he may lose the empire *en bonne foi*. Ignorance in public functionaries is treason against the state. The country has a right to call upon every man for his service, but no man is justifiable who accepts an office that he is not qualified to fill.

their neighbours on the Indus, from Persia, Arabia, Aracan, Tartary, from France and Russia; they will create discontent, and prepare insurrection in the British army in Indostan.

It might defeat these machinations, were we to subdue the princes of Indostan, by military authority, to legal obedience; to organize that empire under *one* rational vigorous and *just* government; admit of no settlements nor factories from other nations; and lay the trade open by land and sea to the whole world.

2. To persuade our West-india planters, that France in possession of Louisiana and certain to possess the kingdom of Fez, will supply her colonies with all sorts of necessaries at a low price, and be able to carry away their produce at a low freight; that the consulate commands the markets of the world, that the consumption of British colony-produce, will soon be confined to the island of Great Britain, and that France being in possession of the Mississippi, the Floridas and Dutch Guiana, she may with her *flottilles*, and without a ship of the line, possess herself of all the islands in the gulph of Mexico at any time she may think proper.

We may retort upon their authors, the effects purposed by these calumnies, and secure the British property, which is invested in her foreign

colonies, by declaring their trade open to all nations; under such regulations however, as would secure our sovereignty and the public revenue. We thereby shall force France and Spain to do the same, or their colonies will do it themselves; in which case we should triple our trade, affirm our maritime superiority, and double our commercial income.

3. To prevent our receiving supplies of corn from abroad; they having all the ports of Europe and Africa under their command, and America under their influence.

If we will but cultivate our own waste lands, improve those that are in culture, look after that shamefully neglected country, Canada, give neither premium nor bounty for the exportation, nor importation of corn, nor any other sort of provisions, we shall have no occasion for foreign supplies. (x)

(x) When corn is exorbitantly dear, to grant bounties to import from abroad, raises the price still higher. When a bounty on importation of corn is voted in England, the markets in foreign countries rise in proportion; so that the money granted in premiums, is in reality, given to foreigners, to enable them to enhance, and keep up the price of grain above its natural level. When corn is cheap in Great Britain and Ireland, to sell and

4. To mislead our sailors and soldiers and create mutiny and insurrection in the navy and army, at home, as well as abroad, and amongst our manufacturers, they will expend millions upon millions.

Give the sailors and soldiers employment in peace, as well as in war, the first in the British fisheries, to be carried on upon a national scale, and the latter in national improvements on shore. When they

export it, to be laid up in magazines abroad, a year or two, until scarcity shall again raise the price in England, is an economy, on which we shall not here pronounce an opinion. But we hope that its baneful effects will be seen into, and that measures will be taken to prevent the continuance of a practice, which is no less inconsiderate on the part of the legislature, than it is pernicious to the state.

When the necessaries of life are almost beyond the reach of the produce of common labor, and the annual imposts already begin to benumb the arms of industry, the *super-drawback* on exported sugars by which foreigners are enabled to sweeten their tea and coffee 5 per-cent cheaper than the English themselves can do, seems the counterpart of the above national economy, and clearly illustrates our system of bounteous liberality in commercial intercourse with foreign states.

are in the royal navy, and on military service, let them be commanded with firmness, intelligence and humanity, and have sound provisions; pay for their service to the state, as it would be paid for by individuals, and provide amply for those who suffer in the defence of their country and in protecting the property of their more fortunate country men. (y) Allow the officers, both naval and military, such subsistence as their ranks in society require, and such as their bravery and generous spirits deserve; (z) To maintain the

- (y) It is a well known fact, that the inferior quality of provisions especially of bread, and the unfair distribution of bounty money, were amongst the leading grievances that produced the mutiny in our navy. It can scarcely be expected, that an able seaman, who has for years fought the battles of his king and country on the scanty pay of a man of war, could with pleasure, or even with indifference, see vagabonds of all descriptions receiving thirty, forty, or fifty guineas to come and mess amongst valiant honest tars. Such inconsequent measures are highly gratifying to our enemies; and what is of infinitely greater importance, they tend to justify disobedience and insurrection, in the opinion of the public!
- (z) To see British officers, grown grey in the service of their country, obliged to leave it, and to languish

public spirit of the navy and the army; the fruits of their conquests and blood should be secured to the nation; and they will long continue the bulwarks of our empire, the terror of our enemies, and the admiration of the world.

5. To embarrass our finances, by manoeuvres, *senatus-consultus*, and by making their dependents and allies insult and quarrel with the British government direct, or with the governments of our settlements abroad; and when we have been at the expense of equipping fleets and recruiting armies the consul will interpose, and as an indemnification to us, he will desire his vassal to make an apology.

It is easy to render abortive these sorts of speculation: as one of the principal members in the great political society of the civilized world, we have a right to insist, that every project, measure, or transaction, which in any wise tends to affect the public peace of that society in general, or the interests of any one of its members in particular, no matter where such originates, shall be communicated to us and fairly explained to our satisfaction before any attempt

out the remainder of their days in exile abroad, for trifling debts, contracted perhaps for a necessary subsistence, which their scanty pay refused, is extremely distressing to a liberal British mind!

be made to carry it into execution. To conceal transactions that concern public affairs, can only proceed from inimical designs; we must therefore consider every *demanche*, or movement, whether military or diplomatic, that wears an appearance, be it ever so slightly of equivocation; as acts of open hostility. We should then neither remonstrate nor receive explanation; the British public is the only power to whom the government ought to appeal. Were a bold and manly system of measures adopted, the supplies raised upon the produce of the property of the empire, and all such pestiferous taxes which vex the public, and sap their morals, abolished; the people would feel a lively interest in the independence of their country. And if we could assure our seamen and soldiers that they shall not again conquer in vain, (a) the nation would soon, proudly soar above the feeble efforts of foreign machinations, our finances would easily be maintained and the ridicule

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- (a) Czar Peter I. said, that to fight for glory was in individuals a recommendable virtue, although they might have no determined object in view; "but we sovereigns," said he, "are not at liberty to gratify our own personal vanities, our arms are made of the flesh and blood of our subjects, they must never be wielded in vain."

and contempt, which our enemies are busied in heaping upon the British government, would recoil with redoubled force upon their own heads. (b) We should then prove to the world, that having often conquered our foes merely, as it were to raise them up, we can, when provoked, subdue them again; and maintain our conquests.

With respect to the public hostile measures of France and Russia, to exclude the political influence of Great Britain from the continent of Europe and Africa, is their first declared object; to interrupt her

(b) To undermine the British government, the consulate employ the same arms which the French encyclopedists were blamed for having used against the christian religion; that is, under the pretext of exposing the principles, doctrine and personal prejudices of the late ministry to ridicule, they hold up the public measures of the present, to universal contempt. Bishop Talleyrand knows, that as the primitive purity of the Christian church would have confounded all the sophistical subtlety of himself and colleagues so an energetic government in Great Britain, could yet make the Jacobin heroes of the republic, hide their polluted heads amongst the rubbish from whence they rose..

commercial intercourse with the rest of the world and deprive us of our foreign possessions, is their second.

To effectuate the first, we are told, that when the consulate has sufficiently disarmed Great Britain, and fully garrisoned the posts and settlements of the republic and her dependents, at home and abroad, we shall then see stationed in hostile array and in the following order viz:

Between North Bergen and Cuxhaven including the Sound and the Categate.

30 sail of Russian men of war, from 60 to 120 guns.

20 sail of Swedish dito from 40 to 74 guns.

24 sail of Danish dito from 60 to 80 guns.

400 sail of Russian gallies and gun vessels.

200 sail of Swedish dito.

50 sail of Danish gallies and floating batteries. (c)

(c) Russia has upwards of 700 gallies, gun-boats and other small armed vessels, and Sweden has the easy means of encreasing her *flotilles* to a much greater number than we have stated.

Denmark had remaining, after the battle of Copenhagen, 21 sail of the line in a state for service and the Prince Royal intends to raise the fleet to 30 sail of substantial well equipt line of battle ships.

The passages of the Belts, and into the Baltic, to Gottenburg and the Elbe, will be defended by double and triple lines of naval horn-works, sunk upon flat bottom vessels that may be moved from place to place and taken up at pleasure. (d)

(d) These naval horn-works are made of large timber-beams from 16 to 30 feet long, shod with iron, and put together like what the military call *chevaux de frise*. They are then fixed upon flat vessels and sunk so as to be hidden 6, 10, or 12 feet under the surface of the water. In the Belts and other passages where there is neither tide, current nor motion in the water, they are easily laid down and taken up. The Swedes were the first who made use of these works; they will now very soon surround Cronstadt, cover Copenhagen and all the other important harbours in the Baltic. To lay triple lines across the navigable channels of the Great Belt, will require about 200 such vessels.

The Danish government keeps in constant pay 6,000 sailors employed in the royal dock-yards. 18,000, with 300,000 tons of shipping are employed in the merchant service. 20,000 able seamen may, at any time, be drawn from amongst the pilots and fisher-men along the coasts of Denmark and Norway.

This naval chain may be attended by any number of military, as circumstances may point out. (e)

Between the Ems and Cadiz (as we have stated page 65) the consulate itself informs us, that the government of the republic intends to raise and distribute a navy of

160 sail of line of battle ships, with from 1500 to 2000 armed light vessels.

The principal stations of the light *flottilles* of this navy will be at St. Valery and in the Scheld;

The Swedish government keeps in pay 7,500 sailors employed in the kings service, and 15,000 sailors are enrolled for the navy besides 20,000 seamen that may be likewise drawn from amongst the pilots and fisher-men on the immense coast of Sweden and Finland.

(e) The Danish army, in Denmark and Holstein, amounts to 24,000 regular troops and 12,000 regular militia. In Norway to 27,000 men regular troops and militia. The fencibles are so organised that they may be raised to any number at a few days notice.

The Swedish army amounts to,
14,000 regular infantry
2,000 regular cavalry
25,000 militia infantry
12,000 national cavalry.

where their *depots* will be rendered invulnerable to any attack that can be made from the sea.

So that, should the consulate be allowed time to raise and equip the quota assigned for the republic, the coast of continental Europe will be covered with *two hundred* and thirty four sail of line of battle ships, and between 2150 and 2650 gallies, gun vessels and other armed craft, (f) attended, we will suppose, by
 100,000 Russians,
 50,000 Swedes and Danes, and
 150,000 French, Dutch, Swiss and other dependents.

(f) To pretend that we have destroyed the navies of our enemies, is to pretend, that a man whose coat is torn in a fray, must be naked, although, by the scuffle, he gets off with ten bales of broad cloth! The destruction of a few ships, or of an enemy's squadron, makes a pompous gazette for the day; but the acquisition of Brasil, Surinam or St. Domingo (or had we only enabled that last colony to change masters) would have been, to Great Britain, more soild and glorious than the annihilation of all the ships that ever were built in France, Holland and Spain. Ships are only the wooden, and perishable parts of a navy; Brasil and St. Domingo are naval souls, and

To this force, the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland will of course be exposed. The enemy, therefore calculates, that he will be able to confine all our naval and military force to Europe, while he carries into effect his long projected plan of depriving us of our settlements abroad. (g)

whoever possess them will have a preponderate body in the commercial and political world. It is easy to conceive that we do not here mean to say, that Portugal will ever make a member in the political world: that deservedly forlorn government can only be considered as a contemptible member of the body of the French republic.

- (g) The chief consul knows, that in subsidizing foreign powers, courting alliances on the continent and maintaining Gibraltar, the British government could have no other national object in view, than merely to check, or occupy the forces of France at home, while we might employ ours abroad: He has seen in the archives of Versailles, that aided by this policy, Great Britain has, during the last century, had it frequently in her power to consolidate her political rank and maritime empire, independent of any continental connexion whatever. That we may never have such an opportunity again, (lest we should make a better

Although this line extends from Bergen to Cadix, to cover our coasts, and bid defiance to

use of it) Bonaparte has not only removed the checks we used to set on the frontiers of France, but he has placed them in more formidable attitudes around our own. We say, *in more formidable attitudes*, because since the peace of Utrecht, the continental powers have never looked upon alliances with Great Britain as beneficial to themselves: We have offered them neither advantage for co-operating with us, nor security when they assumed gestures of enmity to France. Their connexions with the consulate are built upon another basis and better cemented. For the alliance of Russia and the United States, France holds up empires, kingdoms, provinces and sugar-islands; to the lesser powers, she shews her sabre and the wrecks of England; and to all powers she offers an opportunity to retaliate real and presumed injuries.

Although it be an unpleasant reflection, it is a positive fact, that every government, and all the nations of Europe, Asia and America, believe, that they have injuries to retaliate upon Great Britain. It is pitiful to hear proclaimed in the British parliament, and echoed through the nation, that England is considered on the conti-

its menaces, and oblige those hostile squadrons to remain inactive in their own ports, on the East coast

nent as the saviour of Europe! What country have we saved? Is not Europe completely subdued and under the yoke of France and Russia? When, or where have we either protracted or even modified the ruin of any kingdom, state, or nation? Have we not for this last century, been one of the principal instruments in breaking down the barriers of the liberties of Europe and in paving the way to the aggrandizement of the two powers, of whose dictatorial ambition we now complain? In 1670 we made a *monstrous* alliance with Louis XIV against Holland; prior to the peace of Utrecht, we entered into a disgraceful conspiracy with that same monarch against both Holland, Austria and Spain, or against the guardians of the liberties of Europe. When it was again possible to have snatched the Spanish monarchy from the dominion of France, we acceded to an unnatural league with the Duke of Orleans, and destroyed the Spanish navy, to secure the subjugation of that kingdom. We destroyed the navies of Holland, ruined her commerce, divided the Dutch republic into factions, and then left her a prey to her rapacious enemies. We will not, *for shame*, speak of the House of Orange! In the North,

of the island, we have only to make Yarmouth-roads a safe naval station, and another between Flamborough-

from 1714, to the infamous peace of Nystad our political connexions and negotiations at Copenhagen, Stockholm and Petersburgh; and the base part we then acted in the scandalous partition of the Swedish monarchy; do certainly not entitle us to expect much gratitude from the secondary powers in that quarter. After an impartial review of the foregoing transactions, it might be useful to cast a glance at the following, and then to sum up the whole together, viz: Our conduct towards Turkey from 1769 to 1774; our negotiations at Petersburgh from 1779 to 1782; the part we took in that fabric of treachery and diplomatic ignorance, which shackled the House of Austria and sapped the independence of Germany and Italy; we mean, the German convention of 1785. The part we took for Turkey, for Sweden and for Poland in 1788-89 and 1790 with our negotiations and compromise at Petersburgh in 1791. This period of our political and diplomatic history annalysed and fairly explained, would shew whether or not, continental Europe may be expected to consider Great Britain as her saviour. Have we during the revolution acquired a right to that distinguished appellation? Doth the state of secu-

head, and the Coquet island, and one north of Fife-ness, if it could be done at Buchanness so much

rity, in which we have lately left the kingdoms of Portugal, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, the order and island of Malta, Switzerland &c., and the salvation we worked out for Denmark on the 2nd. of April last, entitle us to rely upon the good will of these states? Or is it the pleasure we seem to take, in seeing our allies the Turks butcher one another under our standard in Egypt, that should recommend us as mediators between Europe and Bonaparte? Of all the traits of English policy that are on record, we recollect none *less* honorable to the nation than our conduct in Egypt since the peace! Our predecessor in the government of that country, although we do not know that an honest, generous, or noble sentiment ever issued from his soul, would most assuredly not have suffered those, who had once submitted to his sabre, to cut one another's throats, *in his presence*; at least nor, except he had some end to serve, or vengeance to glut by their blood. Nor is it likely, that in our situation, he would see the massacres of St. Domingo with indifference! The miraculous conquest of Egypt, snatched the reputation of the British army from the brink of oblivion: should laurels, so dearly won, be poisoned by

the better. But such stations must be made at the head-lands, or where there is sea-room; and

the sight of civil carnage, be suffered to fade by a sense of generous shame and left to wither in the breath of noble indignation?

When a government sports with the feelings of the nation, when the nation believe its blood is wasted, and when public measures make honesty blush, these are ominous presages of a falling state!

To abuse the nation, either with groundless fears, or with fallacious hopes, is unfair at any time; but at this momentous crisis, on the very eve of a warfare, which must either end in our destruction, or in the consolidation of a real British empire, to lull the public into illusive security is more than unfair. The nation should be candidly told in what relationship we stand with other powers, and the strength of our enemies should be publicly explained; if then, it be found that we have occasion for extraordinary exertions, the government will soon be enabled to realize the necessary means. We know to a certainty that the world is inimical to Great Britain; and we likewise know, that if efficacious measures are not timely adopted to destroy the hopes of the domineering powers, or if some

it is absolutely necessary to have one north of the Edinburgh firth. Forty sail of British line of battle ships distributed from the downs to Buchanness, with safe anchorages at proper stations, would most completely block in all the navies and *flottilles* that ever could be mustered between Boulogne and Bergen bay. (h)

unforeseen event doth not intervene and confound their plans, we shall have to combat the enmity of Europe and America in open hostility before it be long.

- (h) But if we do not prepare for our ships other shelter than the mouths of the Thames and the Humber, Leith-roads and Cromarty-bay, were the navies of England stationed in the North-sea, the country may be invaded on any point, to which the enemy chuses to direct his course.

A noble Admiral, whose name will stand high on the annals of his country as long as a sense of merit or a spark of gratitude warms a Briton's breast, can corroborate this assertion, for in 1796 he had the mortification to know, that a fleet of 17 sail of enemies men of war came out of the Texel in the month of February and paraded the North-sea along the British coast for three weeks together, and all human exertion

In the Mediterranean the consulate intends to keep up a navy of, — 6; sail of line of battle ships; to which, will no doubt be added a considerable number of smaller vessels. With this navy the coasts of the Turkish dominions and of the Barbary states will be sufficiently covered, to secure the dependence and obedience of those governments to the will of the consulate. And when the period, to deprive Great Britain of her foreign possessions,

could not carry the British fleet then under his command to sea.

To block in port, a fleet, whose commander wishes to go to sea, is likewise extremely difficult and very seldom succeeds; but to block in the hostile line that is now preparing to act against us, would, by cruising on the enemies' coast be impossible; the attempt would be one of our usual measures from which the French would endeavour to derive some advantage, for they believe that the closer we keep on their coast the more we expose our own. But our navy on our own coasts, so stationed, as to be able to move with all sorts of winds, were every French sailor and soldier a *Jean Bart*, and every Russian a Czar Peter, our British dames might sleep at ease.

shall come, this fleet will cover the rear of any transport of men from France and Italy, which may be thought necessary to employ against our interests either in Sicily, Turky, Egypt, Syria, or Persia; or against our settlements in Indostan.

To maintain the liberty of the Mediterranean, to cover our possessions in India from any attack from the side of Europe by land, to secure the friendship of Russia, and to prevent France from fixing herself in Sicily, Candia, and on the coast of Africa; or in short to prevent our expulsion from the trade of the Mediterranean, from Asia and Africa, we have only to maintain the island of Malta or other such invulnerable naval stations between Toulon and the Dardanelles. (i)

- (i) To guarantee by treaty the neutrality of Malta and the Cape, or such military posts, whose proprietors cannot guarantee them by force, is an idea, we think, too absurd for the most besotted statesman, of even, this infatuated age. Would a hostile fleet, going out either to save, or to conquer our empire of India, spare its antagonist in False- or Table-bay? Or would the noble Bronti at the head of a British fleet, quietly pass Bonaparte with another wing of the *army of England* under his command, on the shores

In America the hostility of the republic will, we presume, be principally carried on by *flottilles*, or light squadrons; and it will be directed, more immediately, towards the security of the Spanish settlements and the acquisition of Brasil, than to the conquest of any of the few rocks we now possess there.

To secure our possessions in America, as well as in other quarters of the world, we must forthwith, without loss of time, acquire as many more as shall maintain an army abroad sufficient to defend them; and as may likewise enable us to keep up a marine, superior to that of France and her dependents. (k) To do this, we have only to

of Sicily or Malta? were such treason possible, we believe there would, in the world, be only one opinion on its merits.

(k) It certainly requires no great share of geographical knowledge, to see and be convinced, that the sources of maritime trade now possessed by Great Britain, when compared to those of France, are no more able to maintain a marine equal to what she may maintain, than Holland is at present able to maintain a navy equal to that of England; and every englishman knows, that should the navies of our enemies be suffered to rise nearly

prevent the republic possessing herself of the Mississippi, from putting garrisons in the Havannah, Carthagena, and from approaching Brasil. Nothing is more practicable. The United States, certain of our assistance *in good faith*, will possess themselves of Louisiana (l) and garrison Cuba; we can

to a level with our own, their preponderance on the land and the immensity of their possessions, would soon make our scale on the balance of political Europe kick the beam. It is therefore the duty of every man, who prefers British liberty to the heaviest malediction that ever cursed mankind, we mean the dominion of France, to exert all his powers, while it is yet time, and secure the independence of his country. To rely upon the superior address and bravery of our generous and noble seamen, is criminal; others may learn address, and despotism can drive them to the fight; but we must provide effectual and lasting sources to maintain a sufficiency of men who fight for glory, to a grateful country, and for a beloved king.

- (l) It would seem as if the leading men in America were no better geographers than other folks. Or perhaps their political organization is something like our own now a days, that every Province, county, borough and seaport town, have

ourselves protect Brasil, open the trade and explore the treasures of that invaluable, and to the shame of the civilized world, unknown country; (m) and

their provident patriots, and the state has none. The Mississippi and the Floridas in the hands of the French, by what route or conveyance are half the settlers in America to get to the sea? Nothing more simple, says Talleyrand, "by becoming French citizens."

- (m) To take possession of Brasil, would be, says honest John Bull, "an unjust thing, for the queen of Portugal has done us no harm." It might however not be amiss to inform him, that Portugal has forfeited Brasil and Goa, by exactly the same misdemeanor, that Spain and Holland lost *Trinadad* and *Ceylon*; unable to protect her capital, and certain that we would not do it for her, she committed her dominions to the discretion of the French republic. The first consul, perhaps not certain what the issue of his war in St. Domingo may be, knows, that charged as he is, with the government of France, it is his indispensable duty to secure for the republic, possessions sufficient to give her a preponderance by sea, proportionate to the rank he has given her on land; to do this, the most eligible country on the globe, is Brasil: and to have a plausible pretext to

then the spanish settlements, as well as the rest of the world, will have but little to apprehend from the naval power of France.

garrison that settlement, Bonaparte has, it is said, said, instructed his ambassador of peace, general Lasnes, to make a French *foot-men* quarrel with the queen of Portugal's prime minister, or rather with her majesty's *ministre de finance*. Now if our worthy neighbour get once possession of Brasil, he will, very soon after, make our credulous cockneys buy their rum and turtle, their sugar and muslin, at Bourdeaux and Rouen!

Amongst our definitions of political morality, the following answer of the late empress of Russia to a Polish bishop, might, on some occasions, make an useful ingredient. Prior to the final partition of Poland, a prelate, of high rank in that country, endeavoured to convince Catherine II., that the monarchical republic of Poland was a sovereign state, independent of all other earthly power; and that there was an injustice in her majesty's proceedings against it. The empress answered, "Reverend father, if Poland was an independent state, you would not have been here to intercede for it. As it is, you can give me no security, that your country will not fall under the dominion of those

To conclude the first part of these sketches, in as far as they relate to France and Russia, we shall now only observe, that as these two great continental monarchies were seen to improve their national consistence at home, and to extend their political influence abroad, it should have been the most invariable system of Great Britain, as it was the sacred duty of her government, to have directed all the power and influence of the British nation, towards the support and augmentation of the lesser states of Europe, whose situation was such, as could warrant the possibility of their being rendered permanent. These were, prior to the peace of Utrecht, *Holland, Spain and Austria*; and, until the capitulation of Nystad in 1721, *Denmark and Sweden* came under the same description. To raise and keep up the maritime states, to extend their dominions at home and their possessions abroad, should

"who may one day attempt to disturb the peace
"of my people. To care for the present, and
"to provide for the future safery of this empire,
"the Almighty has imposed upon me the heavy
"duty of a sovereign; and you know, reverend
"father, that to the accomplishment of our di-
"vine mission, all earthly considerations must
"give way."

have been our peculiar care; their interests were our own, and upon our prosperity depended their existence. This sort of policy was however too wide, and its principle too liberal for our contracted views; the spirit of commerce seldom looks beyond the prospect of immediate gain; instead of guiding, as the legislature should have done, the national spirit of commercial enterprise, towards the consolidation of the British empire and the independence of Europe, the British government itself has long been influenced by the narrow projects of mercantile speculation: thus we have lost our natural maritime allies without having gained a *nutmeg* by their fall. On the contrary, instead of having encreased the sources of our commerce, wealth and power, we have greatly declined; the powers of the British empire, compared to those of France alone, bear a far less proportion now, than they did a hundred years ago; when compared to those of France and Russia, united our inferiority appears still more alarming.

However, although the secondary powers of Europe, and amongst them our maritime allies, are subjugated, or rendered dependent upon France and Russia, the world must not be given up for lost. The Russian nation cannot yet have forgotten

what it owes to the glorious memory of its great founder and to that of Catherine II. Nor can the court of Petersburgh compromise the dignity of a sovereign and so far divest royalty of honor, honesty and of all the attributes of a legitimate government, as to countenance the crimes of the rulers of France. Besides, Great Britain herself, now brought to the alternative, *tamely to submit to the domineering spirit of France, or, to unshackle the natural vigour of the nation by adopting a liberal system of politics,* may yet confine the dominion of those rapacious republicans within such frontiers as may secure the peace of the world. In extraordinary cases, to use extraordinary means is not only lawful, but it is a duty. In the present political state of the civilized world, France is in Europe already too powerful; it is therefore, the duty of all other powers, and of Great Britain in particular, to prevent that republic augmenting its force by the acquisition of foreign settlements. If the courts of Lisbon and Madrid cannot be roused up to a sense of the duty they owe to the great commonwealth of polished nations, their possessions must be taken from under the leaden hands of their torpid governments and made subservient, as nature designed them, to the happiness of mankind and

to the independence of Europe; likewise, those luxuriant countries, that may be said to groan under the chilling authority of that monstrous government of Turkey and the Barbary states, should forthwith be appropriated to the same beneficial purpose.

Instead of that common place phrase *balance of power* which never existed but on sheep-skin treaties, Great Britain has yet the means to raise, in Europe, in America, and on the ocean, such powers as would establish a real balance or barrier, which all the force and frantic rage of disappointed jacobinism could never break down. Then we would have no need to proclaim ourselves the saviours of Europe! A grateful world would do it for us.

It should however not be forgotten, that we have only *one* alternative now remaining; to wit, to consign our children and the nation to a state, of all others the most repugnant to the feelings of men and the most degrading to human nature, — that of a *subordination to the French*: or, to break through those contemptible formalities which bind the hands of government and render all the glorious efforts of our irresistible powers of no effect.

Are the king of Spain and the prince of Brasil, *as Vassals to Bonaparte*, more related to us, than

were the king of Sardinia and the prince of Orange who both fought our battles? And is the correspondence of the Grand Signor, of the emperor of Morocco and the dey Algiers with the first consul less hostile to our interests than that of the nabob of Arcot was with Tippoo Sultan? What are Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Morocco to us, when compared to the safety of the British empire? or what are all our miserable calculations on financial economy compared with British liberty?

Rather than risk the possibility of ever being obliged to acknowledge a superior on earth, our last shilling, the movable property of the empire the *national debt*, and if necessary the blood of our *darling children*, must be to Britons no consideration.

Postscript.

It is positively asserted, that, at this moment the consuls and several of the leading members of the government are divided in their opinions on the following serious questions viz:

1. Whether, to maintain the peace of Europe and secure the tranquility of the republic, it be not expedient to proceed forthwith to the incorporation of *Holland* and *Switzerland* with France?
2. Whether it be not the commercial and political interests of the republic to proceed to the execution of certain conditions of her convention with Spain, *to wit*, to incorporate the kingdom of Portugal with the Spanish monarchy, and to put France in possession of the provinces of Biscay, Catalonia, Valencia and the island of Minorca?

3. Whether the safety of the Turkish empire doth not require that France be put in immediate possession of such posts in that country as may enable the consulate to fulfil its engagements with the Grand Signor?

The opinion of one party is, that to carry those measures into execution, so immediately after the peace, might be a dangerous temerity. Others pretend, that the present is the most favourable juncture that ever can be expected to occur. The king of England, say they, is of a certain age, and tired of war; the British ministry wish to maintain the peace which they have made; the emperor of Russia is a pacific prince, intent upon the internal improvement of his own vast dominions; and there are no other powers who can in any manner interfere. Besides, a change of ministers may take place in England, and that circumstance may change the measures of the court of Petersburgh. This auspicious moment must therefore not be lost.

Should it really be attempted to carry those measures into effect, we do not see any probability of preventing the accomplishment of them. Russia and Great Britain are the powers most immediately interested, and they are the only powers that yet possess

the means of action; but acting in opposition to one another, or while they do not act in perfect accord, and as if directed by one soul, Bonaparte may laugh at their *manoeuvres*! Great Britain cannot prevent general Lasnes placing himself in the regent's chair at Lisbon; nor can Russia hinder General Brun to plant the three coloured standard on the ruins of the castle of *Corinth*.

In the foregoing sketches, we said, that France and Russia would probably proceed *conjointly* from the division of Europe to that of Asia; intervening occurrences, however, begin to convince us, that the consulate no more intend any real partnership with the emperor of Russia, than they do with the emperor of Morocco. In their political *manifestos*, they use the name of that virtuous prince, as they do that of the Pope in their religious harangues. In their politics they wish to impose upon mankind; in their religion they make no scruple to insult heaven.

We would not be understood as wishing, by what we have advanced to insinuate any desire for a renewal of hostilities. On the contrary, Great Britain destitute of friends abroad, still labouring under the effects of

the late obstinate expensive war, and considering the inconsequent manner in which she generally *begins* to arm and to act, we are convinced that war could not at this moment, produce any sort of benefit. St. Domingo subdued by France, (*) Malta and the Cape given up, for what go to fight? To lose the possessions we yet retain? Acting upon our principles, or as we may rather say, without any fixed principles, we can have no prospect of making useful conquests; nor can we pretend to check the operations of France in any quarter. Our navy is yet preponderant, there is no doubt; but will the republic send out her fleets for the *mere purpose* of fighting? Certainly not! To defend and secure her settlements abroad, her troops are already sent out, and those settlements are such as can maintain troops sufficient to preserve them. Our navy may, therefore, plough the ocean, as long as the people of England can provide for it; but the hero of Maringo has sworn upon the seals of his triumphal treaty of

(*) That Briton who could yet advise his sovereign to prevent the final subjugation of St. Domingo to France, would merit of his country, a statue of solid gold, as large as Hercules.

Amiens, that its contact with the land shall hereafter depend upon his will and pleasure. (*)

Although we sincerely wish the continuance of peace, and are by no means sanguine in our expectations in case of war, yet, there is one consideration which we must avow should absorb all others; that is, the possibility of being obliged to defend our own territories. A defensive war is a dreadful malediction, it is all loss and no gain. The most brilliant exploits are terrible disasters, and success is only a momentary respite. A nation once attacked can never more command peace, nor enjoy security. Besides, the British nation is, the one half, composed of merchants mechanics and manufacturers, professions, which of all others, qualify men the least to defend their country. In offensive war, such men will perform wonders, but where there is no prospect but the danger of life and property, to save these, they will make peace (perhaps run

(*) We do not believe, that it is within the view of the present rulers of France to be able to raise a navy equal to the maritime force of Great Britain in its present state; but they will endeavour to cut off the sources of our trade, so as to reduce our navy, as they raise their own.

away). Our enemies have calculated all those matters, and wherever they are allowed to attack, they conceive the battle won. At all events, to risk a defensive war at home, or in our settlements abroad, is, in our simple opinion, to lead the state near the brink of inevitable ruin.

However, although the combined powers of France and Russia have now certainly assumed a formidable attitude, yet when we reflect upon the sources of the British empire, and the public spirit of the nation and that these are under the management of an intelligent firm and vigorous administration all apprehensions of public danger vanish.

NB. We are sorry to see that many of the observations in the foregoing sketches, which were written sixteen months ago, are daily realizing.

Paris 1 March 1803.

THE SECOND PART
of these
SKETCHES;

Will contain a general view of the politics and diplomatic history of Great Britain, from the peace of Utrecht to the present year of the French consulate.

1. Remarks on our double negotiations in France and Holland, prior to the treaty of Utrecht. How far in that treaty we deviated from the dictates of sound policy and sacrificed the honor and interests of the nation. When the government was again settled by the accession of George I. we should have adopted a system to raise the House of Austria to the head of the German empire, with hereditary succession — to extend the Frontiers of the united provinces to Coblenz, Luxemburg and Dunkirk, to maintain and extend the possessions of that republic abroad — to have pursued with unremitting perseverance the acquisition of the Havanna, Carthagena and the Brasils, Great Britain should have enabled Denmark and Sweden to maintain the independence of the Baltic, and we should ourselves secured the freedom of the Mediterranean.

2. Remarks on the general policy we followed viz: to confine the House of Austria to defensive operations, whereby the German empire has been lost, Europe subdued and Asia exposed. To ruin the maritime power of Holland and thereby put all the maritime ports and naval power of Europe in possession of France — to raise the House of Brandenburg upon the wrecks of Germany, until we enabled Prussia to secure the acquisition of the electorate of Hanover, Mecklenburg &c. and in conjunction with France to exclude Great Britain from all commercial and political relationship with the continent of Europe — to give up at every peace all such con-

quests as we might have maintained for ever; and retain such only, as were not susceptible of being defended. Whether Indostan and Jamaica be more secure than North-America and the Floridas were &c. Whether in our political calculations on the balance of power in Europe we did not put all the real weight in the scale of our enemies and forgot Great Britain.

3. Remarks on the peace of 1763, on the rapidity with which France raised her marine. From 1775 to 1780 inclusive she built 50 sail of the line and near as many Frigates and Sloops not observed by Great Britain. On the peace of 1783, no sooner signed than France set about organizing her means to drive the English from Asia; the negociation of the court of Versailles with other powers on that subject, samesfully looked over by the British government, which might have, then (1785 to 1790) confined France to Europe for ever, raised Holland and secured Austria. Our miraculous delivery by the peace of Paris fresh in our minds, why we did not, when in our power secure the state is remarkable, accounted for.

4. Quarrel with Spain about Nootka-Sound political, a noble occasion to have rendered the imperial sway of Great Britain permanent on the ocean. Cuba, Carthagena and California should have been the price of peace. Proposition of a party in the court of Madrid to give for Gibraltar the Spanish part of St. Domingo, Ceuta Tangier and the kingdom of Fez in Africa, remarks thereon. Extracts of the conferences of our negotiator then at Madrid!!

5. Quarrel with Russia in 1789-1790 unnecessary but when a quarrel, it should have been settled with honor: shameful compromise; conduct of Mr. Fox & Comp. on that occasion; remarkable indecision of Mr. Pitt; sunk the reputation of the British government abroad, alienated the courts of Berlin, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Petersburg and Constantinople from the interests of Great Britain. Public men should scrupulously perform whatever they Promise

good or bad; and they should never fail to carry their threats and menaces into regorous execution, even at the expense of half the kingdom; since our convention with Russia in 1791 no foreign state has placed confidence in Great Britain; remarks on that transaction, singular in its kind. Inconsequence and servility of public men. Catharine II. her pleasantry on that occasion.

6. Death of Joseph II. consolidated the Prussian monarchy, changed the system of Europe and the continental interests of Great Britain; Prussia should then have been reinforced and rendered independent of France.

7. French revolution, the policy of Great Britain, what it should have been, a firm adherence to a rational system of monarchy, at the head of which to have supported the king; when that failed, to have drawn forth in a manly manner the whole force of the British nation to raise our maritime empire above the reach of future rivalry — Every European state whose independence became problematical and which we could not protect, was to be considered as at enmity with us, and its colonies, or other possessions were by the right of self preservation our property, or at our disposal — when Holland could no longer be protected it should have been given to Prussia — Spain subdued, Portugal could not be preserved, their possessions abroad should have therefore been disposed of to such powers as were secure and independent, these would have become our permanent and faithful allies — the naval power of Holland and Spain under the command of France, Russia should have been brought into the Mediteranean, America into the gulph of Mexico, and the Danish and Swedish navies encreased by additional colony trade — from a number of naval powers, Great Britain could never have any thing to apprehend — the naval power of continental Europe and the trade of America in the hands of France alone may prove inconvenient — inferior to France, Great Britain cannot subsist — sacred duty of government to seize every

occasion to secure our superiority — At this moment we are bona-fide inferior.

8. Armed neutrality — causes of; northern war, instigators of. — Remarks upon the British diplomacy at Petersburg, Berlin, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Hamburgh; intelligence candour and Gentleman-like conduct of some — their negotiations, manner and style of their memorials — the official ignorance and insolence, contemptible awkward intrigues and fallacious reports of others, — their ridiculous and disgusting indecencies, made themselves detested and their country hated by foreigners. — Several remarkable instances particularised — the whole substantiated by facts. The part acted by Prussia — invasion of Hannover — effects upon the politics of the British cabinet — conduct of certain men on that occasion analyzed — manly conduct of some, servility of others — relationship of Hannover and Great Britain — remarks on the regency of that electorate — conduct during the late war — interior administration, — with particulars in as far as concerns the public interests of Great Britain. Conduct of the prince royal of Denmark, noble, candid and Prince-like, the affair of Hamburgh explained, the reproach which prejudice, ignorance and ill will attempted to throw upon the Danish army employed on that expedition vindicated by impartiality and truth. Affair of Copenhagen — consequences produced and those yet to come — explained. — Conduct of Sweden — character of Gustavus Adolphus. — Unmanly conduct of Great Britain towards that young sovereign, critical state of Sweden — explained. — Tragical death of the emperor of Russia, manner of, particularised — most unfortunate event for Europe, — explained — Sensation it created in the several courts of Europe, particularly at Berlin — behaviour of some English official-men on this occasion exposed — little knew what their country had lost. — Remarks on a late transaction at Vienna relating to the same subject, to which we were personally witness. — Character of Paul I. — His principles on the politics of

the times — His veneration for the king of England — personally witness to, on several occasions why irritated — by whom — what those merited — how rewarded — How sovereigns are sometimes imposed upon, several recent instances passed under our own eye particularised — certain effects inevitable — the ignorance, or design of some official men exposed — why — necessity of.

9. Peace of Amiens — an analysis of its merits — the real and pretended causes that led to its conclusion the characters, capacity, address and reputation of the negotiators on both sides — Europe astonished to see the name of Lord Cornwallis on the catalogue — the conferences, word for word in detail — remarks on the sagacity political knowledge and elocution of his Lordship's assistants illustrated by a number of examples — mentioned because foreigners draw inferences — were witness on several occasions — Opinion of cool impartial men in Paris, remarks on a most libelous accusation of Bonaparte on his approbation of a monument for Jean d' Acre wherein he makes the English better calculators and more cunning than the French — The state in which Great Britain stood prior to the signature of the treaty, compared to that into which she sunk by that signature — no remark — the state in which France was prior to the peace, impartially compared to that wherein she is now — the means her present situation affords her to rise higher. Bonaparte's intrigues and conventions at foreign courts during the negotiation — effect of the peace on the other powers of Europe and America — these powers not in the interest of France tho' inimical to Great Britain — why, explained. — The arrogance of the consulate accounted for — remarks upon Bonaparte's system of turning all the measures of the British government into public ridicule — effects — his momentary mimicry of certain measures reasoned for — from good authority in Paris — his project of colonizing the coast of Barbary — not to leave a port nor anchorage to the British flag in the Mediterranean — offered by the Jews of Barbary

and Morocco for a French army to revolutionize those countries, 40 millions of piasters — the inevitable consequence — no remark. Consulate acting on the same principle since the peace of Amiens which was laid down by the cabinet of Versailles at the peace of 1783 — to ruin Great Britain ere she can recover her finances — remarkable vigour and decision of Bonaparte's measures — their almost certain success owing to the stupidity of other powers — the more remarkable, as the present situation of the consul is such, that he could not dare to oppose any *firm proceeding* of the British government — Advantage of occupying the public mind with great undertakings — of making believe that France is the first power in the world. — Danger of the British empire, should the national spirit be allowed to sink — a speculation of the consulate — Parisian remarks upon an English Lord *ambassador* to Bonaparte while, the consul honours his — George with a subaltern officer as *minister* — upon the courtesey made by the *ambassadress* to the late queen, compared with her Grace's reverences to Madam Bonaparte Observations of the last lady on the pliancy of courtiers in general, — on the base servility and awkwardness of English nobility in particular — the prostration of such royalist Dutchesses, before his *present wife* determined the consul to refuse the hand of a princess. Jacobin policy of these court pleasantries heartily laughed at by our merry plenipotentiaries; several English sickened by the littleness of our representation — We did not go near him because we wished to see and speak only with the people of Paris, and were told we would be no better received by this introduction. — Found a similar impediment at Stockholm in 1798 — where the British minister could introduce his country men to an Irish sugar planter from St. Croix, but into no other house — Remarks at Petersburgh, Dresden and Vienna, met gentlemen-like men who where respected by foreigners — remarks. — Advised not to go near the minister at Berlin — in 1798 why.

10. An account of all the public and private negociations of

the court of England with the continental powers of Europe, from the peace of Utrecht to this time; with a sketch of the characters who have filled our missions abroad from the nominations of *Jeffreys*, *Carteret* and *Bassewitz* in 1718-1719 to that of M—r. to the Swiss patriots in 1803. The parts acted by our diplomacy at Paris the Hague and Madrid, between the peace of 1763 and the war of 1778 particularised their astonishing stupidity and willing blindness — causes of. — At Stockholm in 1772 — at Petersburgh in 1779-82 — exposed. Intrigues at the Hague — in the Netherlands — at Berlin during the troubles in Holland and insurrection in Brabant, exposed, and reprobated as unworthy of the British nation, authenticated by facts. Terrible consequences foretold by the late king of Prussia but spurned at in England. — Negotiations at Madrid and Petersburgh in 1790-1791 analyzed — ill conducted and disgracefully settled — characters and ability of the negotiators set forth from facts — honourable mention of Mr. Fawcett — pity he accepted such a mission as that he had to Petersburgh — consequences to the honor and interests of Great Britain shewn. An authentic list of the ministers, public and private agents, civil, military and recruiting commissioners employed by Great Britain during the late war — an exact statement of the expense incurred by them — honourable conduct of some — insignificance of others, reprehensible behaviour of several — baseness of many, particularized and substantiated by facts acquired at the courts where they resided. Remarks on *espionnage* — of all diplomatic vices the blackest — the man capable of being himself a spy, or of employing one, should never be in the service of the public — every honest man will stake his life for the benefit of his country, but he, who to save the state, can compromise his honor is not worth an exile at Botany-bay — several such exposed — to protect such gentry extremely impolitic — betrays a weakness of the state, or the means on the part of its rulers — Is a government

that wants the support of spies worth protecting? — Prior to the revolution, the French were all either spies or culprits; fate of the monarchy an example to others. Remarkable how rare we find an intelligent sensible man belonging to British missions abroad — some exceptions named. English gentlemen who wish to be respected by foreigners dare not now be introduced by the minister of their country at foreign courts — several remarkable instances in Italy, at Berlin, Stockholm and Copenhagen, lately at Paris. *For the sake of common decency Hamburg is passed over*, for these ten years past every Englishman abroad is taken for a spy — why, explained. Ludicrous anecdotes of several of our official men abroad — their pitiful figure amongst the French — in Russia &c. some curious examples to be regretted make the nation be held up to contempt — danger of giving foreigners a mean opinion of the nation. Men of independent, spirit, honor, candour and common sense only, should be appointed to the public service. The man who can descend to ask the place should never be employed except on public labor. — The emoluments of office a base consideration. Has not old England yet patriots to fill the public functions of the state on more noble conditions? — Yes while *noble* men can, consistent with honor and integrity, accept public functions. — Prior to the revolution of France integrity, candour, honor and birth had abandoned that devoted court — inferences drawn from a train of notorious circumstances.

11. Subsidy system examined, absurd in itself — nugatory in its effects — never produced any benefit to Great Britain, but caused much evil, demonstrated. Remarks on our commissaries attached to the army in general — with the foreign troops in British pay in particular. — Astonishing abuses — baseness beyond the conception of any honest man exposed — immense fortunes collected — by whom, number of facts authenticated to be laid before Parliament. Anecdotes respecting the transportation of the British and emigrant troops from the Weser and the Elbe to England. — Danger of beginning reforms in the lower offices — the higher departments should first be purged.

12. Opinions of the most distinguished officers on the continent, on the bravery of British soldiers — on the usual administration of our army — on the improvements introduced by the present commander in chief — that were his royal highness provided with ample means, he would make the British troops the best army in

Europe — that a *British army* must finally check the progress of France, or Europe is undone! Great advantage of a prince at the head of an army if he has power to act — destroys jealousy the curse of all military operations. Justice has not been rendered to the merits and services of the Duke of York — why — explained to his honor. — Striking contrast between the noble bravery and dignified candour of our military and naval officers — and the general reputation of our civil characters — Conclusion —

Remarks on the internal state of Great Britain and Ireland — decline of national spirit — of attachment for the government — on the frequent insurrections in the navy — army — conspiracies — discontent amongst manufacturers and others — Danger of suffering insurgents and traitors to carry the sympathy of the public with them to the grave, — emigrations — causes of — notorious — fighting in vain, and government more occupied in taxing than in promoting national improvement. — Singular unanimity in parliament — leads to what — is opposition knocked down by the wisdom and vigorous measures of government — or is government come round to the opposition — a most serious question. Danger of reforms being attempted by a weak parliament — if carried through upon the principles of opposition to the court the monarchy is lost! Statement of the British capital invested in the French and Dutch colonies given up at the peace — immense — will never return — nor any part of its produce — draws more of our capital abroad with those who on account of their interests in the said colonies will settle in France and the Netherlands. British exports to the markets yet open to the colony produce and manufactures of Great Britain, will in the year 1804 diminish by seven millions sterling — why — explained and proved. — Will after 1804 be regulated by the will or caprice of the consulate — effects — may be prevented — most certainly. Rather than risk the failure of his present Projects in America the West- and East-Indies, Bonaparte will yet agree to any thing. — This crisis will however not be of long duration. If lost will near return.

Thoughts on the national debt — its abolition, the panic would be momentary — the effects would raise the British empire to the head of the world, inspite of Bonaparte — if continued, Custom-house registers and Sinking Funds will themselves sink — other measures necessary. On smuggling whether the laws that make smug-

gling a lucrative trade be not more detrimental to the state than the evasion of them — Pity the British navy should be employed to hunt the property of British merchants, and that British naval officers must be assimilated to *excisemen*! Will smuggling such of our bonafide property as cannot be entered ever be considered a moral crime? — Should punishment be inflicted where there can be no conviction of moral guilt? — every such stripe breaks a sinew in the state. Honesty and candour are the natural and most noble attributes of Englishmen — allow them to enjoy these and they will never dissemble. Were the pestiferous crew of revenue officers sent to hard labour, every Briton would with a generous warm heart pay his quota of the necessary expense of government, and his nervous arm would bid defiance to foreign foes. We have no personal animosity at exise, or other revenue officers, they never injured us individually for a groat. But as soon as we can, we intend to lay an exact statement of their legal and illegal expense on the public before parliament. We have already upwards of 1100 cases of grievous impositions and connivance. Would an association, for Brasil and Indostan, take up the national debt? — the operation would enable government to maintain these two empes — Indostan cannot be maintained if other possessions be not secured, with it, must fall the national debt &c. — Not the want of means but timidity and indecision loses all great states. — Great Britain yet possesses the means to raise her, where to be any thing, she must be the unrivalled sovereignty of the Ocean, and that implies the umpireship of the world.

When his present Majesty ascended the throne of these realms Great Britain stood high in the political world acknowledging neither superior nor equal. — The peace of 1763 raised France from that state of inferiority into which the vigour of his majesty's councils and the valour of his arms had reduced her: — the use made of this indulgence was on the part of France natural and political — she obliged Great Britain to accede to the peace of 1783. — which, but for the insignificance of the cabinet of Versailles at the time, would have been the last deed Great Britain, as an independent state, would ever have signed. — An extraordinary man saw the perilous situation of his country — snatched her from almost evident ruin — repaired her finances restored her vigour — and then raised her to an eminence of powe and grandeur which no nation had ever attained,

and to which a possibility of danger could never have reached. — The peace of Amiens placed the nation, in as far as relates to our own powers, where it was in 1803 — and relative to France, greatly inferior. Can Great Britain, *inferior to France*, subsist as a state? — No! — the French government must necessarily make use of its present superiority to prevent the possibility of future rivalry — we speak of an intelligent government. — To leave to his posterity the British empire, independent and at the head of the world, as he received it from his ancestors, must be the leading wish of our most gracious, good and universally revered sovereign — is that yet possible? — Yes. The means are staring us broad in the face, without risk, expense or bloodshed These are viz!

Issue orders to take immediate possession of the Havanna — Carthagena — Saldana-bay and district — Candia, Cyprus and Jean d' Acre. — Should the consulate remonstrate, if we can make no answer of our own, we may for the occasion borrow one of theirs to wit. — "*The treaty of Amiens, nothing but the treaty of Amiens.*" If Great Britain is not allowed to interfere in the affairs of continental Europe, France can have no pretension to interfere in our affairs out of Europe. Nor can Bonaparte at this moment venture to remonstrate without exposing the republic to be forever confined to Europe: Should he attempt to oppose us, where could he act? in Portugal, in that case Brasil is ours, so is then Paraguay and Peru; and all his projects in America, St. Domingo &c. instantaneously vanish. Will the consul, either direct or through Russia, attack Indostan? certainly he will if we do not by the above or similar measures prevent him. Great Britain mistress of the Levant, Russia is her natural ally; we can then interweave the national interests of that power with our own, and yet reinforce Austria. By the Havanna &c. we secure the United States; our cause is theirs; and their case is similar to ours — if France succeed in America they are undone: if the consulate succeed in America and in the Levant we are ruined. Should the United States acquire Louisiana, the Floridas and Mexico, the better for us as a commercial state — and as a military consideration: While we can maintain a navy, we regulate the intercourse between America and Europe — a more permanent pledge of friendship with all states than any written alliance. Philanthropic remarks on the extravagance and injustice of these ravings. — Answer — Britons! if you do not confine the French to continental Europe they will confine you to your island.


Cowardly politicians will tell us, that such projects as we have mentioned should not be publicly talked about. If we ask why — because, say they, should they ever be attempted other powers will take measures to prevent their execution! A despicable consideration! Secret arms are of all others the most contemptible and the least available. Our expeditions to Porto-Rico — to Tenerif — to Holland — and to Ferrol, were all secrets; we wish they had remained so! The heroes of the peace of *Amiens* were applauded for the secrecy they observed during the glorious warfare of that negotiation — is there an Englishman living who could have wished it ever published? When a government has recourse to secrecy its sources of power will not long be formidable! That British soldier who offered to his disarmed antagonist, a sword before he would give him quarter, was worth to the nation a million of state secretaries. The man who can face his armed enemy will defeat him.


We would not be understood to insinuate any reflection on those brave officers who commanded the before mentioned expeditions; on the contrary — we are convinced that they would be the last men upon the globe who would wish to derive any advantage from secrecy or intrigues.


Remarks on the shameful quibbling about a few thousand pounds to the ^{Heer} apparent, while men who neither have, nor ever had the slightest pretension to birth merit, nor common honesty, are rolling in all the splendor of luxurious extravagance at the expense of an injured country.

* * *

The subjects we have mentioned, will be treated with perfect impartiality; we belong to no party but that of our country. We despise the man who from partial, or personal motives attempts to depreciate the measures of government; nor will we ever respect him, who for any consideration, can dissemble his sentiments when the interests of his country is the question.













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